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PREFACE
It is an undeniable fact that the issue of terrorism, both as a theoretical 
area of analysis and as a practical phenomenon, has grown exponentially 
in significance over the past few decades. Indeed, terrorism has for some 
time stopped being a term solely discussed in academic settings and in 
strategic documents, but has recently been introduced in our everyday 
lexicon in ways that are far more profound than in the past. Put more 
simply, in understanding the extremely intricate nature of today’s inter-
national affairs, the analysis of the concept and praxis of terrorism no 
longer belongs to an obscure area of study, and has developed into an 
urgent necessity, as a means of exploring how to respond to the phenom-
enon in an appropriate manner.
As the illustrative examples of the rise of al-Qaeda and Daesh and 
their expanded global landscape of terrorist attacks indicate, this dual 
realisation that terrorism has unequivocally become a part of our reality 
and that its analysis has become more urgent than ever is particularly 
true of what has been widely termed as “Islamic fundamentalist terror-
ism”. Due to the kaleidoscopic interests involved in it, the multifarious 
dynamics that have been at play in the region from which it has primarily 
originated, and the multiplicity of its actors, methods and cause, Islamic 
terrorism has come to the fore of our attention in spectacular fashion, 
necessitating consistent and rigorous analysis.  
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This book is focused precisely on this area. Covering a wide range of 
pertinent aspects and referring to the causal links and history behind this 
strand of terrorism in various countries of the world, this book intends to 
provide an in-depth look at the rise and evolution of Islamic fundamen-
talist terrorism. Divided into three parts, the first one focusing on the 
Middle East and Africa region, the second one on the recruiting methods, 
financing and propaganda instruments used by Islamic terrorist organisa-
tions, and the last part on the evolution of the phenomenon in a select 
few European countries, it attempts to answer some of the very basic 
questions surrounding this very important topic.
What are the causes behind the phenomenon? What are its principal 
methods of recruiting and financing? What are the primary challenges in 
designing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to tackle it? Why 
has it spread in the Middle East and Africa? What explains its presence in 
Europe? These are all relevant questions into which this book attempts to 
offer much needed insights, aimed to aid our shared understanding con-
cerning the past, present and future of Islamic terrorism. What is more, 
and perhaps more crucially, drawing from the analysis, it also provides a 
set of conclusions with a view to assisting the reader to better compre-
hend what is needed in order to minimise the future ramifications of this 
strand of terrorism and severely undermine its future dynamics. 
Foundation for European Progressive Studies 
and Fondazione Italianieuropei
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INTRODUCTION
Andrea Manciulli 
On January 7, 2015 a terrorist cell with al-Qaeda ties carried out an at-
tack on the editorial headquarters of “Charlie Hebdo”, and European 
public opinion deemed it the beginning of a new phase in the shared 
perception of the seriousness and unpredictability of the jihadist terror-
ist threat. This attack in the city of Paris was a watershed moment, effec-
tively marking pre- and post-Charlie Hebdo eras. Just a few months later, 
Europe and the entire world were shaken by other attacks in the city of 
Paris and elsewhere. This time Daesh militants claimed responsibility for 
what proved to be even bloodier and more violent attacks, and the effect 
on our perception of the terrorist threat was even greater. 
The most striking and upsetting part of the latest series of attacks 
carried out beyond Daesh’s territory was evidence of a precise strate-
gy carried out by men commanded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who views 
terrorism as but one potential bellicose option for fighting the West and 
enemies of the “self-proclaimed caliphate”. Furthermore, the assailants 
displayed military and tactical competency in the field, especially in the 
more recent attacks in Paris. If we examine the three most striking attacks 
as part of a series taking place over just a couple of days and beyond 
the territory claimed by the self-proclaimed Islamic State, we see how 
they had been launched against three symbolic enemies with the goal 
of sending a message well beyond the very victims of the attacks: Leba-
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non’s Shiite population, Russia and France. We must not underestimate 
the precise series of events taking place over a very short period of time, 
from the downing of the Russian airplane in Sinai to the massacre in Par-
is on November 13. Indeed, these attacks now show a change of pace 
on the part of Daesh and place us squarely in front of the reality of the 
situation and the type of war that we are fighting: a hybrid war in which 
the terrorist threat is one of the weapons used by our enemies in order 
to take the conflict beyond the confines of their territory, bring it directly 
into our home and create an atmosphere of terror in our communities.      
These attacks provide the necessary starting point for a more pro-
found and broad-ranging consideration not simply of the varied and com-
plex jihadist terrorist threat but rather of the type of conflict and the 
enemy that we are facing. Our efforts in the way of research and analysis 
are necessary to make our communities more aware of the risks that 
we face and to ensure that our politics, institutions and society are pre-
pared to appropriately meet this long-standing challenge. Presented to 
us some time ago and based on a well-delineated strategy, this challenge 
will unfortunately give life to a long and difficult battle. The provocation 
of jihadist terrorism targeting the international community is primarily 
tied to the present and future geopolitical order of the Arab world and to 
both the security of the West and the survival of the open and democrat-
ic model of our society. It is no coincidence that this challenge has once 
again arisen and been fuelled with renewed vigour and greater momen-
tum in the wake of the collapse of the 2011 Arab Spring and following the 
upheaval, produced by those traumatic events, that took place across the 
Middle East and along the southern coast of the Mediterranean. 
In order to more thoroughly understand the nature, the likely evo-
lution and the targets of the challenge that we face, it is necessary to 
probe and analyse the events that have taken place around us and to 
better understand their causes and progression. We must also increase 
our awareness of both the constantly changing nature of the situation 
that surrounds us, ranging from Afghanistan to West Africa, and the 
turmoil that prevails on our southern borders, which is much greater 
than Europe has truly been able to understand over time. Our atten-
tion must be focused on the threat before us and on its greater setting 
in an attempt to better discern the underlying scheme determining its 
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movement. While for some time the strategy has existed as clear as day 
and been recognised by experts in the field, it is now well known by 
many. It amounts to a project neatly structured in stages that seeks to 
determine the future order of the Middle East and Arab nations, and 
slowly but surely within the present international landscape of turmoil 
and rampant crises, this project is taking shape. The underlying strategy 
may essentially be traced to the document “Towards a New International 
Order”, written by Osama Bin Laden in 2004, in which we can discern 
the outline of a real, programmatic manifesto subdivided into a series 
of stages. Codified in a consequential logic, these stages set the goal of 
ultimately building a new global world order and founding a political 
entity in the Middle East that is capable of overthrowing the present 
regimes and squaring off against the West. Even then the specific steps 
of the strategy foresaw that a first stage of intra-Arab conflict, both be-
tween Sunnis and Shiites and intra-Sunni, would be followed by a peri-
od of struggle against the Arab governments allied with the West and 
then specifically against Western governments. The goal of destroying 
the possibility of promoting democracy in the Arab world is the common 
thread in the second and third stages; in Bin Laden’s eyes the second 
stage is closely tied to the third, which is directed more broadly toward 
the West. Speeches dating to 1998 already demonstrate the al-Qaeda 
leader’s strong hope for crisis within those Arab states closely allied with 
the West, and he proposed inciting political and military instability in 
the countries surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, the principal objective 
given its religious, political and economic importance. The peninsula is 
home to one of the regimes most strongly tied to the West throughout 
history. Most importantly, however, it is the land of the holiest places for 
Muslims and the cornerstone of the potential new caliphate, the heart 
of the project for the new world order. According to this strategy, Sau-
di Arabia would be surrounded by intensely unstable situations to the 
north, east and south. As a result of a number events, such as the war in 
Iraq, the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria, these unstable situations 
have unfortunately materialised, offering tangible proof of the risk that a 
similar proliferation of battlefronts might not only pose a serious threat 
to the Arabian Peninsula but also force the West to intervene in very 
tumultuous circumstances, as theorised. 
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It is important to be aware of the other diverse fundamentalist 
hotbeds that are steadily opening up, which attest to the actualisation 
of this strategy. These areas range from Nigeria to Yemen and extend 
across the whole of North Africa and, more generally, along the south-
ern coast of the Mediterranean. They include the territory under siege 
in Syria and Iraq, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where 
unrest and violence are far from coincidental, and India, in which new 
groups affiliated with al-Qaeda are forming. When the battlefronts are 
multiplied, the enemy is effectively confused in its attempt to plan a 
strategic response, making it difficult to discern which instruments to 
use, the timeframe and the logistics of a potential counter operation. 
Considering the clarity of the strategy adopted by Bin Laden and of 
those who follow it, we see how our response appears less lucid, con-
fused at times, and insufficient to confront the institutional and political 
crises in the Arab world. Furthermore, it is not suited to confront the 
crises in our society, whose contradictions offer fertile ground for the 
growth of radicalism that is “homemade”, unorthodox and promoted 
on-line by today’s messengers of Daesh. 
Against this backdrop the unexpected rise of the self-proclaimed Is-
lamic State (or Daesh), due to to the way it came about and those who 
established it, has helped develop and accelerate the strategy of prolif-
erating the battlefronts and of assaulting the geopolitical layout of the 
Middle East, which has probably exceeded the greatest expectations of 
its very theorists. This is the case in spite of the fact that Daesh is some-
thing very different and separate from al-Qaeda. Unknown to most until 
the summer of 2014, Daesh has presented a new local and global threat 
that differs significantly from the al-Qaeda model. It is carrying out an 
actual hybrid war on several fronts, and terrorist attacks amount to just 
one of several methods of striking the enemy. Daesh has managed to 
grow and gain strength, above all, in recent years by taking advantage of 
both the setting in which it has operated, the so-called “Syraq” area in 
the midst of a civil war, and a series of errors (some even committed by 
the West) beginning with the decisions made in Iraq first by Paul Bremer 
and then by the Nuri al-Maliki government, which isolated the country’s 
Sunni minority, often in a sectarian manner. This was the opposite of the 
situation under the leadership of General Petraeus, who had actively in-
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volved the Sunni tribes in the Iraqi reconciliation. Lacking power or any 
role in society and in the country’s government, the Iraqi Sunnis did not 
oppose or obstruct Daesh’s claim as they could have. Contrarily, many 
Sunnis joined the ranks of its militias.  
In light of this turn of events, the ranks of Daesh leaders now include 
some of the most important representatives of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath 
party (confirmed by numerous analysts) and also secret service opera-
tives of the previous regime. Some of these men are thought to have 
come in contact with local jihadist radicals within Iraqi detention centres. 
They have made significant contributions to the creation of the power 
structure, the improvement of ties with local communities and the estab-
lishment of networks of tribal alliances throughout Iraqi territory under 
the control of Daesh. By capitalising on the Syrian crisis, they have man-
aged to breathe new life into the organisation founded by the notorious 
Jordanian terrorist al-Zarqawi, which was considered dismantled after his 
death, allowing it to reach its present levels and setting its ambitious goal 
not only of becoming a “state” but also of challenging the supremacy of 
al-Qaeda within the sphere of global jihadism. 
In the wake of the November 2015 attacks in Paris, Daesh poses a 
triple threat as protagonist of a new form of hybrid war. First of all, it is 
fighting for land and the establishment of a state in Iraq and Syria in a 
conventional and symmetrical war. Secondly, it is carrying out a full-scale 
media war on a global level. Finally, it is waging an unconventional war 
through the asymmetrical threat of terrorism. Along with these three 
military features there is the illusion invoked in the world of radical Is-
lam, which consists of the establishment of a “pure” Islamic State and a 
return to the historically symbolic caliphate. The caliphate is promoted 
as the cause that Muslims must dedicate themselves to (and not solely 
as fighters), and in this way it distinguishes itself from the model and 
methods that al-Qaeda had adopted on the Afghani and Iraqi fronts. 
Moving beyond the prevalently global but identifiable terrorist strategy 
followed over time by al-Qaeda, Daesh has changed the nature of the 
conflict by becoming the principal player in this new hybrid war that is 
complex and well structured. It has declared its intention of creating a 
state with administrative control of its territory and its own government, 
which it aims to support through the recruitment of not only soldiers but 
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also engineers and experts in other fields. Its marked improvement in 
the field reveals connections with the new international order strategy, 
which allow us to understand how these events are proceeding along a 
defined path towards the realisation of a new order. This is presumed 
to consist of the creation of an Arab state that has the makeup of an 
international power capable of posing a great challenge to the West. As a 
sovereign state, it will play a role in international politics, call one of the 
world’s most resource-rich areas its home and actively oppose the West. 
The result will be the establishment of a new caliphate that includes the 
holy sites of Islam and unites both political and religious engagement in 
its government. It will serve as a point of convergence for all Muslims and 
surpass al-Qaeda’s rigid and moralistic makeup.
Al-Qaeda saw itself as the leader of a global mobilisation of Muslim 
communities against secular control and attracted followers with reli-
gious rhetoric advancing the good of the ummah. Its members appeared 
as ascetic warriors seated on the ground in far-away caves, absorbed in 
study in libraries or even sheltered in remote encampments. Daesh, on 
the other hand, has the goal of seizing territory and creating a “pure” 
religious state capable of eradicating the Middle Eastern political borders 
created by Western powers in the twentieth century, beginning with the 
Sykes-Picot agreement. By doing so, it positions itself as the only political, 
religious and military authority for all Muslims throughout the world. It 
seeks to achieve its goal by preaching and creating proselytes “at the 
speed of the web”, motivating militants via the internet and through 
social networks and offering them short-term gratification and success. 
This success is achieved through active participation in the organisation’s 
scheme by following the tactics of striking the enemy and carrying out 
acts of terrorism. Savage violence is an effective instrument for intimi-
dating enemies and suppressing dissent. It communicates an absolute 
dominion over conquered territories whose unification under the same 
black flag is highly attractive to those who convert to a ground-breaking 
and mass Islamic movement.  
One area that presents the most intense challenge to the West 
is Daesh’s use of digital media. It has quickly developed skills in sev-
eral complex platforms, has a strong social media presence and offers 
“glossy” propaganda promoting the self-proclaimed caliphate. Indeed, 
Introduction 15
we speak of a “media war”, which is unconventional and part of the more 
widespread and complex hybrid war. The representation of jihadists is 
carefully studied and defined in order to attract converts and propagan-
dise the narrative of the realisation of the Islamic State. 
Al-Qaeda and Daesh have a relationship that is not fully consolidat-
ed and is rife with conflict and competition on some occasions yet also 
collaborative at times. In the meantime, the West finds itself in the mid-
dle of this relationship marked by methodological and “promotional” dif-
ferences. It is no coincidence, for example, that the early 2015 attacks in 
Paris and Copenhagen, for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility, indeed 
helped it reaffirm its existence by reclaiming its (declining) primacy over 
Daesh and transferring the resulting tension to us by means of a series 
of strategic attacks against a number of countries and symbolic targets. 
Let us consider the two attacks that greatly disrupted Tunisia, which 
was slowly managing to democratically rebuild itself; the country and its 
economy were substantially brought to their knees as a result. Symboli-
cally striking three distinct enemies of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, 
the targets of the November 2015 terrorist attacks are worthy of our at-
tention: a Shiite village in Lebanon, the Russian passenger jet and the city 
of Paris. The Shiites are fighting alongside Assad’s loyalist troops in Syria; 
Putin’s Russia was outwardly challenged as a result of its involvement 
against Daesh in Syria, and the downing of the Russian passenger jet also 
struck a blow at Egypt’s tourism system, which has been irreparably dam-
aged by the attack. Lastly, the West (Europe, in particular) and its lifestyle 
were struck by a genuine military attack on one of its most beautiful and 
populous capitals. The assault precisely targeted places that symbolise 
its social way of life: a theatre, the football stadium and crowded restau-
rants on a Friday evening. The Paris attack is changing our approach in a 
broader sense and not only concerning the terrorist threat. 
Thanks to its promotional strategy that stretches throughout the rad-
ical Muslim world and beyond, Daesh attracts male and female supporters 
who are thirsty for religious and social justice and a personal and collec-
tive raison d’être. They search for a sense of community different from 
that of the West, which does not seem able to integrate young people 
like them, often second- or third-generation immigrants ranging in age 
from 16 to 25 years old. They leave behind liberal European and Western 
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democracies in order to join the ranks of jihadist militias in Syria and Iraq 
after having been subject to unsophisticated indoctrination on the web, 
which makes them much different from the religiously knowledgeable for-
eign fighters of the 1980s in Afghanistan and of the 1990s in Bosnia. While 
in no way new, the greatly transformed foreign fighter phenomenon now 
concerns the West and the contradictions within our society.
The recruiting of foreign fighters once followed a more traditional 
path, but now the phenomenon is more complex, is tied to causes that 
are social and cultural in nature, and involves several European countries, 
not only France and Great Britain, but also the Scandinavian countries, 
the Netherlands and Belgium. In time Italy could also be increasingly af-
fected. With many thousands of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and 
Iraq, the phenomenon is on the upswing, and the protagonists are in-
creasingly younger individuals who come to embrace the jihadist cause 
principally through the internet. Tunisia ranks first in the number of for-
eign fighters while countries such as France and Russia also show high 
numbers. In the wake of the November 13 attacks in Paris, the phenom-
enon makes our future look increasingly worrisome and menacing as au-
thorities have discovered related networks in the outskirts of several Eu-
ropean cities, such as the municipality of Molenbeek in Brussels, which 
has proven to be a “strategic centre” of European jihadism. 
The new breed of terrorism we are facing is unpredictable and dan-
gerous by virtue of the global reach of Daesh’s call to arms and the dif-
ficulty of monitoring the threat, which can strike the heart of our cities. 
The agents of the threat can consist of “lone wolves” that are essentially 
individuals or cells acting autonomously and often striking random tar-
gets through unsophisticated means. The tragedy in California and the 
act of aggression by a deranged individual in the London underground 
fall into this category by which an individual armed with a kitchen knife 
turns deadly in a crowded area. The horrible “Knife Intifada” that has 
bloodied Jerusalem for months could set a trend in this case, and the 
single events and acts of aggression could engender an unmanageable 
copycat effect among the deranged admirers and unpredictable zealots 
of the jihadist cause. 
In the face of such a complex situation and dangerous threat, we are 
undeniably and urgently in need of a strategy capable of confronting the 
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current emergency, but such a strategy must also be projected toward 
providing feasible responses and alternatives in the future, because we 
will certainly face a long and technically hard-fought war that will likely 
require us to reconsider some of our most robust certainties. Europe will 
have to act in a unified way, finding a common strategy given the need to 
confront an articulate variety of threats that endangers its southern bor-
ders, jeopardises the security and development of the entire Mediterra-
nean area, and continuously gives rise to contradictions and new hazards 
within its borders. It will be necessary to act as quickly as possible to 
make political decisions and execute concrete actions that can tackle this 
challenge on the ground, not only in the places of origin of the jihadist 
threat but also in our home.
From this standpoint, regarding internal affairs, for example, the re-
cently approved antiterrorism decree in Italy, which is in line with similar 
measures enacted in Great Britain and France, was without a doubt a first 
important attempt to respond in a timely manner with the aim of prevent-
ing and suppressing these phenomena. The decree was consciously drawn 
up despite the inherent difficulty of enacting legislation dealing with a still 
evolving phenomenon. In Italy, from the time of its approval to the pres-
ent day, the new antiterrorism regulations have allowed security forces 
to intervene against types of cases that were previously non-existent, 
thus neutralising a number of threats. In addition to the new regulations, 
conceived and written in order to strike a blow at terrorism, its web mes-
sengers and its prospective volunteers, political action involving deradi-
calisation is also necessary to effectively confront this challenge. There is 
the possibility, for example, of examining several models currently being 
tested in Germany, where officials work with Islamic associations that deal 
with the phenomenon of radicalisation by providing services to families 
with at-risk members with the goal of deradicalising them.  
Finally, yet equally important, it will be necessary to review and im-
prove budgets and investments intended for our security and the devel-
opment of methods to prevent and suppress terrorism by following the 
indispensable process of strengthening our public security, intelligence 
and defence systems. Europe has the opportunity to overcome another 
significant challenge by succeeding in fostering real coordination and real 
collective cooperation in security and defence.
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The West is full of internal contradictions, some of which can wind up 
feeding widespread feelings of intolerance to the point of xenophobia and 
racism. Through their actions terrorists have the apparent goal of adding 
fuel to the fire of rancour and fear, which presents a battle that must be 
fought not only through appropriate security measures but also from a 
cultural standpoint. This is yet another cultural and societal challenge that 
must be met and overcome in our cities, in our suburban areas, in our 
schools and also in our institutions with a diverse and greater understand-
ing shared by all. The common good must be pursued in the face of threats 
of this nature, and partisan interests must be cast aside. Awareness of the 
seriousness of the situation is essential toward making timely decisions to 
benefit all citizens and safeguard our democracy. Public opinion will need 
explanations and effective communication of difficult decisions, some of 
which would probably have seemed unimaginable until only a few years 
ago. For this reason unity and awareness are necessary starting with poli-
tics and our institutions. The reaction in the wake of the events unfolding 
in Paris has been important, in particular the dramatic and collective rais-
ing of consciousness in the face of a multiform and ruthless enemy intent 
on changing our lifestyle and habits and instilling in us the fear that each 
moment of our existence might be at risk.
Daesh has launched a war against us on three fronts; it is societal, 
cultural, and also military and political. We must keep these three bat-
tlegrounds in mind with the understanding that the war cannot be won 
in our cities alone: it must also be fought at its source. Europe can do 
more to confront and defeat Daesh’s threat. The time has come to set 
aside fears and the national selfishness that clamorously emerged during 
the humanitarian crisis of Syrian refugees in 2015 in order to create a 
united front, together with the Atlantic Alliance countries, our partners 
on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and the Islamic countries 
that have been hit and threatened harder than us by Daesh. In this way 
we can overcome the challenge that lies before us and guarantee the 
future for the countries that are currently overwhelmed by civil war and 
terrorism. A European strategy is needed for our common security and 
also for the Mediterranean area and its development. 
This publication, which takes its cue from a collection of articles 
published by the journal “Italianieuropei” in July 2015, includes essays 
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by distinguished European and extra-European experts on the subject of 
jihadist-inspired international terrorism and its many facets and forms, 
its history and its evolution to the rise of Daesh. It aims to offer a contri-
bution to the European political dimension in order to devise a shared 
strategy to confront and defeat jihadist terrorism. This volume, whose 
authors we wish to thank, also offers a contribution toward defeating 
this challenge on the level of understanding and culture. Following the 
attack in Paris on November 13, 2015 and the resulting commotion, fear 
and anger that it triggered throughout the continent, Europe will have to 
emerge more unified. Certainly in the wake of the attack and, regrettably, 
amidst the fear that our enemy might carry out others, political Europe 
cannot surrender and must meet this challenge courageously. It is essen-
tial that we heighten attention and awareness and deepen our examina-
tion and understanding of the enemy not only to achieve military victory 
but also to assert, in this battle, the guiding principles of democracy by 
defending our security and the freedom of millions of European citizens.

PART I
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM:
FROM AFGHANISTAN TO LIBYA
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FROM THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
TO ABBOTTABAD:
THIRTY YEARS OF AL-QAEDAISM
Elisa Giunchi
It is now well known that the roots of al-Qaeda date back to the Afghan 
revolt against Soviet occupation and to the aid given to the mujahideen 
in the 1980s by the US and its allies. In the ensuing decade the organ-
isation broadened its goals and diversified its financing and means of 
fighting through a network of affiliated groups. The profile of al-Qae-
da recruits has also gradually changed. In recent years, al-Qaeda has 
progressively lost support and broken apart as a result of its lack of a 
constructive vision and of any prospect of statehood, and its increasing 
internal discord. The Islamic State has taken its place in its embodiment 
of jihadist ideals. By proclaiming the emergence of the caliphate, it has 
transformed what had been for al-Qaeda a generic reference into a pow-
erful means of recruiting.
Origins
The origins of al-Qaeda date back to the 1980s, when funding from the 
Gulf countries and the complicity of the West allowed tens of thousands 
of Muslim volunteers from various countries to travel to north-west Pa-
kistan in order to fight against the Soviets, which had invaded Afghan-
istan in 1979. In Peshawar and the surrounding area, volunteers were 
trained by Pakistani secret services so that they could fight beside those 
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mujahideen factions that were ideologically closer to their sponsors in 
the region, first among them Hezb-e-Islami. The more moderate factions 
or those not ideologically motivated were marginalised; others, like the 
Maoist movement, were decimated by a twofold repression at the hands 
of Kabul and the Islamist mujahideen.
The Afghan resistance, which was divided into an assortment of 
groups according to ideological, tribal and ethnic affiliations, had begun 
at the end of 1978 with support from Islamabad. In the summer of 1979, 
Afghan mujahideen had also begun to take advantage of non-military as-
sistance from the United States through a secret programme authorised 
by President Carter in April of that year, eight months prior to the inva-
sion of Afghanistan by the USSR. The United States, deeply concerned 
about the revolt against the Shah in Iran, hoped to weaken the govern-
ment of the communist and pro-Soviet PDPA (the People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan), which had gained power in Kabul in 1978 with a 
coup d’état and a platform of radical reforms. It was a dangerous strat-
egy, since the support to the mujahideen could potentially provoke an 
armed intervention by the Soviets. However, according to the National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and other representatives from 
the National Security Council and the CIA, “drawing the Russians into 
the Afghan trap” could have the effect of weakening them economical-
ly and hurting their image, consequently compromising their appeal, 
above all in the event of a conflict lasting “for a sufficiently long period”.1 
This is exactly what happened.
According to American rhetoric, in December 1979 the Red Army’s 
entrance into Kabul, after the victorious Iranian revolution, transformed 
Afghanistan into an “offensive wedge” for the Soviets2 that threatened 
the West’s “vital interests” in the Middle East. Inevitably, American sup-
port for the mujahideen became military in nature: in the following dec-
ade the United States and their European and Arab allies supplied the 
mujahideen with billions dollars’ worth of arms. The weapons, initially 
Soviet-manufactured in order to cover up American involvement, were 
purchased from several countries and transported by the CIA to the prov-
ince of Sindh. There they were taken by the Pakistani secret services, who 
distributed them in Peshawar to mujahideen factions that were recog-
nised by Islamabad. As noted previously, Hezb-e-Islami, the most fanatic 
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of the factions, gained the greatest benefit from this situation. The group 
had the advantage of being tied to Jamaat-e-Islami – an Islamist party 
allied with President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan – and of being 
in favour among the Saudis, who had been an important sponsor of Pa-
kistan since the 1970s. Several declassified documents show that Amer-
ican authorities were aware that Hezb was a radical party and strongly 
anti-Western. However, the agreement between the United States and 
Pakistan, which was vital to the success of the operation, was that Zia’s 
government would decide how to distribute the weapons. Ignoring Pa-
kistani priorities was not possible: its cooperation was key to success.
Between 1980 and 1990, Saudi Arabia, for its part, transferred ap-
proximately 4 billion dollars solely in official aid,3 which arrived through 
an account in Switzerland controlled by the CIA and was used in order to 
purchase arms in the international market. Fuelling the resistance were 
also private contributions, money collected from mosques, and proceeds 
from Shari‘a compliant finance. Around 1983 the Saudis began to pay 
for travel and lodging for militants from the Arab world and (though to 
a lesser degree) from other areas heading to Peshawar in order to take 
part in the jihad. There, in what Gilles Kepel called the bouillon de culture 
of al-Qaeda, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian supporter of global ji-
had, and Osama Bin Laden, who had been his student at the University of 
Jeddah, founded the Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK) around 1984. The organ-
isation provided meals, lodging and training for volunteers. Belonging to 
a rich Saudi family of Yemeni origin, Bin Laden also contributed his own 
personal funds to the Maktab. Thanks to his important ties, Bin Laden 
managed to gain additional financing for a cause that was widely shared 
in the Gulf and in areas connected to the Gulf: what was at stake was not 
only driving back Soviet aggression directed at a Muslim nation but also 
spreading Wahhabism throughout the world. This continued an enter-
prise begun by Riyadh in the 1960s through a variety of means, from the 
direct financing to governments to the construction of mosques and the 
circulation of Wahhabi texts.
The spread of Wahhabism (or Salafism, as nowadays the two cur-
rents are indistinguishable) had coincided with the growth of Islamic un-
rest in the cities of Middle Eastern countries at a time when Nasserism 
was losing favour. Islamism and Wahhabism shared some elements, like 
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the dichotomous vision of the world, the desire to return to a former 
idealised Islam, and the plan of applying Shari‘a. The latter was under-
stood as a strictly normative system resulting from a literalist exegesis 
of the primary sources of Islam and was meant, against any historical 
experience, to apply to every aspect of the public and private life of be-
lievers. However, in the domesticated form typical of the Saudi religious 
establishment, Wahhabism was politically quietist, while Islamism had 
the objective of subverting the status quo at the national level (with the 
removal of “impious” governments) and at the international level. In the 
MAK and then in al-Qaeda the anti-establishment activism of Islamism, 
which assimilates the themes and language of anti-imperialism, and the 
moral rigour and literalism of Wahhabism merged.
Developments in the 1990s
With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the central rea-
son of MAK had been achieved. Before leaving the country in 1989, Bin 
Laden transformed it into al-Qaeda (meaning “the Base”), which, ac-
cording to several scholars,4 owed its name to a database containing the 
names and contacts of militants who had poured into Peshawar. These 
jihadists could then be reactivated elsewhere, in other jihads. Many “Af-
ghan Arabs” returned to their countries of origin, fomenting violence 
against reformist intellectuals, Western tourists, government employees. 
This was the case with Egypt and Algeria, which experienced violence 
throughout most part of the 1990s. Militants also travelled elsewhere, 
including Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia, in order to overturn “impious” 
governments or chase away occupying forces. Afghanistan, in the mean-
time, with its agricultural economy mostly destroyed as a result of Soviet 
bombing, fell into a civil war between rival groups of mujahideen. The 
descent of the country into chaos was greeted with disinterest by the 
Western powers, which by then had won the Cold War, and by Osama Bin 
Laden, who had won the jihad against the Soviets.
The billionaire returned to Saudi Arabia and in 1990, when Sad-
dam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened Riyadh, he offered “his 
own” militants to the Kingdom. King Fahd preferred to rely on American 
military forces, causing a deep rift between the two: from that moment 
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onwards, Bin Laden became extremely critical of the Saudi royal family, 
accusing them of innovation (bid‘a), which in Wahhabi discourse is sub-
stantially equivalent to apostasy. In 1992, he was expelled and took ref-
uge in Sudan, where he attracted other militants and organised terrorist 
attacks in the Middle East. In 1996, he was expelled from Sudan due to 
mounting pressure from the United Stated and returned to Afghanistan 
under the protection of the Taliban, which had emerged from the Paki-
stani madrassas in order to re-establish order and impose Shari‘a in Af-
ghanistan. Already that summer, Bin Laden issued his first fatwa against 
the West: the “Declaration of jihad against Americans occupying the land 
of the two holy places”. In 1998, the year marking attacks on American 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, Bin Laden repeated his call to strike the 
United States and its allies in a new fatwa, which was followed in subse-
quent years by similar announcements. This time, however, the target 
was expanded to include not only US troops on Saudi land but all Amer-
icans and their allies, wherever they were, until the Masjid al-Aqsa (the 
main mosque in Jerusalem) and the Masjid al-Haram (in Mecca) could be 
liberated. The 1998 fatwa bore the signature not only of Bin Laden but 
also of other jihadists of different nationalities; among them was Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian doctor who had led the Egyptian Islamic jihad 
and who became Bin Laden’s right-hand man.
Financial support for al-Qaeda had in the meantime become more 
diversified, deriving increasingly from a large variety of investment 
schemes and business activities. Financial globalisation contributed to 
the globalisation of al-Qaeda, though the latter also relied on traditional 
methods, such as hawala, which cannot be easily traced. Al-Qaeda, like 
lesser organisations in other parts of the world – from the Taliban to al-
Shabaab – also developed ties with organised crime in the 1990s in an 
increasingly give-and-take relationship.
The southern and south-eastern areas of Afghanistan, in the mean-
time, became the primary operating base of the al-Qaeda network, 
which rewarded the Taliban through generous financial backing that al-
lowed the group to free itself from the exclusive protection of Pakistan. 
In Afghanistan militants trained by al-Qaeda and originating from a num-
ber of regions across the globe, including Chechnya, Xinjiang, and the 
Philippines, developed ties with like-minded organisations, and planned 
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attacks targeting the West. In 1993 a first attempt at striking the Unit-
ed States had failed: Ramzi Yusef, a Kuwaiti of Pakistani origin, who had 
earned an engineering degree in Wales, attempted to blow up the World 
Trade Center. Eight years later, on September 11, 2001, the World Trade 
Center was once again targeted; three airplanes struck the Twin Towers 
and the Pentagon while a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania, setting in mo-
tion operation Enduring Freedom a month later.
Al-Qaeda’s ideology
Globalisation, which has accelerated since the end of the bipolar inter-
national system, has allowed al-Qaeda to spread its ideas, form alliances 
with local groups, transfer funds, and communicate through a transna-
tional network that is sophisticated and, in some ways, impenetrable. 
It is primarily through the internet that the writings of Bin Laden and 
al-Zawahiri have spread. They consist of proclamations, interviews, trea-
tises, and fatwas that reveal an evolution of the notion of the enemy. In 
an initial phase, the enemy, as pointed out previously, is the American on 
Saudi soil; then the enemy becomes all Americans and their allies, includ-
ing civilians, who by voting and paying taxes share the responsibility for 
their countries’ foreign policy choices. Killing civilians is justified accord-
ing to the principle of reciprocity,5 which is unprecedented in classical 
political doctrine and even runs counter to the Qur‘an. This principle has 
also been cited by the Islamic State in the claiming of responsibility for 
the recent attacks in Paris.
Al-Qaeda’s writings express a variety of claims: the goal of estab-
lishing an Islamic state where Shari‘a would be applied is accompanied 
by a number of concerns. These include injustices suffered in Palestine, 
Kashmir, and Chechnya; environmental policies and consumerism of the 
West; despotic nature of Muslim governments; and the general malaise 
produced by global systems of government that impose themselves cul-
turally through the spread of immorality and godlessness beneath the 
cloak of human rights and the United Nations.6
Close examination of the texts reveals differences in style and, in 
part, in content in accordance with the target audiences. In statements 
addressed to the West, Bin Laden emphasises that the motive for the 
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confrontation with the West is essentially political and defensive in na-
ture: revenge is sought for “terrorist acts” perpetrated by the West, and 
Muslim territory occupied by infidels must be re-conquered. In writings 
addressed to Muslims, both Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri underline the im-
portance of an offensive jihad as a religious duty: it is necessary to fight 
the West because it is faithless, not simply because it occupies Muslim 
lands and murders Muslims.7
In any case, there is no room for compromise, nor is any form of 
coexistence with the infidel envisaged, contrary to well-established prin-
ciples of Islamic classic doctrine. Influenced by Qutb and subsequent 
activists, al-Qaeda’s jihad is an all-out, unremitting fight devoid of the 
limits and rules of bellum iustum formulated in the medieval period. It 
is aimed at all that goes against divine will, including democracy. Echo-
ing the words of Abdul al-A’la Mawdudi, who is the jihadists’ privileged 
point of reference along with Qutb, al-Zawahiri writes: “Whoever agrees 
[to give] the rights of legislation to anyone else instead of Allah makes 
him Allah’s equal in regard to the sovereignty of law-giving. And whoever 
makes another equal to Allah by giving him the sovereign rights is surely 
an infidel”.8 However, while Mawdudi had participated in the electoral 
process in Pakistan, like other ideologically similar movements ranging 
from the Muslim Brotherhood to Ennahda, for al-Zawahiri and Bin Lad-
en the rejection of participatory democracy is absolute inasmuch as it 
violates not only the principle of divine sovereignty but also God-given 
religious and gender distinctions and constitutes a mere imitation of the 
infidel. Nationalism is also accused of being alien to divine will, as it is 
based on ethno-linguistic identity, although al-Qaeda’s writings do betray 
a sense of Arab pride in several instances.
The militants
Despite al-Qaeda’s criticism directed at the perverse aspects of globalisa-
tion, the transnational jihadism that took shape in the 1980s is in many 
ways its product. Jihadists who joined al-Qaeda came from “modern”, 
urban areas, in which cultural confusion and socioeconomic disparities 
are more pronounced. They were familiar with the West (often through 
direct experience) and had transnational families and lives. They were 
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citizens of the world yet belonged to no country. They were uprooted, 
without any clear cultural affiliation, and alienated. They did not iden-
tify with their parents’ Islam, which was watered-down by tradition 
and perceived as not “modern”, nor did they identify with the “official”, 
state-sponsored version of Islam.
Since the 1990s, jihadist ideas have also attracted increasing num-
bers of radicalised young individuals living in Europe who are second- 
generation Muslims and, more recently, converts. Both have no personal 
history of devotion or religious activism and are disaffected by their par-
ents’ culture and confused by contradicting messages. Lacking nuances, 
Salafi Islam is a simple form of Islam that rejects classic Islam’s pluralism 
and bases itself on selected elements of the primary sources (the Qur‘an 
and the prophetic Sunnah), which are decontextualised and read literally. 
It is, therefore, an easily to manage tool-kit that attracts individuals with 
limited knowledge of Islam and in need of a normative system that, con-
trary to classic Islam, is structurally rigid and lacks nuances and spiritual-
ity. Salafi Islam also provides a grand narrative and a strong identity that 
unites all the other identities while also submerging them. 
After 9/11
As operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, al-Qaeda’s lead-
ership sought refuge in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), 
tribal areas adjacent to the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along the 
Afghan-Pakistani border. New attacks were devised here even if the 
planning became more decentralised. With greater frequency, al-Qaeda 
supplied funds and weapons to local groups that not only offered “man-
power” to carry out attacks but also helped to identify specific targets 
and particular operational strategies. It became increasingly difficult to 
distinguish one organisation from the other, and it was not uncommon 
for a group to declare its affiliation with al-Qaeda in order to gain greater 
prestige and financing even though its short-term goals were quite dif-
ferent. A prime example is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant 
who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 2004, he estab-
lished al-Qaeda in Iraq with the approval of Bin Laden, but their strate-
gic alliance began to experience difficulty soon after, when al-Zarqawi 
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appeared interested in fighting the Shiites more than in striking the “far 
enemy”, the al-Qaeda leadership’s top priority. 
In 2011, Bin Laden was killed by American special forces in the Pa-
kistani city of Abbottabad. But even before then al-Qaeda was no longer 
able to impose its own strategic goal (the pre-eminence of attacking the 
“far enemy”) on its affiliate organisations and had begun to break down 
into autonomous cells, while other groups showed a greater capacity to 
attract militants. These groups either had closer ties to local groups and 
responded to local grievances, as is the case with the Islamic State, or 
were able to offer goods and services to the population, as with Hamas 
and Hezbollah. Al-Qaeda, for its part, has no territorial control and seeks 
consensus only on an ideological level, without concern for the distribu-
tion of welfare and order. The organisation has no institutional blueprint 
that goes beyond perpetuating violence and upheaval. The writings of 
Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri include mention of the goal of creating “Islam-
ic states”, as do Qutb and Mawdudi, who wished to establish a political 
entity within the existing borders of the nation-state, but political and 
institutional details in this regard are absent. The caliphate, which is not 
even mentioned in the fatwas of 1996 and 1998, appears as a far-away 
and barely sketched-out ideal. It is presumed to develop from the expan-
sion and union of a number of Islamic states, but nothing is mentioned 
concerning its specific structure. The call for the caliphate becomes more 
frequent only after the occupation of Iraq in 2003. Like the liberation of 
Palestine, which is mentioned for the first time in the 1998 fatwa, the 
call for the caliphate seems part of a strategy aimed at gaining greater 
consensus and attracting recruits, but remains in the background. 
In 2013, al-Qaeda’s vague call for a caliphate was transformed into 
a reality by al-Baghdadi, who proclaimed the emergence of a suprana-
tional entity that eliminates the boundaries imposed by colonial pow-
ers, thus evoking a long-desired union that had nominally existed until 
the thirteenth century. Besides evoking a glorious past and legitimising 
al-Baghdadi’s absolute power, the caliphate provides a real opportuni-
ty for applying Shari‘a to every aspect of private and public life, thus 
actualising an objective that has gained popularity all over the Muslim 
world since the 1990s as a panacea for all ills. By controlling a specific 
territory, IS can also appeal much more than al-Qaeda ever did to mil-
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itants yearning for a new world to create from scratch and a new self. 
At the same time, IS pursues a fight against both the nearby enemy, 
such as Assad, al-Maliki, and the Shiites, and the far enemy, the West, 
thus coalescing different strands that had uneasily coexisted until then 
within the jihadi movement.
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FROM TERRORIST GROUP TO
SELF-PROCLAIMED STATE: THE ORIGINS 
AND EVOLUTION OF IS
Andrea Plebani
Even if it seems that the Islamic State became headline news only recently, 
its roots run deeper in the transformations and mergers that have involved 
jihadist groups active in Iraq since the occupation by international coali-
tion forces in 2003. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, takes the “merit” for 
having launched a project originally devised by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 
the first decade of the 21st century. He managed to tap into the widespread 
discontent among Iraq’s Sunni population in the face of Nouri al-Maliki’s 
Shia-led government and subsequently lead Daesh forces to a series of 
considerable military victories, which allowed him to expand his control 
over increasingly larger areas of Iraq and Syria. However, compared to his 
predecessors and other jihadist organisations, the self-proclaimed caliph 
raised the stakes by aiming to reconstruct the caliphate not in the distant 
future but rather “here and now”.
In 2014 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reclaimed the position of caliph that had 
been vacant since 1924. The Iraqi militant had rapidly climbed the lad-
der within the jihadist scene despite being relatively unknown outside 
academic and security circles. At the same time the self-proclaimed 
Islamic State (IS) came into being, which, according to its supporters, 
was destined to unite the entire ummah under its banner. As had been 
the case seven years earlier on the event of the proclamation of the 
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Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the move was received with suspicion and an 
ill-concealed embarrassment not only within the Middle Eastern gov-
ernments but also within the same jihadist circles. The governments felt 
once again obliged to distance themselves from seemingly medieval and 
obscurantist declarations while the jihadist groups, who had the rebirth 
of the caliphate as one of their primary goals, were divided concerning 
its legitimacy, the correctness of its method of operation, and its ac-
tual effectiveness. This was the case even though the proclamation of 
IS had been preceded by a rapid rise that over little more than a year 
allowed al-Baghdadi to broaden his sphere of influence in an area that 
ranged from north-eastern Syria to middle-western Iraq, continued to 
an occupied Mosul, and then spread rapidly through the Nineveh Plains 
and the Sunni-Arab heartland of Iraq. Once again the strength of the 
jihadist cohorts had been widely underestimated, which resulted in 
consequences greatly more dramatic than those initially expected. An-
alysts had predicted a rapid breakdown due to internal divisions or an 
inability to manage large and complex territories, but they were forced 
to change their minds. The same holds true for strategists (or, more pre-
cisely, political decision-makers) from the international anti-IS coalition 
who had gambled on pairing airstrikes with (local) boots on the ground, 
even though both then and now it remains unclear whose “boots” are 
actually involved. 
Despite the losses suffered in Kobane, Tal Abyad, Tikrit, Sinjar and 
Ramadi the Islamic State has demonstrated not only an ability to take 
punches but also a capacity to maintain over time concentrated attacks 
on several fronts. This is shown by victories obtained in 2015 in Ramadi, 
the “capital” of the Iraqi governorate in al-Anbar, and in Palmyra, one of 
the last strongholds of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in central Syria and a city 
known across the globe for its priceless archaeological heritage. 
The significance and particular nature of the threat posed by the 
self-proclaimed Islamic State cannot be understood through analysis of 
the present situation, which would prove insufficient. A thorough exami-
nation of its history is indeed necessary in order to connect the dots that 
began in Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, passed through al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic 
State in Iraq, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and led to the 
present configuration of the movement.
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The origins of IS
The origins of IS are inextricably linked to the figure of Abu Musab al-Zarqa-
wi, the Jordanian terrorist who sadly gained fame as the first to slice the 
throats of westerners dressed in orange jumpsuits (an obvious reference 
to Guantanamo detainees) and then post videos of the executions on the 
web. A number of peregrinations had led him to tread the most important 
battlefields of last century’s “armed jihad” before arriving in Iraq, which 
was occupied in 2013 by international coalition forces. There he found 
fertile ground to turn his organisation into one of the most important 
reference points of the Iraqi insurrection. Despite its reduced size and its 
composition of predominantly foreign fighters, the group named Tawhid 
wa-l-Jihad reached its goal thanks to a series of attacks that were highly 
symbolic and designed to increase media exposure. In this way the group 
gained a reputation that did not go unnoticed in the eyes of the global 
jihadist community. Osama Bin Laden himself was even led to reconsider 
his initial uncertainty towards al-Zarqawi, eventually accepting his vow of 
loyalty and placing him at the head of the fledgling al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
in 2004. It was a marriage of convenience that, as will be seen, would have 
profound repercussions not only within the al-Qaeda network but also 
throughout the entire jihadist community. Through its association with 
al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda was able to return to fight the American enemy just 
two years after the events of September 11 by co-opting an inconvenient, 
though undeniably charismatic, leader; on the other hand, despite having 
to submit to the supervision of al-Qaeda, the Jordanian terrorist gained 
resources, men, and, above all, the essential legitimacy for the continua-
tion of his strategy.1 After successfully holding in check the American-led 
international coalition as well as the nascent Iraqi security forces and the 
increasingly important Shiite militias, AQI fell into a gradual yet evident 
state of decline that brought it to the brink of an abyss beginning in 2006. 
The elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (June 2006) and the loss in the 
battle for Baghdad had been followed by the decisive change of mind of 
the formerly allied Sunni Arabs, who had reunited beneath the emblems 
of the Awakening Councils (Sahwa).2 However, the greatest scars were left, 
above all, by the collapse of the Islamic State proclaimed in Iraq in 2007. 
Just three years after its proclamation, ISI had not only suffered a military 
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loss but also proven incapable of holding onto territory, of creating an ad-
ministration equipped to provide services for its people, and of adequately 
representing its interests. In 2010 ISI was a shadow of the movement that 
had emerged under the leadership of al-Zarqawi, and, while far from anni-
hilated, it remained in the north-west of the country, specifically in Mosul, 
the city that would leave an indelible mark on its destiny.3
The rebirth of ISI
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emerged from this backdrop. After a few months 
only, he succeeded in re-establishing ISI from its roots by rebuilding the 
union between leaders and militants, which had disappeared after the 
death of al-Zarqawi. Above all, he managed to reposition his own organ-
isation in such a way as to tap into the growing dissatisfaction within the 
Iraqi Sunni Arab community and to take advantage as best he could of 
the volatility in the entire region. 
In the area of internal affairs, the wave of sectarian politics of Nouri 
al-Maliki’s administration4 allowed ISI to recover part of its lost space of 
manoeuvre and to begin a destabilising campaign that would result in its 
introduction once again as the only competitor capable of confronting 
Baghdad’s sectarian administration. In a period of just a few months the 
group once again managed to work its way into the country, relying ul-
timately on those who had ended up identifying al-Maliki as their main 
enemy. In order to do this, ISI did not limit itself to increasing attacks in 
the capital and the rest of the territory but rather sought the support of 
those who had lost everything following the regime change while also 
targeting the establishment of the new Shiite-led Iraq. It is principally 
from this perspective that one must interpret the operations aimed at 
liberating thousands of detainees locked up in the country’s prisons and, 
above all, gaining the support of hundreds of former officials from Sad-
dam Hussein’s military, who quickly became the backbone of the move-
ment’s operative system.5  
If much of al-Baghdadi’s merit lies in his achievement of bringing 
ISI back within the Iraq’s Sunni Arab community in Iraq (or, at very least, 
of once again gaining the opportunity to operate in its areas of tradi-
tional influence), his greatest success is certainly tied to his movement’s 
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incredible rise to power recorded in Syria. Within this landscape Abu Mu-
hammad al-Julani was positioned as the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), 
a group of guerrillas that would quite quickly become the spearhead of 
the opposition against Bashar al-Assad. This was made possible thanks to 
the remarkable operational ability of the members of JaN, support from 
ISI, but also the group’s close attention to building relationships with the 
many components of the Syrian social system. Far from repeating ISI’s 
errors, which had ultimately tarnished the name of the movement in 
Iraq, Jahbat al-Nusra dedicated enormous resources towards winning the 
“hearts and minds” of the local population by distributing food and basic 
goods, imposing a law and order system aimed at stopping crime (petty 
crime in particular), and establishing collaborative relationships with the 
most influential tribal and religious leaders. These factors came into play 
when Washington decided to include the movement in its list of terrorist 
groups. This decision was heavily criticised by many Syrians and also by 
several Syrian opposition forces, which considered JaN an essential part 
of the fight against Assad’s regime.
From ISI to ISIS and then to the proclamation of the Islamic State
ISI’s sustained development reached a crucial stage in April 2013, when 
al-Baghdadi proclaimed that Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Sate of Iraq 
would join forces to form the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).6 
The move created a profound rift not only with the leadership of JaN but 
also with al-Qaeda and the various forces of the Syrian insurrection. In 
fact, al-Baghdadi’s declaration included a strategic vision that was anti-
thetical to the one shared by the groups that had fought on the Syrian soil 
up to that time. The Iraqi leader was aiming not to overthrow al-Assad 
or to give life to a “new Syria”, but rather to mould a supranational entity 
that would redefine the entire geography of the Middle East by eliminat-
ing states like Iraq and Syria, which were considered nothing more than 
vestiges of the region’s colonial past. In this way, he placed ISIS on a much 
higher level compared to the other insurgents, who were no longer seen 
as equal partners (along the same lines as the model adopted by JaN) but 
were forced to choose between joining the new Islamic State or being 
considered as an enemy. These events led to the definitive fracture not 
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only between Daesh7 and al-Qaeda but also with the majority of Syrian 
opposition forces, which became the first victims of al-Baghdadi’s new 
strategy. Aside from a series of victories by the Syrian opposition forces 
at the end of 2013 in north-west Syria, the influence of ISIS spread like 
wildfire after only a few months without encountering the least bit of 
resistance in its path. At the outset of 2014, Daesh’s influence extend-
ed from Raqqa all the way to Syria’s northern and eastern provinces, 
stretching from there to the heart of Sunni Arab Iraq, especially in the 
provinces of Nineveh and al-Anbar as well as in Salah al-Din, Diyala and 
even the capital region.8
While attention was focused on Baghdad, ISIS once again demon-
strated its military wherewithal by concealing its real goal: Mosul. The 
heart of Sunni Iraq as well as the largest metropolitan area in the north 
of the country, Mosul had been a central focus of the group’s strategy 
for several years as well as a safe haven from 2007 to 2010. ISIS militants 
exploited the presence of active cells in the city, the unpreparedness of 
the Iraqi security forces, and the atmosphere of terror that the group had 
knowingly created over the years, which allowed them to occupy the city 
in June 2014 and push away divisions of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) de-
ployed there to protect the city. The militants succeeded despite an enor-
mous disparity in terms of numbers and operations, and the considerable 
gains included not only huge financial resources and military provisions 
but also a popularity deemed unimaginable up to then (at least within 
the most radical jihadist circles). Bolstered by this success, al-Baghdadi 
finally managed to proclaim the birth of an Islamic State, which aimed 
at including not just a specific portion of the Dar al-Islam but rather the 
entire Islamic community. As Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declared, the 
long-awaited and strongly desired reestablishment of the caliphate had 
finally become a reality: “O Muslims everywhere, (...). Raise your head 
high, for today – by Allah’s grace – you have a state and khilafa, which will 
return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership”.9
Remaining and expanding. A motto that must give pause for reflection
After two years since its founding, it appears clear how the self-pro-
claimed Islamic State’s motto, “Baqiya wa Tatamaddad” (remaining and 
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expanding), embodies the quintessence of a movement that has prov-
en capable of openly challenging opponents not only on the battlefield 
but also in terms of ideology. In fact, the victories alone do not play the 
most critical role in the creation of the legend or in the dramatic rise of 
the Islamic State; equally important and influential is its blueprint of a 
society (according to its supporters) modelled after ancient Medina, the 
city of the prophet. However, the firm beliefs of the self-declared caliph 
(and those of his supporters) appear unaffected by the fact that these 
results were obtained through massacres of innocent individuals and the 
perpetration of crimes expressly forbidden by an Islamic tradition that 
has developed over hundreds of years. The very fact that we are more 
and more forced to distinguish between, on the one hand, a sort of ji-
hadist wing that appears almost moderate in light of the horrors perpe-
trated by Daesh and, on the other, a reality in which there are no limits 
to atrocities represents a paradox that can only be overcome through a 
paradigm shift. The international community, therefore, must consider 
its responsibility in the face of a menace that is striking not only one of 
the most important areas in the Middle East but also the entire interna-
tional landscape.  
It was once thought the jihadist threat could be contained in “far-
off lands”, like Afghanistan. This strategy was unsuccessful then, and it 
is unlikely that it will work now that the enemy is much closer to our 
borders and actively involved in a fight that knows no geographical or 
moral limits.
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THE ORIGINS AND AFFILIATIONS OF 
ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN AFRICA 
Alessandra Sasso
The panorama of terrorist groups of Islamic origin in the African conti-
nent is rather varied and consists of a series of Qaedist-inspired organisa-
tions, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or others that have sworn 
loyalty to the Islamic State, like Boko Haram in Nigeria. Despite their com-
mon goal of strict enforcement of Shari‘a in controlled territories, their 
affiliation, the development of specific tactics, and the increasingly sen-
sational nature of public violence adopted from IS, these organisations 
do not depend on centralised leadership and are integrated for the most 
part in regional dynamics. The danger is, however, not diminished.
The fluid nature of Qaedist-inspired groups and the difficulty involved 
in defining the core of the original movement1 led the American Pres-
ident Barack Obama to affirm that the primary threat represented by 
the Qaedist movement “comes from decentralised al-Qaeda affiliates 
and extremists, many with agendas focused in the countries where they 
operate”.2 In recent years the terrorist group, guided once by Osama 
Bin Laden and led now by Ayman al-Zawahiri, has slowly branched out, 
moving from a more vertical organisation to include a more horizontal, 
autonomous, and decentralised structure.3 Africa is undoubtedly the the-
atre for expansion of some of these Qaedist-influenced groups, which 
are increasing the range of their activities to an extent that they are no 
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longer perceived as an exclusively regional threat. Without a doubt the 
Islamic State is exercising influence over these groups in the areas of or-
ganisation and communication, raising the threat to a more serious level. 
The historical and social events that have led to the development 
and expansion of integralist Islamic groups on the African continent are 
markedly different, just like some of the terrorist groups operating there: 
al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram, to name 
only a few.
Al-Shabaab’s Somalia within the geopolitical game
in the Horn of Africa
Somalia is one of the world’s poorest countries and the setting for a 
bloody civil war that erupted in the beginning of the 1990s after the 
fall of Mohammed Siad Barre’s dictatorship and also as a result of the 
Somali elite’s inability to form a new government. The ensuing instabil-
ity provoked a restructuring of Somali society in clans, which became 
a reference point for the population given the lack of governmental 
authority capable of exercising control over the region. Vying for the 
position of dominance held by various “warlords” were various Islam-
Islamist militant groups and their areas of influence in Africa
Source: Stratfor, BBC Somali Service/Monitoring
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ic tribunals present in the capital Mogadishu, which joined together to 
form the so-called Islamic Courts Union (ICU). In 2006 the ICU suffered 
a defeat at the hands of the transitional federal government, which was 
supported by various Somali clans, and thanks to Ethiopian military op-
erations. It was at that time, also as a result of Ethiopian intervention, 
that the al-Shabaab fundamentalist group under the command of Abu 
Zubair gained popularity and radicalised its activity, implementing strict 
enforcement of Shari‘a. Through a series of systematic guerrilla opera-
tions al-Shabaab managed to impose its control over vast strategic ar-
eas in central and northern Somalia, supporting itself thanks to access 
to Somali ports, the practise of piracy, and the taking of hostages, not 
to mention the perpetration of predatory and criminal activities carried 
out in the area. Although al-Shabaab’s activity was initially concentrated 
in Somali territory, the movement began to draw progressively closer to 
al-Qaeda4 to the point of professing its loyalty in 2012 to the movement 
founded by Osama Bin Laden5 and invoking a jihad in the entire region 
of the Horn of Africa.6
In 2010 an attack carried out by al-Shabaab in Uganda ushered in a 
new season in the Somali terrorists’ action plan, initiating a series of at-
tacks aimed at countries that provided forces as part of the peacekeeping 
efforts of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). 
Their goal involves action designed to disrupt and weaken the 
countries involved in the fight for Somali liberation and, as a result, a 
reduction of pressure in Somalia’s internal conflict.7 A favourite target 
is nearby Kenya, which is guilty of offering support in the fight against 
the movement, is easily accessible, and counts on a large presence of 
foreigners. The most recent and visible attack was on the campus of Gar-
issa University, which had a death toll of nearly 150 people.8 The meth-
od of attack differs slightly from those implemented previously, which 
implies that al-Shabaab may be adopting a new communication strate-
gy, ultimately seeking greater international visibility in the wake of me-
dia promotion and sensationalised violence sponsored by the Islamic 
State. However, al-Shabaab still holds firm control over some areas of 
Somalia and continues to pose a serious threat. This is the case even 
though the offensive strategy carried out by AMISOM and Somali forces 
helped them gain ground and also despite a leadership dispute within 
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the movement, in which a pan-Somali current, which deems the cen-
trality of the clans as fundamentally important, runs counter to a trend 
that is more supportive of the group’s ties with al-Qaeda and increas-
ingly oriented toward the Islamic State.9 The primary goal in combatting 
the movement, together with military operations aimed at reducing the 
threat represented by al-Shabaab and the fight against piracy, must be 
the development of a realistic political solution through the involvement 
of as many social constituencies as possible in order to support a process 
of legitimisation that is shared as much as possible. 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its sphere of influence
in the Sahel: between regionalism and localism
Evidence of phenomena tied to religious integralism in North Africa dates 
back to the Algerian civil war of the early 1990s, which erupted following 
the annulment of the parliamentary elections that would have offered 
victory to the Islamic Salvation Front. Arriving on the North African coun-
try’s political scene were the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which was led by Hassan Attab 
and born following conflicts within the GIA concerning tactical manage-
ment of the group, whose goal was the institution of an Islamic state.10 Its 
activities were concentrated in Algerian territory and were conceived to 
ensure as much support as possible among the local populations, with a 
particular focus on the fight against governmental, civil and military insti-
tutions. Between 2006 and 2007 the group merged with Osama Bin Lad-
en’s movement and changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magh-
reb (AQIM), offering evidence of the broadening of its scope and targets 
on a more global scale. Both groups benefited from the union: the legiti-
macy gained by AQIM facilitated its efforts to expand and to recruit new 
combatants, while al-Qaeda broadened its sphere of formal influence in 
the eyes of the international community and also managed to gain access 
– at least symbolically – to a region close to Europe.11 With the success of 
antiterrorist measures organised by the Algerian government, AQIM was 
forced to change the trajectory of its activities and expand its range into 
the Sahel region. Against this backdrop, the porous nature of border with 
Mali and the lack of widespread governmental control helped it to sur-
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vive economically – through the practise of kidnapping and the traffick-
ing of arms, cigarettes, motor vehicles and human beings – and to con-
tinue fighting. AQIM’s ability to increase its sphere of influence in Mali 
can be examined in light of the particular relationship that it established 
with the Tuareg tribes in the north of the country, offering them concrete 
assistance during the 2012 insurrection against the central government 
that led to civil war and French intervention, support that was later ex-
ploited in order to exercise autonomous control over the territory. 
The outbreak of the Arab Spring enabled extremist movements to 
appear once again on the North African scene, especially in Libya and 
Tunisia, where the void left in the wake of the fall of the Gaddafi and 
Ben Ali regimes created the preconditions for the successful infiltration 
and spread of integralism, and two groups called Ansar al-Sharia have 
since appeared. In Libya the outbreak of civil war led to the emergence 
of historical ethnic divisions, inciting a real confrontation between two 
opposed governments claiming to rule the country and supported by 
different tribal militias;12 the Islamic State has found fertile ground to 
enter the fray as a third player in the conflict and gained control over 
the Libyan city of Sirte.13 
Groups appearing on the scene in Mali are the Movement for Unity 
and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar al-Din and al-Qaeda of West Africa, a prod-
uct of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian national and presumed master-
mind of the November 2015 attacks on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako. 
In the emergence of these movements and in the expansion of Daesh in 
the Maghreb a duality can be deciphered, which consists of the necessity 
to limit the range of the activities to local targets – a concern connected 
to each group’s intrinsic nature – and the strategic interest of adhering to 
a more global project like the one promoted by the Islamic State.  
Specific language and the trend toward sensational terrorist acts 
have been adopted from the Middle Eastern movement to such a degree 
that the Islamic State offers support in the form of money, trainers and 
fighters, giving life in terms of visibility to a mutually profitable process 
and increasing the level of threat.14 
The response to jihadist expansion in the region should include 
firstly the local communities and the international community with the 
goal of creating stability and initiating a process of state-building and 
The origins and affiliations of Islamic terrorism in Africa 47
law enforcement. This can be achieved by involving local communities 
and ethno-religious groups, reinforcing within them the role of moder-
ate Islam, and filling the voids in power that have permitted the devel-
opment of these groups.15
Boko Haram and Nigeria
The extreme poverty of northern Nigeria and the impossibility of incisive-
ly gaining access to the process of governance led in 1998 to the develop-
ment of Boko Haram, the Salafi-influenced extremist movement founded 
by Mohammed Yusuf.
Despite its objective of fighting in order to establish an Islamic state 
with a strict application of Shari‘a, the group’s activities were initially 
calm. Born in the northern region of Borno, the movement began to 
increase the intensity of its attacks in 2009. The re-election of the outgo-
ing Christian president Goodluck Jonathan was the motivation for Boko 
Haram’s radicalisation of its operation. The customary procedure estab-
lished in Nigeria calls for alternating the presidency between Muslims 
and Christians, thus guaranteeing equal representation among social 
and religious factions. The re-election provoked a series of disorderly 
events in the northern region, which were quickly stifled by Nigerian po-
lice; this exacerbated the feeling of marginalisation and the perception 
of limited transparency in the management of the public sector suffered 
by the Muslim majority in the northern states.16 Boko Haram’s anti-gov-
ernment sentiment translated to violent attacks against institutions 
and, above all, civilians to the point of perpetrating outright massacres 
and seizing control of large expanses of land in the north of the country. 
The increased intensity of Boko Haram’s activity led to terrorist activity 
even beyond the national borders, extending to countries such as Cam-
eroon, Niger and Chad, which spurred the African Union to authorise 
a multinational offensive17 in the territory under the influence of Boko 
Haram near the Nigerian borders. The group’s activity is tenacious to 
the point of having forced the postponement by several weeks of the 
presidential elections that were originally scheduled for February 2015 
and eventually won by the Muslim candidate from the All Progressives 
Congress, Muhammadu Buhari. 
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The Islamic State casts a threatening shadow: Boko Haram pledged 
its loyalty to the organisation on March 7, 2015, gaining considerable 
media coverage from the event and becoming part of the global jihad-
ist network. However, despite its movement toward the brutal tactics 
and media propaganda typical of the Islamic State, there is no evidence 
of an effective cooperation between the two entities, thus limiting the 
union to a symbolic level. The landscape in which Boko Haram has de-
veloped does not allow for comparisons between this group and other 
Qaedist-inspired groups due to the fact that the group formed as a re-
sult of the phenomenon of social marginalisation linked to its territory, 
and this, indeed, is the symptom of a social disadvantage present in the 
northern regions of the country. The Nigerian system of government is 
solid, which is precisely why the battle against Boko Haram should be 
carried out through social inclusion, reinforcement of the political sys-
tem, and the implementation of a law enforcement strategy, as well as 
through military intervention aimed at ensuring the safety of citizens and 
the restoration of public order.18 
The nature of islamic fundamentalism in Africa
Ethnic identity is still a pillar of the African system, and it often conditions 
political and social processes. The sense of belonging to diverse ethnic 
groups and the demise of socialism as a foundational ideology of protest 
movements after the end of the Cold War have pushed the disagreement 
of many Africans toward movements influenced by Islamic radicalism 
of Salafi origins.19 A lowest common denominator may be found at the 
root of the spreading of jihadist movements: precarious economic con-
ditions and ethnic and religious tensions are exacerbated by the lack of 
control, fragility, and flaws within governmental systems, which presents 
fertile ground for the emergence and development of these groups. 
Their adherence to organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
expands ideologically the range of these groups to a regional and glob-
al level. Aside from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and a group tied 
to the Islamic State present in Libya, whose actions can be framed in a 
transnational context, the other groups have, nonetheless, continued to 
focus their operations locally rather than within the greater ummah. In 
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their public expressions of unity and in their exploitation of the outward 
appearance of shared goals, there is no corresponding dependency on 
central leadership and no level of concrete and effective cooperation. Al-
though the ethnic and social motivating forces that have brought about 
the development of these groups are different from the impulses that led 
to the establishment of the caliphate, one must not underestimate the 
ideological influence of the Islamic State on these groups thanks to the 
widespread exposure of its strategy of inflicting terror.
The problem concerning the spread of Islamic terrorism in Africa is 
far from being solved and requires medium- and long-term investments. 
In order to do so, the engagement of governmental, ethnic and social 
stakeholders is essential, and the international community must offer 
support through diplomatic means and the promotion of greater social 
inclusion, with the aim of creating political stability and reinforcing gov-
ernmental systems.
The views and opinions expressed herein are entirely those of the author.
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LIBYA, DAESH ON EUROPE’S DOORSTEP
Kader A. Abderrahim
In February 2011, France and the UK decided to get rid of Colonel Gaddafi 
and launched a military campaign to bring about the fall of the Libyan 
dictator and the destabilisation of the Sahel and the Maghreb. The Is-
lamic State (IS) found new territory to conquer. It was a predictable ma-
noeuvre in view of the deterioration of the political and security situation 
in Libya. IS established itself on the ruins of a country that had itself also 
been the target of a western military intervention. Now present in the 
Mashreq, the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, IS was formed in 
2006, against the background of the chaos in Iraq, resulting from the 
American military operation in 2003. Within a few months, the Islamic 
State became the most powerful and feared of terrorist organisations. 
Since the taking of Mosul in the summer of 2014, IS has continued to 
make territorial and military advances.
Daesh’s strategy
The break-up of Libya was a stroke of luck for Daesh, which managed to 
unite under its banner ex-Gaddafites, Islamists, soldiers, and of course 
foreign fighters. IS extends its influence by regionalising conflicts and 
waging proxy wars. In the case of Libya, Daesh took advantage of clan 
rivalries, and rekindled tensions in the Sahelian band. In the face of weak 
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states and fragile institutions, the challenge was easy and the outcome 
guaranteed. Mali, Chad, Cameroon, Sudan, Tunisia, the Central African 
Republic and Nigeria: the list of countries neighbouring Libya affected by 
attacks by the jihadist organisation continued to grow. Throughout 2015, 
Daesh continued to advance and carry out operations on Libyan territory 
or in its neighbouring countries. One of them, Tunisia, a democracy un-
dergoing consolidation, experienced three attacks. Moreover, Daesh was 
careful to strengthen the bastions it occupied before embarking on new 
conquests. Daesh took control of Sirte, home city of Muammar Gaddafi, 
has a strong presence in Derna in the east, and occupies areas of Beng-
hazi. Its presence on the Mediterranean coast is linked to strategic and 
practical concerns. It serves as a reminder to Europe that its territory 
is no longer ring fenced, and a way to engage in all kinds of trafficking 
(arms, human beings, drugs) to fund the terrorist organisation. The next 
step for Daesh could be to extend southwards to join up with movements 
such as Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to IS in March 2015. 
Today, the Islamic State has an army of 3,500 to 4,500 men in Libya. 
This army consists of Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, Sudanese and Ira-
qis. At the end of 2015, there was a change in IS strategy, advising those 
who wish to join jihad to go to Libya, not Iraq or Syria. This trend marks 
a turning point, because the Maghreb was not initially one of the Daesh 
leaders’ priorities. The fragility of countries such as Algeria and Tunisia, 
and especially the proximity to Europe, led them to modify their plans. 
This demonstrates strong adaptability and an excellent knowledge of 
local conditions.
Social and cultural disparities 
Libya is in a state of chaos, divided by geographical, ethnic, economic, 
and religious rifts, and with two militia-supported governments compet-
ing for the country’s oil. The establishment of jihadist activity, the growth 
of numerous types of trafficking, and the exploitation of the flow of mi-
grants, are all factors that mean Libya’s state of disorder is becoming a 
significant regional issue. Libyan political leaders seem to have accepted 
this state of affairs, and there is no sign of any medium-term compromise 
between the various protagonists of the civil war.
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Since the 2011 revolution, Libya has fallen into a destructive spiral, 
which has had consequences for the Maghreb, the Sahel and the whole 
of the Mediterranean. The conflict has killed almost 30,000 people, and 
since the beginning of 2015, the country has become a regional base for 
jihadist activity. The production and export of oil, which represents vir-
tually all Libyan exports, fell by more than 80% compared with pre-war 
levels. There are increasing numbers of displaced persons and refugees 
within the country and in neighbouring countries, and the absence of a 
state provides a favourable area for criminal organisations, which some-
times control whole swathes of territory and are involved in the traffick-
ing of drugs, arms and migrants, whose numbers are constantly rising. 
The complexity of the current war stems from the fact that Libya 
must in reality face the cumulative effect of a number of conflicts. On 
a national level, the confrontation between old and new elites partial-
ly overlaps a rift between Islamists and secularists, but primarily has its 
roots in the economic competition between the various coastal cities. 
Since the revolution, this rivalry has taken the form of a growing hos-
tility between officials of the old regime and the revolutionaries, turning 
into an armed struggle in 2013. On an international level, Libya now con-
stitutes a front, with international jihadism set against the secular pow-
ers of the region. The Islamic State has signalled its presence in Libya 
and Tunisia with blood, claiming responsibility for a series of attacks and 
executions, following the modus operandi of its Iraqi counterpart. Egypt 
and the United Arab Emirates are directly involved in the conflict along 
with the government of Tobruk, while Qatar and Sudan support some 
Islamist militias in Cyrenaica. The south of the country, which enjoys a 
de facto autonomy, has become the refuge for armed bands of all origins 
that have participated in the various regional conflicts.
Libya is a vast country, made up of a narrow coastal plain border-
ing on mountain ranges and steppe plateaus, and opening out onto the 
Sahara. On the coastline is the natural east-west boundary between 
Maghreb and Mashreq, while the boundary between the Sahel and the 
Mediterranean is drawn in the Sahara Desert. Gaddafi’s regime retained 
power over these geographical divides for 42 years through a redistri-
bution of oil revenue based on clientelism, deliberately preventing the 
emergence of local representative institutions. As well as the multitude 
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of disputes linked to the abuse of power and manipulative practices by 
the old regime, post-revolutionary Libya continues to face the dilemmas 
of identity that already existed at the time of its independence in 1953. 
The issues of power sharing between the various cities and the desert, 
minority rights, and the terms of redistribution of the country’s natural 
resources, have been brought back to the table and debated by a multi-
tude of players, who would not hesitate to use armed force. Libya’s coast-
al cities, which share the political history of Europe and the Middle East 
due to their central location in the Mediterranean, became autonomous 
civil-military authorities at the time of the revolution. Against the back-
ground of a sudden opening of the political spectrum, and in the context 
of rapid development based on Mediterranean trade, the institutional 
debate rapidly reflected an intense economic competition. The material 
interests of the various cities were thus the main reason for their national 
political positioning. In particular, the debate on the federal character of 
the future Libyan state – according to a Tripolitania-Cyrenaica-Fezzan di-
vision, which refers to an alleged golden age of the Libyan Kingdom – has 
been used as a pretext by political stakeholders, intent on getting their 
hands on the oil wealth of the Gulf of Sirte, or justifying irredentist aims 
for the Sahara desert. Currently, the behaviour of the numerous militias 
from the Libyan coast still has more to do with interest in their city of 
origin than with ideological alignments.
Saharan Libya is historically the place of conflict between Arab tribes 
and desert tribes, the Tubus and Tuaregs. The Arab tribes of central and 
south-west Libya formed the core of the political base of Gaddafi’s pow-
er, and priority was given to recruiting them into the security forces. In 
this way, the regime maintained control over trafficking with neighbour-
ing countries: import of cigarettes and alcohol, export of oil and other 
subsidised products. Later on, the Tuaregs and the Tubus were the main 
victims of the regime’s misguided pan-African policies. Their recruitment 
as back-up troops during the Colonel’s conflicts with his neighbours was 
based on a manipulative use of access to Libyan nationality. Over several 
generations, Gaddafi granted citizenship to groups of mercenaries from 
these two ethnic groups according to his geopolitical needs, only to go 
back on his decisions later. As a result, to date, several thousand Libyan 
Tubus and Tuaregs are stateless. In August 2013, the Nationality Reform 
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Commission declared the status of nearly a million people to be illegal, 
resulting in turn in a declaration of autonomy by Fezzan and a show of 
force by armed groups. Fewer in number, the Berber-speaking groups 
paid in a different way for their alleged support for the previous regime, 
when the Misrata militias drove them out of the town of Tawergha. In 
short, radical Islamism has a long history in Libya, despite the brutal re-
pression it has been subjected to. Returning from exile or coming out of 
hiding, old members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) entered 
the post-revolutionary political field, some of them trying their hand at 
legal policy while others took control of militias in their home towns. Abu 
Suleiman, Warfallah and Khadafah have sent their men to the military 
units stationed in the south, firstly to Gaddafi’s son Khamis’s 32nd Brigade. 
From 2012, radical Islamism has invaded political discourse, creating a 
tense social climate, while young militia members acted as guardians of 
virtue at numerous check-points. While the first Islamists have now been 
marginalised by IS, overtaken by a new, more radical generation, their 
views formed the matrix of post-revolutionary Libyan jihadism.
This is the anthropological and social context in which the Islamic 
State is expanding, using a unifying discourse under the green flag of Is-
lam and the black banner of Daesh. Libya’s size, its regional environment 
and the lack of any state structure, make it a “blessed” area for IS, which 
can in the worst-case scenario envisage withdrawal from the Middle East 
to this country. In the best-case scenario there is the prospect of settling 
long-term, which would enable it to become a key stakeholder or inter-
locutor. The rifts between Libyans play a central role and enable Daesh to 
exploit antagonisms to further its aims.
Two governments
Libya in 2015 is theoretically under the control of two competing 
governments. In the east of the country, the Tobruk government was 
formed after the 2014 House of Representatives (HoR) elections, and 
remains the only authority recognised by the international community. 
Tripoli is the seat of a government supported by the Islamists of Fajr al 
Libya (Libyan Dawn), from the previous parliament, the General Nation-
al Congress (GNC).
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Beyond the attachment proclaimed to one or the other of these 
parties, which are currently clashing in the Arab world – Islamists or sec-
ularists, the two authorities exercise their power in a similar way. Both 
wear the legitimacy of the ballot box, but are not in fact representative. 
Neither of these governments has effective control of a continuous por-
tion of the territory, and neither has a reliable administration. They are 
backed by disparate military forces, driven more by private interest than 
by ideological affinity.
They are officiated over by a number of strong men, who also con-
tributed to the escalation of the conflict by placing armed groups under 
their direct authority to put pressure on the political staff. Today, the mi-
litias affiliated to the two camps indulge in similar abuses of power, carry 
out political assassinations and are involved in criminal activity.
Between these two sides in the war in Libya, IS represents a coher-
ent, uniform force based upon a clear objective and a unified leadership. 
It will be difficult to get rid of Daesh without first achieving a political 
compromise between Libyans. Paradoxically, the chaotic state of the 
country could provide the best chance of dislodging the jihadists. For 18 
months, Daesh has not managed to make any territorial inroads, such as 
winning Tripoli or Tobruk, which would have given it an unquestionable 
advantage. Local conditions are changing; the agreements of yesterday 
are not necessarily the same as those of tomorrow. Tribal culture contin-
ues to dominate political life in a land that has never experienced genu-
ine statehood and has not experienced it at all since 2011.

PART II
TERROR BY ANY MEANS:
RECRUITING AND FINANCING
IN THE DIGITAL ERA
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FOREIGN FIGHTERS: AN IDENTIKIT OF 
VOLUNTEERS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 
Claudio Neri
It is well known that the phenomenon of foreign fighters is nothing new. 
Nonetheless, the number of foreign fighters has increased considerably 
as the phenomenon has accelerated in recent years, particularly with 
regard to the on-going conflict in Syria and Iraq. Relevant data are not 
easily found, but there is apparent consensus that most volunteers leav-
ing their countries to take part in the fight come from Middle Eastern 
countries, above all Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, joining forces in particular 
with militants from Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. However, a 
foreign fighter who has taken part in a civil war does not automatically 
become a terrorist.
Participation in Middle Eastern conflicts among foreign fighters, in other 
words among non-mercenary volunteers from countries different from 
those at war and not citizens of those countries, is not a phenomenon 
that has begun in recent years in Syria or in Iraq. It is rather one that has 
roots in the recent past. Thomas Hegghammer, a Norwegian researcher 
who has studied in depth the movement of foreign fighters, defines the 
phenomenon as “private global foreign fighter mobilization”1 and traces 
its origins to 1967-68 and to the Arab-Israeli conflict. During that period 
a small nucleus of foreign fighters comprised of fewer than 100 men hail-
ing above all from Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Sudan volunteered to fight 
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alongside the Arab coalition. In the 1980s, however, the phenomenon 
established itself more fully. In fact, between 5,000 and 20,000 foreign 
volunteers are estimated to have streamed into Afghanistan in support 
of their Muslim brothers under attack by the Soviets between 1978 and 
1992. Of 70 armed Arab conflicts taking place after 1945, it is possible to 
identify contingents of foreign fighters in 18 of them, in groups of extreme-
ly limited numbers for the most part. Among the 18 conflicts, 10 were in 
the 1990s and 5 following the year 2000. The presence of foreign fighters 
in Arab/Middle Eastern conflicts is, therefore, a fundamentally contem-
porary phenomenon (it has not been possible to identify the movement 
of foreign fighters prior to the 1940s) that emerges forcefully during the 
conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s, continues in Bosnia in the 1990s, pro-
ceeds to Chechnya and Iraq in the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
and is now at play in Syria. 
The situation in Syria, however, presents several peculiar matters 
that raise concern among those responsible for national and international 
security. First of all, there is the matter of the number of subjects involved. 
According to one of the most detailed current analyses of the sub-
ject, which was published by the Soufan Group in 20142 and then re-
cently updated3 to include the four years of the Syrian conflict (2011-15), 
between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters travelled to Syria to fight 
alongside the rebels. 
This number includes those who returned to their countries of origin 
and those who died in the field, the latter of which amount roughly to 
between 8% and 10% according to data collected at the close of 2013. It 
does not include, rather, foreign fighters who operated and continue to 
operate among the ranks of government forces. In particular, according 
to the Soufan Group, approximately 3,000-4,000 men are said to have 
rushed to the aid of Assad’s regime, most coming from Iran, Iraq and Leb-
anon and receiving substantial assistance from the Iranian government.4 
In a general sense, estimates of the overall number of foreign fighters 
arriving in the Syrian and Iraqi area are subject to variation due both to 
the fluidity and dynamism of the constantly evolving situation and to a 
real difficulty in making such estimates, but the process is also complicat-
ed as a result of the difference in the very definition of the term “foreign 
fighter” that one encounters when analysing various reports. For exam-
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ple, in January 2014 Washington’s director of intelligence, General James 
Clapper, estimated that the number of foreign fighters present in Syria 
and, according to the CIA, hailing from some 50 different countries was 
at least 7,000.5 At the end of 2014, rather, President Obama checked the 
number and increased it to more than 15,000. Keeping this in mind, it is 
certainly possible to assert that the contingent of foreign fighters that 
has operated in Syria since the beginning of the war probably constitutes 
the largest ever recorded in the history of Middle Eastern conflicts. The 
number is even greater than the one relative to the contingent of foreign 
fighters present in the Afghan conflict in the 1980s. There remains, how-
ever, one important difference: the high intensity of arrivals of foreign 
fighters in the region of Syria and Iraq, a fact that is undeniable and also 
alarming. If, as Hegghammer reports, between 5,000 and 20,000 for-
eign fighters travelled to Afghanistan in a period of roughly twelve years 
(1980-92), between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters are said to have 
streamed into Syria in only five years. The conflict in Syria, therefore, is 
attracting foreign fighters at a noticeably higher rate compared to previ-
ous conflicts in the area. Most striking and alarming, in particular, is the 
rate of increase in the influx of foreign fighters from 2012 up to the pres-
ent day. In the first half of 2012 between 700 and 1,400 were recorded. 
In August 2013 the number increased to 6,000, and at the end of 2014 
estimates made by Western intelligence agencies placed the number at 
15,000. In 2015 the number appears to have more than doubled, arriving 
at 31,000. At present the Syrian-Iraqi conflict constitutes a very powerful 
catalyst within international Muslim communities, in particular within 
those in the Middle East. 
Where do the foreign fighters in Syria actually come from? They ar-
rive from roughly 86 countries, but the majority hails from Middle East-
ern Arab countries and the Maghreb (more than 16,000 foreign fight-
ers). Detailed estimates of these foreign fighters are as follows: no fewer 
than 6,000 from Tunisia, about 2,500 from Saudi Arabia, between 2,000 
and 2,500 from Jordan, and about 1,500 from Morocco. There are also 
at least 800 from Lebanon, roughly 2,000 from Turkey (according to of-
ficial data) and between 600 and 1,000 from Egypt. From Libya, rather, 
roughly 1,000 individuals are estimated as having arrived. It is also worth 
mentioning that Libya and Tunisia, in particular the areas of Ben Gardane 
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(Tunisia) and Derna (Libya), are strategic hubs for fighters streaming into 
and out of the Syrian-Iraqi area.  
Of the 30,000 foreign fighters estimated to offer support to the re-
bels, approximately 5,000 are presumed to hail from Western countries, 
European ones for the most part.6 This number has more than doubled 
in the last year. Foreign fighters arriving from Europe are far fewer than 
those coming from the Arab world even if hundreds of volunteers in Syria 
are shown to have departed not only from France, Great Britain and Ger-
many but also from Belgium, Denmark, Australia and the Netherlands. 
More specifically, 1,800 have departed from France, 760 from both Great 
Britain and Germany, and 470 from Belgium. On the whole one can con-
ceivably assert that the present phenomenon relating to the influx of 
foreign fighters into the Syria-Iraq region is for the most part specific to 
the Arab world with only a numerically limited component arriving from 
the West, above all from Europe. This confirms a well-established trend: 
even in previous conflicts foreign volunteers came predominantly from 
Arab countries, in particular from Saudi Arabia. 
According to information currently available there are four main 
fighting groups that benefit from the influx of foreign volunteers: Jaish 
al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, a group that counts on a sizeable presence of 
Chechens; Sukur al-Sham, a group approximately 10,000-20,000 strong 
in which combatants from France and Belgium are suspected to operate 
and whose leadership consists of individuals with al-Qaeda ties; Jabhat 
al-Nusra, a member group of al-Qaeda in Syria with a strong presence 
of veterans who fought against the Americans in Iraq; and IS, which has 
its roots in the organisation of the Islamic State of Iraq created in 2006. 
This last group is believed to count on a very high number of foreign 
fighters, comprising as much as 30% and 40% of the total according 
to some estimates. In particular, volunteers arriving predominantly 
from North Africa and the Middle East appear to be joining forces with 
al-Nusra and IS, two groups in which foreign fighters are believed to 
play an important operational role. 
Herein lies yet another contradictory feature that distinguishes the 
situation in Syria. If in the past contingents of foreigners have had only 
marginal effects in conflicts (also in terms of their numbers),7 in Syria 
and Iraq foreign fighters have conversely assumed an important role, one 
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that is actually on the increase as the tragic consequences of civil war 
have reduced the number of local fighters. In general, foreign fighters 
travelling to Syria, above all those hailing from Europe, do not have mili-
tary training due to their young age. Of these men 85%-90% are younger 
than 40, with an average age between 18 and 29 years old. They are, 
therefore, very young compared to those joining forces previously in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, conflicts in which the average age was between 25 and 
35 years old. This is obviously not always the case, and there are many 
confirmed cases of veterans of previous conflicts who are fighting in Syria 
and Iraq. Fighters hailing from the Middle East tend to be more militarily 
competent compared to their comrades in arms arriving from Western 
countries, precisely because in many instances they have gained guerril-
la experience in other theatres. In any case, untrained subjects undergo 
a swift conditioning period (around six weeks) in order to prepare for 
inclusion among the fighting forces. The foreign fighters’ military contri-
bution is considered significant above all in jihadist and Qaedist groups, 
in particular when involving suicide attacks (with a high percentage of 
Saudis and Jordanians used in such attacks). Do foreign fighters, there-
fore, pose a terrorist threat? Or even more, is it possible that foreign 
volunteers who have embraced the extremist ideal and carried out mil-
itary training in the conflict in Syria and Iraq could decide to carry out 
guerrilla operations or terrorist attacks upon return to their countries of 
origin (in some case European countries)?8 As demonstrated by recent 
events in the news, the danger exists and is real. Though making predic-
tions based on reliable models is impossible at present, it is possible on 
the other hand to identify some problematic elements in the process of 
radicalisation of those foreign fighters flocking to Syria and Iraq. Fore-
most among them is the large number of foreign volunteers. A sizeable 
contingent growing at an unusually steady pace manages to significantly 
increase the pool of individuals who can potentially be radicalised. The 
earlier conflicts included groups consisting of a limited number of foreign 
volunteers that ultimately banded together, like a cliquish elite in some 
cases, to form closed circles in which only few others were welcome. 
This phenomenon has increased tremendously in the conflict in Syria and 
Iraq. A second problematic element in the present conflict involves the 
ease of communication and transportation. For example, while travelling 
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to Pakistan and Afghanistan was a complicated and challenging task in 
the 1980s, especially without the presence of a developed network of 
facilitators, travelling to Syria and Iraq in the present day is rather easy 
and inexpensive. Furthermore, the internet and social media guarantee 
the rapid and easily controllable propagation of jihadist teaching toward 
potential recruits located in theory across the globe. The presence of 
guerrilla and terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq constitutes a third and, 
in this case, extremely critical element: these groups, like al-Qaeda for 
instance, are battled tested and deadly. In other conflicts (Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Somalia) such groups either did not exist or emerged only after 
several years. In Syria and Iraq, on the other hand, Jabhat al-Nusra and 
the Islamic State have commanded the fight for a couple of years now. 
All this increases the likelihood of foreign volunteers joining the ranks of 
such jihadist groups, which consequently leads, on the one hand, to their 
exposure to a path toward radicalisation and, on the other hand, to the 
reinforcement of fraternal bonds, which will likely endure even after the 
volunteer returns to his country of origin.
In conclusion, history teaches us that volunteering as an insurgent 
in a civil war, even if marked by the presence of jihadist forces, does not 
automatically make the individual a terrorist. In fact, in past conflicts 
the majority of foreign fighters upon return to their countries of origin 
did not form terrorist networks or organise terrorist attacks. Many of 
those who had travelled to participate in the fight did not even devel-
op anti-Western sentiment. However, it is also true that terrorism is an 
activity that essentially requires a limited number of players. A group of 
adequately trained individuals who are motivated and well-connected to 
jihadist networks is all it takes to execute deadly attacks. In this sense, 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq constitutes a dangerous field in which the 
seeds of anti-Western terrorism can easily grow. The risks resulting from 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq can be reduced to a minimum through the 
elaboration of a precise and timely international strategy of opposition 
with the employment of intelligence as its cornerstone.
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THE JIHADIST VOCATION OF FOREIGN 
FIGHTERS AND THE RESPONSE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
Sandro Menichelli
While news stories and investigative reports have made us more familiar 
with the terms jihad, caliphate and foreign fighters, there remains the 
problem of gaining a deeper understanding of the motives that lead in-
dividuals to choose the path of terrorism despite their being raised in Eu-
ropean societies and according to a European system of values. How can 
an effective strategy for the prevention and elimination of these phenom-
ena be developed on the national level and within the European Union 
without first understanding who these individuals are and why we have 
become their targets? What can be done and, above all, what is being 
done in Europe to tackle this phenomenon?
The graphic image of a policeman, who will only later be identified as 
Muslim, lying wounded in a street in Paris and then brutally murdered 
by a hooded individual leaves us once again bewildered concerning how 
killings can be inspired by religious faith even in the twenty-first century. 
With the cry of “We have avenged the Prophet Muhammad!” the killer 
of the policeman, along with his brother, had just carried out a massa-
cre at the headquarters of the satirical magazine “Charlie Hebdo”, whose 
editors had been accused of offending the two killers’ religious faith. A 
similar scene was once again witnessed as a group of young French and 
Belgian men willingly armed themselves with machine guns and explo-
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sive belts in order to massacre hundreds of their peers guilty of spend-
ing time in a “place of perversion” in the despised French capital. Along 
with the extremely fateful attacks against European tourists at the Bardo 
National Museum in Tunis, the attacks against police in the same North 
African capital and on the beaches of Sousse, or, though slightly different, 
those taking place in Ankara, Beirut, Brussels and Copenhagen, these 
events are unfortunately just a few of the latest tragic ones in the news. 
Nonetheless, public opinion has not been able to fully comprehend the 
underlying motives. What should the response be? How should it be car-
ried out? Above all, how can this deadly violence be prevented?
We must certainly acknowledge and praise the numerous displays 
of indignation in response to these events. Some have consisted of large 
demonstrations that have united (both physically and ideally) millions of 
people across the globe, who are convinced that individuals must not die 
for expressing their opinions, for belonging to one religion or the oth-
er, for choosing a line of work involving public safety, for spending an 
evening in an outdoor cafe or for listening to music in a concert hall.
While this response may offer evidence of indispensably shared 
democratic values, it does not appear to solve the problem of radicalisa-
tion in our societies in which increasing numbers of individuals, mostly 
young men and women, are prepared to embrace forms of violent ex-
tremism, travel to war zones and then, perhaps, return to their country 
of origin carrying with them significant and sinister baggage of experi-
ence in the battlefield ready to be put to use for the cause of interna-
tional terrorism. 
News stories and investigative reports have helped familiarise with 
the terms jihad, caliphate and foreign fighters. However, objectively tran-
scending our day-to-day lives, they lead us only to an indistinct sense 
of disapproval, confusion and fear. The real problem lies in our inability 
to fully understand the motives behind such negative behaviour, which 
is often quite simplistically attributed to individual choices that reveal 
social uneasiness, an inability to fully integrate in society or an outright 
inclination toward delinquency. The key to confronting this problem lies 
in the necessity of understanding not only the makeup of these young 
people, raised in our societies and according to our value systems, but 
also the motivating forces behind their decision to carry out such atro-
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cious acts. Furthermore, it is consequently necessary to outline the ap-
propriate course of action in order to stop and, above all, prevent these 
attacks according to the rules of law. 
Quite obviously, the response to a phenomenon that inherent-
ly transcends individual states and ultimately assumes a global reach, 
even though it must be identified and carried out on a national level, 
must not exclude a specific and coordinated approach that is global and 
multidisciplinary. Based on this premise, one must, therefore, ask who 
these individuals are and why we have become their targets. Further-
more, in reaction to this phenomenon in Europe and on the national 
level, we must consider what can be done and, above all, what is being 
done. From a practical standpoint, we must also ask how we can prevent 
the radicalisation of these people and convince them not to depart for 
today’s war zones. For those who do depart to fight in foreign battle-
fields, we must ask how their movements can be monitored, above all, 
when they travel beyond the borders of the European Union and, even 
more so, once they return. It is worth mentioning that the figure of the 
young Muslim departing “to fight the infidels” amounts to nothing new. 
Such cases have been recorded, for example, in the wars fought in Af-
ghanistan, in the former Yugoslavia and in Algeria. Today, what is new 
and alarming is the scale of the phenomenon. If we begin to examine 
the reason behind such a decision, we can safely conclude that a more 
ideologically oriented jihadist vocation must be linked with the overall 
radicalisation movement of Sunni Islam and its desire to advance the 
cause of Islamification through the seizing of power, which is understood 
as complete control of the State with the goal of re-establishing Islamic 
order in societies distinguished today by their religious ignorance. For 
radical ideologists and, ultimately, for supporters of the Islamic State, the 
so-called “grass-roots strategies for the Islamification of modernity” have 
repeatedly proven incapable of producing significant political and social 
changes, such as the establishment of the caliphate. Such strategies are 
typical of a neo-traditional form of Islam, based on preaching and chari-
table actions, which is desired above all by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
its local branches. For radical ideologists Islam is not only religious faith 
but also life itself in its individual, social, domestic, political and economic 
dimensions, which offer the possibility of serving and worshiping God. 
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Consequently, jihad, in its double meaning of “fighting” and “striving”, 
each “in the path of God”, embodies the complete submission of believ-
ers to the divine message and serves as the necessary instrument for the 
elimination of every obstacle in the way of the complete victory of faith. 
Based on the takfir, or rather the declaration of nonconformity with any 
human expression of Shari‘a, it is necessary to launch and carry out a ji-
had against any human authority that ignores the Qur‘an and the Sunnah 
as the only legitimate sources of socio-political and individual order, thus 
allowing the adoration of veritable “idols” in the place of God. Such idols 
include the sovereignty of the people, free elections and the rule of law. 
The principle of tawhid, which upholds the uniqueness and absoluteness 
of God, must instead be reclaimed and defended. The true meaning of 
the divine message, therefore, may only be fulfilled on earth by violently 
opposing supporters of “Satan’s party”, and doing so amounts to nothing 
more than an expression of faith for the true Muslim. These supporters 
may be ostensibly Muslim governments, which are essentially impious 
and corrupt, the “crusading” West, worldwide Zionism, all those indiffer-
ent to Islam’s message or apostates. 
Impious governments, in this case, are those that formally claim to 
be Muslim but apply a secular and nationalistic ideology in their political 
workings and adopt laws and customs typical of infidels. By doing so, 
they foster the penetration of Western culture in their societies, and 
if in the past figures such as Nasser, Sadat, and Algerian and Tunisian 
rulers fell into this category, in the present day Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi 
leaders have taken their place, constituting an obstacle in the fight for 
the (re)establishment of the caliphate. The caliphate would embrace the 
entire community of believers or, geographically speaking, the Greater 
Middle East extending from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to Pakistan. This 
principal ideological call continues to incite hundreds of young Europeans, 
predominantly Sunni Muslims but also converts, to travel to war zones as 
foreign fighters and join the ranks of the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra 
and other Islamic groups so that they might help their “brothers in faith” 
break free from the subjugation of neo-paganism. Our societies and their 
colonial politics were accused in the past of provoking the division of Is-
lam into nation-states, thus preventing the political reconstitution of the 
ummah. They belong, therefore, to the category of the “Western crusad-
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ers” and have become the target of varied forms of Islamic radicalism for 
a number of reasons, even though two major ones come forward. On the 
one hand, there is the question of the support offered to impious Muslim 
governments, which have ultimately adopted secular ideologies. On the 
other hand, the West, through its insidious and “satanic” cultural mes-
sages, is deemed capable of causing dangerous and profound changes to 
Muslim society and way of life that will ultimately lead to the erosion of 
their very foundation. Taking this and other factors into consideration, we 
can begin to understand the motives behind the various attacks that have 
been carried out or planned in the world, even at the hands of those who 
return to their countries of origin after an experience of fighting in the 
battlefield against impious governments. We must consider, on the one 
hand, the profound sense of humiliation and frustration experienced by 
those who see themselves as heirs to the powerful and militarily glorious 
tradition of the original Islam, yet today feel dominated and exploited by 
the very infidels who were once militarily their subjects, and, on the oth-
er hand, the renewed confidence and power felt by those who manage 
to arouse a sense of tangible fear in Western societies, forcing them to 
change their routines by closing underground railway systems, schools, 
museums and shopping centres. Closely related to these considerations 
is the subject of violence against Christians. We all know the profound 
doctrinal differences involved here, but violence in this case is incited by 
the choice of separating politics from religion, which objectively promotes 
a state of materialism. The direct consequence of this choice is religious 
ignorance and the recourse to pagan symbols. Attacks can end only if and 
when Christians convert and submit themselves to Islam.
A religious and political dimension offers an explanation for the con-
tinued attacks on individuals, synagogues, yeshivas, kosher shops and 
other targets involving Judaism and the State of Israel. From a religious 
standpoint, if it is true that one must exercise tolerance towards other 
religions as stated in the Qur‘an (2:256: “there is no compulsion in reli-
gion”), then Jews would autonomously imagine themselves as God’s cho-
sen people. The purification of their presence from the “House of Islam” 
is, therefore, a religious obligation, just as Christians must be forced to 
convert and assume an inferior role. The political dimension stems from 
the unresolved Palestinian question. God’s messenger began his ascent 
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into heaven in Jerusalem, which is considered the third holiest city of 
Islam. The occupation of Jerusalem and the founding of the State of Is-
rael on land historically considered the “House of Islam” represent open 
wounds because they offer tangible evidence of the insertion of a foreign 
body in the community of believers, which undermines from within the 
sacred desire for unity. As a result, peace is impossible, and Israel must, 
therefore, be fought until it is destroyed and its land is consequently re-
turned to its legitimate owners. 
Those who prefer to accept various forms of pagan idolatry in their 
lives rather than conform to the message of Islam by living it in their 
daily lives belong to the category of the indifferent ones, be they men, 
women, elderly or children, not to mention the detested Shiites. Directed 
toward these indifferent subjects, war and the practise of decapitation 
and of annihilation are symbolic; they ensure both the purification of the 
victim and propaganda that ends up terrorising the enemy and, at the 
same time, offer a point of reference for all those ready to join the fight 
against the infidels. The apostates belong to the last category and must 
be fought because they have committed a capital offence punishable by 
death: the repudiation of God’s great gift received through birth, that of 
belonging to the Muslim religion. Those who are guilty of committing 
this offence and those who lead others to commit it must be punished. 
Some jihadist choices are less ideologically driven though perhaps 
more difficult to interpret because they are more individual in nature and 
often common among young people. It is impossible to create a typical 
and uniform profile of the new jihadists of European cities. For the most 
part, these young men and women are adolescents, post-adolescents 
and, progressively more, converts. A robust and well-established ideolog-
ical inclination appears only marginal, even if at the end of their process 
of radicalisation they come to understand Islam as the religion oppressed 
by the arrogant West, which must, therefore, be fought and punished. The 
possibility of “crossing swords” with the West and its absolutely negative 
values is welcomed as opportunity for redemption among those who, fac-
ing an identity crisis and/or belonging to a minority group, feel as though 
they are the lowest on the social scale and barely accepted. 
For these reasons an examination of the dynamics that lead individ-
uals to make choices of this nature shows that a lowest common denom-
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inator is found in the profound hatred toward those who hold power and 
in the resulting desire for revenge. In such cases, these individuals are 
often third- or fourth-generation immigrants who face the difficult reality 
of living in large and anonymous suburbs of European cities. At some 
point they may have been found guilty of a petty crime and are, at least 
initially, in the dark concerning the Qur‘an, the Sunnah and the Hadith. 
Their hatred toward the West is often developed in the prison system 
where inmates consider themselves victims of unjust sentences and of 
persecution. While in the past meeting places such as mosques, places 
of worship, cultural centres and gyms were considered typical locations 
in which radicalisation occurred, today it happens in different places 
that are less subject to monitoring by the police. Aside from the prison 
system, in which the path to radicalisation is easily followed, attention 
must now be focused on highly individual areas such as neighbourhoods, 
streets and the internet, which allow potential fighters to remain anon-
ymous like thousands of other young men and women. The essentially 
infinite possibilities of communicating anonymously on the internet al-
low individuals not only to share their opinions, taking comfort in those 
who are of like mind, but also to quicken their path toward radicalisation 
through the contribution of others. The appearance of these individu-
als is also changing. The djellaba, the kamis and long beard have been 
replaced by a style of dress completely in line with the vast majority of 
young people, allowing for greater anonymity. The same may be said 
of expressions of religious faith that no longer include showy displays 
during congregational prayers or the imam’s readings of the khutbah on 
Fridays, which could potentially attract the attention of security officials. 
Conversely, they adopt techniques that allow them to appear as regular 
people, which bring to mind the strategy of terrorists belonging to Italy’s 
Red Brigades in the 1970s, though with obvious differences. There is a 
similar religious basis in a certain behaviour borrowed from the hated 
Shiites, which consists of the dissimulation of faith that is ultimately le-
gitimised at times when a display of religious faith could potentially pose 
the risk of persecution to the believer.
We are all aware of the profound changes concerning the time, com-
position and organisation of today’s attacks compared to those in New 
York, Madrid or London. The personal stories of the perpetrators of the 
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attacks in Toulouse, Brussels, Copenhagen, Paris and Tunis reveal differ-
ent types of jihadists, who work in smaller cells if not on their own, like 
“lone wolves”. In these men and women a new type of bond supplants 
ideology. It consists of a competitive spirit among those courageous 
enough to rise up and reveal themselves to a world that is disinterested 
and hostile. They risk their very lives in order to add a heroic dimension 
to their choice and make themselves not only visible to the world but 
also worthy in the “eyes of God”, whose cause they are ready to defend 
even to the point of martyrdom. In fact, for the subjects of this new form 
of indoctrination and radicalisation, attacking the West embodies the 
fight for a world that is neither chaotic nor depraved but rather firmly 
oriented toward the values of Shari‘a. These men and women can live 
in “honour and goodness” in a world different from Western societies, 
which permits smoking, drugs, alcohol and pornography while using the 
media as a means of distorting reality and manipulating the individual. 
It seems, therefore, that for the new generation dissimulating and 
appearing anonymous might help an individual attract significant media 
attention through some spectacular act and consequently gain a great 
deal of notoriety, effectively allowing that individual to remove himself 
from a relatively obscure social situation. The jihadist vocation appears 
as the only opportunity to rediscover one’s identity through the sacral-
isation of hatred directed towards a particular society and its symbols. 
For such an individual there is a need to become visible and to leave 
proof not only of a given choice but also of existing and making a mark 
in the world. This necessity is easily demonstrated by the cases involving 
Mohamed Merah in Toulouse and Mehdi Nemmouche in Brussels, who 
chose to film their exploits.
The European response
Up to now we have managed to paint a more complete picture of the 
motives behind the protagonists whose behaviour indeed appears hei-
nous to us. The crucial next step is to determine if there is an awareness 
of the new nature of the jihadist vocation and, consequently, to examine 
what has been done up to now and how we are preparing to confront not 
only this threat but also, more generally speaking, its actors in the Euro-
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pean Union. The topics of radicalisation, recruiting and, of course, foreign 
fighters are worthy of particular attention in this context. 
An examination of this nature is, from an operative standpoint, 
closely and inevitably tied to the subject of police cooperation among 
member states. Relevant core business naturally consists of the exchange 
of information among those authorities charged with upholding the law, 
specifically in this case in the realm of antiterrorism. Over time European 
Union legislators have demonstrated a steadfast willingness to provide 
the member states’ police operatives and/or intelligence services with 
the appropriate instruments. Within the greater context of objectively di-
verse legislation and sensibilities, these instruments are designed to tan-
gibly contribute to efforts in the way of prevention and investigation of 
some of the most serious criminal cases, foremost among them the var-
ied expressions of international terrorism. Indeed, the increasingly trans-
national nature of these criminal phenomena has prompted the occasion 
of building upon bilateral agreements among member states by adding 
more extensive methods of cooperation that consequently enhance the 
general principal of subsidiarity. In this light, it is worth mentioning the 
quality and quantity of these instruments, such as the Swedish Initiative, 
the Prüm Convention and the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II), which the Union has used over time in order to promote 
and realise the exchange of information. 
Before reviewing the initiatives adopted in recent months by the Eu-
ropean Council and the Justice and Home Affairs Council in light of the 
increasing attacks recorded in Europe, it is worthwhile to take a general 
look at the politics of the Union with regard to the fight against interna-
tional terrorism. A natural point of departure is the Communication to 
the European Parliament and the Council with which the European Com-
mission proposed “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps 
towards a More Secure Europe”.1 The document identified five strategic 
objectives through which security could be improved. These objectives 
involved preventing terrorism and made specific reference to recruiting 
and radicalisation, dismantling international criminal networks, raising 
the level of security for citizens in cyberspace, strengthening security 
through border management and increasing Europe’s resilience to crises 
and disasters. The strategy put at the disposal of the European Union 
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and its member States all resources and the best experiences available in 
order to effectively respond to such common security threats, forecast-
ing also a periodic review of their implementation. Towards meeting this 
goal, an important role was assigned to the Committee on Operational 
Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), which was instituted in accord-
ance with article 71 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFUE) and presented in the Council Decision of February 25, 2010 
as a body designed to facilitate police cooperation. 
The second report on the implementation of the internal security 
strategy pointed out the necessity of defining, as quickly as possible, two 
other instruments, whose combined implementation will place greater 
importance on actions in the way of preventing and countering the phe-
nomena in question; the European Union’s Smart Borders Package and 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive are now under discussion in the 
Council and in the European Parliament. Now, while the smart border 
rules will be used to provide additional tools promoting collaboration 
among policing agencies, especially during security checks at the exter-
nal borders of the European Union,2 the European PNR has been adapted 
to help prevent and counter terrorist offences and other related crimes 
on flights to and from Europe, offering a clear advantage for police inter-
vention. In fact, the European Parliament and the Council have proposed 
a directive concerning the use of the reservation code for prevention, 
verification, investigation and legal action involving terrorist offences and 
serious crimes. The proposal involves the personal information provided 
by passengers upon purchasing tickets and registering for travel prior to 
departure, which is recorded in the databases of the air carriers for pre-
dominantly commercial purposes. Airlines will be required, upon request 
by specific authorities of member states via the so-called “push” meth-
od, to transfer information relative to the reservation code registration 
of passengers travelling beyond the European Union and to its member 
states. This information is transferred to the Passenger Information Units 
(PIU) of member states, which are entitled to use it exclusively for pre-
vention, verification, investigation and legal action involving terrorist of-
fences and other related crimes.
Both the European Council and the Council for Justice and Home 
Affairs were in favour of adopting this instrument, and the JHA Council 
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pushed yet again for its implementation in an emergency meeting fol-
lowing the Paris attacks on November 13, 2015. Within the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) 
there emerged some difficulties, which are currently under discussion 
among the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. The primary 
concern involves the possibility of increasing the reach of this instrument 
to include all flights within the European Union, strongly favoured by the 
Council, and the subject of data protection, with specific focus on relative 
time limits and storage methods.3 
As we move from discussion of the more practical elements to an ex-
amination of the strategic features from a political standpoint, two stra-
tegic guiding principles are worthy of attention, namely the EU’s strategy 
involving radicalisation, recruitment and foreign fighters on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the new home security strategy. Thanks to the 
significant amount of experience gained in recent years in this area and 
in response to the new “jihadist next door” phenomenon, the European 
Union has shown a willingness to offer an approach that strikes a balance 
between appropriate security measures and direct intervention aimed at 
confronting the factors that promote situations leading to radicalisation 
and recruitment. This leads us to the necessity of combining government 
efforts with action carried out by local communities, society at large, and 
both non-governmental and private organisations. Generally speaking, 
the strategy aimed at opposing these two phenomena will need to adapt 
by advancing the following initiatives: the enhancement and promo-
tion of security, of law enforcement and of equal opportunities for all 
by directly opposing inequality and discrimination; the widespread dif-
fusion through mass media outlets and social networks of the credible 
majority opinion that condemns the use of violence by extremists; the 
enhancement of governmental communications aimed at refuting ex-
tremist ideologies in support of terrorism on-line and off-line; the show 
of absolute support for messages condemning terrorism, with particular 
emphasis on arguments presented by well-known and influential individ-
uals; opposition to these phenomena on-line; the complete reliance on 
the competencies of front-line experts, such as social service and health 
professionals, teachers, religious leaders and personnel employed in the 
penitentiary system so that they might be able to intervene in likely cas-
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es of radicalisation at the beginning stages, thus preventing individuals 
at risk from becoming involved in terrorist activities; the enhancement 
of recovery programmes through political initiatives in support of young 
adults so that they may develop a positive sense of self and recognise the 
inherent dangers of jihadist rhetoric; the support of release initiatives 
modelled after relative socio-cultural conditions; the development of re-
search studies involving ongoing and future trends and challenges relat-
ed to these phenomena, all the while ensuring coherence and decency 
with regard to actions carried out within and outside the European Union 
and working toward both improved integrated management of borders 
and a more functional relationship with other countries. 
The real challenge presented by this strategy obviously lies in the 
necessity not only of implementing it but also of doing so quickly. For 
this reason, in the second semester of 2014 the Italian Presidency of the 
European Union steadfastly pushed at different negotiating tables for the 
JHA Council to approve, among other instruments, a set of guidelines 
for the implementation of each of these strategic policies. As a result of 
the Council’s adoption of these strategic initiatives in December 2014, 
member states, the European External Action Service and the European 
Commission now have at their disposal a well-articulated series of instru-
ments that may be quickly implemented by some of the most diverse 
branches of the European Union’s operative network. Instruments such 
as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), Horizon 2020, the Inter-
nal Security Fund, the Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team and 
INTCEN may be used to fight radicalisation and/or recruitment by identi-
fying effective methods of communicating between the institutions and 
individuals according to the social norms of the communities in question. 
Response to the subject of foreign fighters is more focused, espe-
cially in the wake of attacks in Brussels, Copenhagen and Paris. In Paris 
on July 11, 2014 the Ministers of the Interior of eleven countries issued a 
joint statement, and on February 12, 2014 the heads of state of the Euro-
pean Union also delivered a formal statement. Each statement addressed 
the problem of foreign fighters and articulated the need to devise ap-
propriate responses aimed at improving the security of citizens, prevent-
ing radicalisation and fostering cooperation with international partners. 
Here the goal of improving the security of citizens is linked with the ex-
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pectation of certain actions, such as the necessity of using the current 
Schengen legal system to its full potential. The aim is to ensure that at all 
external borders of the European Union security checks are systematic 
and integrated with the relevant databases of the European Union and 
Interpol. Such checks must be carried out on individuals from the Euro-
pean Union and other countries with the goal of identifying every suspi-
cious border crossing possible both entering into and departing from the 
European Union, thus helping to determine common indicators and carry 
out integrated risk analysis involving the movement of possible foreign 
fighters. The system has also seen improvement in the fight against the 
illegal trafficking of weapons and the financing of terrorism, as well as 
in the areas of intelligence sharing and operational cooperation on the 
national level of intelligence and among policing agencies, to which both 
Eurojust and Europol must offer their full assistance.
Regarding the question of preventing radicalisation, monitoring re-
mains a primary concern along with the elimination of messages from 
the internet that promote terrorism or other forms of violence, which 
must be a joint-effort between public and private sectors. Equally im-
portant are the development of communication strategies aimed at pro-
moting messages of tolerance, non-discrimination, protection of civil lib-
erties, and inter-religious dialogue as well as initiatives dealing with the 
topics of education, work, social integration and rehabilitation. The last 
necessary component involves international cooperation. In this case, it 
is necessary to rethink pre-existing strategies in areas of crisis and con-
flict, to create a tighter dialogue with Middle Eastern and North African 
countries, which includes aid and capacity building projects, and to col-
laborate more closely with the United Nations and the Global Counter-
terrorism Forum. 
Up to now discussion has been focused on the guiding principles 
of the European Union’s strategy for combating radicalisation, recruiting 
and the phenomenon of foreign fighters. The next topic of discussion is 
the second guiding principal of the European Union’s action plan, what 
will become the new Internal Security Strategy. Recently adopted by the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council, the document includes a list of prior-
ities for the coming years, among them: the fight against terrorism and 
terrorists’ access to funding through the prevention of radicalisation (also 
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in prisons), the appropriate management of external borders within the 
greater sphere of integrated border management according to EU norms, 
the fight against organised crime and the fight against cybercrime.
The challenge obviously remains that of obstructing the ever-increasing 
flow of European citizens who travel to war zones and then return without 
being checked. With this in mind, special attention must be paid to internet 
use, the detection and freezing of funding in support of terrorist activities 
and a firm legal response. In this regard, all national regulations must in-
clude as crimes particularly significant acts such as, for example, those 
involving recruitment, training and financial support for terrorist activity 
as well as incitement to carry out such activity.4 Within this landscape, 
on the European, national, regional and local levels much more must be 
done to improve or enact processes involving education, participation 
among young people and inter-religious dialogue in order to fight ine-
quality and prevent instances of social marginalisation. Lastly, of funda-
mental importance is the role carried out by the EU with its neighbours, 
specifically with countries in the Middle East, North Africa, the Western 
Balkans and Turkey. Turkey and the Western Balkans (area traditionally 
exposed to Wahhabism) must be constantly monitored. Two elements 
demonstrate the necessity of “investing” in these areas: on the one 
hand, the vastness and porosity of the borders between Turkey and Syria, 
and, on the other hand, the strategic importance of the airports of Istan-
bul and Sanliurfa, which have become important crossroads for foreign 
fighters arriving from and departing for Europe. Sanliurfa, in particular, 
is situated just a few kilometres from Raqqa, the Syrian city elected as 
capital of the Islamic State. From this perspective, the initiative of the 
European External Action Service deserves praise for its placement of 
security experts in various crisis areas. It is hoped that their work will be 
carried out in the actual areas of conflict rather than in the capital cities 
of the host countries.
Discussion thus far has centred on the response of the European 
Union, but how has Italy responded? As a member of the EU, in recent 
months Italy has played a role in all of the European Union’s important 
relevant groups, such as the COREPER, the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council, and the European Council. It has pressed for the close consid-
eration of the topic of foreign fighters, the adoption of the guidelines 
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for the implementation of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisa-
tion and Recruitment, and the necessity of filling a gap by creating 
together with Europol a network of contacts with the goal of collecting 
and sharing operative information on foreign fighters. For a number 
of reasons Italy has not witnessed a large number of departures of 
foreign fighters for war zones, as has been the case in France, Great 
Britain and Belgium, but it has created a combination of regulations 
that have proven fully functional for the prevention and suppression 
of the phenomena discussed herein. Activity aimed at preventing and 
suppressing these phenomena on the operational level has produced 
significant results, thanks to the possibility of sharing information 
available among police forces or intelligence agencies in the Com-
mittee for Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis. This instrument, in fact, 
serves as an organisational model “ready for export” to countries that, 
as was once the case with Italy, have complex systems of interaction 
between police forces and intelligence agencies. Distinguished by its 
pragmatic and informal approach, it has proven highly functional and 
also complemented pre-existing operational activity. 
Will the aforementioned politics, regulations and operational instru-
ments on both the European and the Italian level guarantee success? 
Regrettably, there is no definite answer since, as is witnessed on a daily 
basis, there is still room for the threat to evolve despite the great amount 
that has been done up to now, especially in the way of understanding 
new patterns of terrorism and responding appropriately to them. Cer-
tainly, an effective response to this challenge must consist of a joint effort 
to spread a greater understanding of the basis of the problem without 
succumbing to an indistinct sense of fear. Legal action against relevant 
criminal activity is naturally a necessity, but while a number of appropri-
ate actions may not offer permanent solutions to the problem, they will 
go a long way to limiting its spread. In order to do so, we must understand 
motives behind these acts, equip ourselves to prevent them beginning 
in our local communities, foster dialogue with the relevant players and 
adapt the training of the diverse public and private professionals through 
modernisation that will result in a shared language and direction. As for 
the European Union, it must explain more effectively the motives behind 
its politics and their inherent value. 
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We must face an inevitably long and complex challenge in order 
to offer a clearer understanding of our society to these young men and 
women by means of the complete reliance on the instruments available 
to us through the rule of law. Our society will appear to them neither as 
dar al-harb (House of war) nor as dar al-islam (House of Islam), but quite 
simply as dar al-salam (House of peace), the realisation of which will pre-
vent any possible foothold of hatred. It is a truly great opportunity that 
we must not let slip away.
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NOTES
1 European Commission, The EU Internal Security in Action: Five Steps 
towards a More Secure Europe, Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2010) 673 
final, Brussels, November 22, 2010.
2 With these new regulations two systems will be developed. One is 
an entry/exit system that will allow for the tracing of entry and exit 
dates and places of non-EU citizens in the Schengen Area. The other 
system includes registered travellers that will offer automatic cross-
ings for regular foreign travellers, who will be subject to preventa-
tive security screening. 
3 On the subject of personal data and the protection of privacy, the 
greatest difficulties surfacing in LIBE are two. One involves the desire 
of some parliamentarians to wait for the decision of the European 
Court of Justice on the potential compatibility with the Treaties of 
the PNR agreement between the European Union and Canada. The 
other involves the necessity that this new instrument keeps in con-
sideration both the contents of the Court of Justice’s April 8, 2014 
sentence on data retention (Cases C-293/12 and 594/12), with a 
subsequent annulment of the related directive, and the forthcom-
ing adoption of the new package (regulations and directive) dealing 
with data protection.
4 Towards this end the Commission intends to carry out an impact 
assessment in view of a potential modification in 2016 of the 2008 
framework decision on terrorism. The United Nations Resolution 
2178 of September 24, 2014 will be taken into account, which re-
quires signatories to “prevent and suppress the recruiting, organis-
ing, transporting, and equipping” of foreign fighters. The resolution 
was issued as a result of the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s military 
role as well as its role as recruiter of volunteers.
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THE CHALLENGES OF FIGHTING 
TERRORISM FINANCING: FOLLOWING 
THE DAESH MONEY TRAIL
Inês Sofia de Oliveira
In the aftermath of the November 2015 attacks in Paris, the interna-
tional community must take time to review and rethink its approach to 
terrorism and the new challenges that emerge as terrorist organisations 
grow stronger and evolve. Terrorist organisations finance their activities 
in a number of ways, and much has been done to limit their access to 
funds. However, new challenges to the pre-existing strategy are emerg-
ing. Whereas tools are in place to freeze and follow the money headed 
towards terrorist groups, the international community must do more in 
terms of coordination and information sharing across borders if it is to 
successfully drain terrorists of financial means and profit. Analysis of the 
financing structure adopted by Daesh reveals a stunning flexibility and 
diversification capability that must be matched by international efforts 
to tackle the financing of terrorism, which is an essential piece of the so-
called “war on terror”.
What is terrorist financing?
Terrorist financing is the process through which funds are made availa-
ble to groups working towards acts of terrorism as defined by states and 
the international community.1 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolution 1373, adopted on September 28, 2001,2 defined terrorist 
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financing as the “wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly 
or indirectly, of funds […] with the intention that the funds should be 
used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out 
terrorist acts”.
Unlike money laundering, the conversion of the proceeds of 
crime into legitimate goods or capital, the financing of terrorism of-
ten involves “controlling funds coming from legal sources that may be 
intended to be used for crime (perhaps primarily but not exclusively 
terrorism)”.3 “Following the money” through the identification, moni-
toring and reporting of suspicious financial transactions is, therefore, 
the key pillar of the international strategy to tackle terrorist financing 
and maintain the integrity of the formal economic structures that may 
inadvertently support it.
International action against the financing of terrorism is distinct 
from other areas (military and political) of response to the terrorist 
threat due to its intrinsic reliance on the collaboration of financial 
service providers and other transnational business involved in trading 
and transport.
“Following the money”,4 as it has become known, relies on the 
premise that criminal groups and terrorist organisations alike use finan-
cial institutions5 to launder money and finance activities, which not only 
compromises law enforcement efforts to prevent the corruption of the 
formal economy but also endangers global economic stability by weak-
ening its core infrastructure.
Government and global financial institutions, therefore, work in 
close cooperation, exchanging information and building common un-
derstandings of the main strategies and financing tools being used by 
terrorists. As implemented by states, existing counter-terrorist financ-
ing measures require private businesses to identify, monitor and re-
port on their clients if and when transactions suspected of being relat-
ed to terrorist activity take place.6 Among others, the existing strategy 
includes a strict understanding of the identification and background 
of clients, the beneficial ownership of enterprises, the restriction of 
capital transfers in case of suspicion, the monitoring of all accounts 
for traces of terrorist acts and the transmission of relevant identified 
information to authorities.
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The international (un)coordinated response
The international adoption of counter-terrorism financing measures 
and legislation is fairly widespread and consistent. UNSC Resolution 
1373 (2001) calls upon states to criminalise, freeze and prohibit terror-
ist financing.7 As a binding act, it triggered the obligation on states to 
prevent funds from being accessed by terrorists (and those aiding or 
abetting) and from entering the international financial system. More 
recently, in order to reflect the adjustment and new challenges posed 
by terrorist organisations, the UNSC updated its intentions to specif-
ically target Daesh and its related funding streams. UNSC Resolution 
2170 (2014) specifically aims to restrict Daesh financing by including 
binding provisions prohibiting profiting from or dealing with: revenues 
generated from the control of oil fields and related infrastructure, kid-
napping ransoms, trade, donations from individuals and entities, and 
any sanctions evasion through aircraft or other transport to transfer 
gold or other valuable items and economic resources for sale on inter-
national markets. These measures were furthermore corroborated by 
UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) to include the financing and support of 
foreign terrorist fighters and all those seeking to travel to fight along-
side terrorist organisations.
In February 2015, the UN reinstated its conviction that limiting funds 
is an essential element of its counter-terrorism strategy8 by adopting yet 
another resolution, UNSC Resolution 2199, which aimed specifically at 
suppressing the financing of terrorism9 and included restrictions on all 
trade, banking and similar commercial dealings counter to international 
law. International action to combat the financing of terrorism is, there-
fore, not only a political tool but also one with significant implications for 
international industry. 
The multilateral actor supporting the implementation of UNSC 
measures – and their impact on the private sector – is the Financial Ac-
tion Task Force (FATF), which has been the standard setter for anti-money 
laundering regulations since 1989. FATF recommendations on “interna-
tional anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
and proliferation” broadly define the measures required to address an-
ti-money laundering and terrorist financing that must be put in place by 
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states in order to respond to the threat. FATF recommends that all rele-
vant stakeholders, public and private sectors alike, pay special attention 
to alternative remittance systems, cash couriers, non-profit organisations 
and wire transfers, which are identified as particularly vulnerable given 
the difficulties in determining the provenance and destination of funds 
in these areas. As a result of the binding nature of UNSC resolutions and 
the enforcement capacity of FATF recommendations, the criminalisation 
of terrorism financing, including the preparation, abetting, facilitation or 
financial support of terrorism, is a globally adopted practice.
Regional organisations also support international counter-terror-
ist measures. The European Commission (EC) has recently proposed a 
package of measures to complement, review and harmonise EU action 
to combat terrorism, including some measures on terrorism financing. 
Presented by Frans Timmermans, first Vice-President of the Commission, 
the package is divided into a Terrorism Directive and an Action Plan on 
illegal trafficking of firearms and explosives10 and will ultimately aim to 
increase information sharing, mutual legal assistance and joint investiga-
tions among EU member states. 
In sum, actions to counter terrorist financing are relatively well es-
tablished and implemented globally. However, although the process of 
criminalising terrorism and restricting its support has been easy for gov-
ernments, the extent to which countries have been able to cooperate 
in real terms to track, pursue and detain potential terrorist finances is 
still a challenge. Governments, through the guidance of the UNSC and 
FATF and with the assistance of the private sector, are able to “follow 
the money” and determine criminal finance trends, perpetrators and 
destinations. However, Daesh’s diversification of terrorist financing pos-
es new challenges that require awareness of not only the source and 
destination of money but also methods of curtailing the new activities 
used to finance terrorism.
Daesh financing
2014 estimates put Daesh’s oil profits at 1 million dollars per day and 
kidnap ransoms at 20 million dollars per year.11 The diversification of 
the funding strategy illustrates the group’s acknowledgement that it 
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cannot rely on one single income source and that it faces increasingly 
greater restrictions within the international financial system. Daesh’s 
“fortune” originates essentially from its control of territory and the ap-
propriation of existing revenue sources.12 Bank looting, oil trade, ag-
ricultural exploitation, external funding networks and taxing civilians 
are crucial, but militants also rely on human trafficking, smuggling of 
precious goods, kidnapping for ransom, and the looting and selling of 
cultural artefacts.13  
Occupation of territory and taxation
Daesh has made its fortune through occupying territory belonging to Iraq 
and Syria and by the looting of state assets and available resources. The 
2013 take-over of Mosul’s central bank and its treasures is thought to 
have generated a profit of 420 million dollars,14 not including property, 
transport vehicles and other goods appropriated during the occupation. 
As an aspiring state, Daesh has also begun to collect taxes from citizens 
and businesses and also from the very few individuals that travel across 
its controlled territory.
Natural resources
Trading in natural resources is perhaps the second largest source of fi-
nancing after territorial gains. Taking into consideration declining oil pric-
es and the increased difficulties in refining oil, FATF estimates that Daesh 
is able to produce 50,000 barrels of petroleum per day selling at around 
35 dollars per barrel.15 Currently, despite the efforts of the international 
anti-Daesh coalition16 prioritising airstrikes on the terrorist organisation’s 
oil refineries, which aim to limit their oil production capacity, it is be-
lieved that the group is still able to trade unrefined oil on the black mar-
ket by hiding or disguising the origin of the product.17
Daesh’s reliance on the exploitation of natural resources, especially 
oil and gas but also agriculture and products of other extraction indus-
tries, represents one of the most difficult challenges to the international 
combat strategy due to the impossibility of distinguishing or identifying 
the provenance of these resources. Unlike with other trafficked goods, if 
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the international community fails to identify the transport of the products 
and if “smurfing” is successful, then little can be done to counter these 
practices other than freezing any identifiable financial transactions.
Antiquities
Although looting had always been a problem in Iraq and Syria, now it 
represents a source of income and offers “hope for people”.18 “The trade 
begins with ‘local diggers, who sell their finds through a black market to 
intermediaries, who in turn resell to local or foreign dealers’ who then 
resell artefacts to collectors”.19 Professional criminals, civilians, rebels 
and government forces (in Syria), and Daesh co-exist in this sphere and 
compete over the market and profits from the trade of artefacts.20 Daesh, 
however, has deployed an organised strategy, which, through an inten-
sive network, access to tools and relevant markets, and an outright will-
ingness to destroy, has helped it emerge as the largest looter and great-
est threat to cultural heritage in the areas under its control.21 
As part of its aspiration to operate as a state rather than an armed 
group, it issues licenses for excavation and facilitates the transport, thus 
profiting from a trade that would consume too much time and too many 
resources to carry out on its own. It also enforces taxation, at a flat rate of 
20%, for the transport and sale of artefacts.22 Daesh takes advantage of 
the historical sites and artefacts within its reach “by running a trafficking 
network, facilitating smuggling through offering a service, or levying a 
tax on traffickers who move looted artefacts through their territory”.23 
The US Department of State has recently found evidence that Daesh has 
raised at least 1.25 million dollars from antiquities smuggling.24 Judging 
from satellite pictures of Daesh-controlled areas that illustrate the in-
crease in excavation sites since 2012,25 profiting from the trade of arte-
facts appears to be firmly on the rise and facing little resistance.
Donations
FATF has also identified donations by non-profit organisations and indi-
viduals as an important, albeit much smaller, source of income.26 Daesh 
carries out some fundraising activities on-line that target international 
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supporters, particularly donors from the Gulf region. Some donations are 
in the form of goods and services rather than capital, which makes them 
increasingly more difficult to trace. 
Overall, Daesh’s financing model illustrates a diversified strategy and 
highlights the varied challenges posed to the international community, 
which must address this threat in its many different forms. Following the 
money trail of such a multi-resourceful actor is insufficient, and the ex-
isting measures must become more reliable in the area of collaboration 
among states, which facilitates targeted cross-border action against traf-
ficking in antiquities, illegal oil sales, and any sort of supply chain heading 
towards terrorist-controlled areas. 
The devil is in the detail
The international community has produced and agreed upon sufficient 
documents and legislation to address terrorist financing. However, recent 
terrorist attacks have actually been relatively inexpensive to carry out.27 
Furthermore, the increasing incidence of lone-wolf terrorist attacks, 
which are carried out by extremists drawing inspiration from terrorist 
organisations but acting alone, further indicates that the time when ter-
rorism was a costly and complex network operation may be behind us. 
Daesh’s multifaceted financing structure, which simultaneously 
engages in trading, illicit trafficking and state-like fundraising schemes, 
is challenging the international community’s existing strategies to limit 
terrorist financing. The result is the unavoidable recognition that terror-
ist organisations are adjustable actors with the capacity to respond and 
adapt to counter-measures and adversity.
International action to identify and restrict terrorism financing has 
thus far been focused on asset freezing and ensuring the criminalisation 
of all those aiding, abetting and financing terrorism. However, criminal 
action is constantly evolving and making use of a number of resources, 
and the efforts to stop it, therefore, must also evolve and make use of 
diverse resources. While the use of financial intelligence to identify the 
origin of attacks and their perpetrators may prove relatively successful, 
recent attacks and Daesh’s financing structure demonstrate that sig-
nificant challenges still remain regarding sharing information among 
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states, coordinating investigations, addressing diverse cross-border 
threats in tandem, and making full use of partnerships with the finan-
cial institutions involved.28
Solid relations and partnerships between states and financial insti-
tutions are, therefore, key elements of any future action aimed at ad-
dressing the relative challenges and building a cooperative and consist-
ent implementation of the existing strategy. Since September 11, 2001, 
the international community has come a long way towards counteracting 
terrorist financing, but, as is the case with most everything in life, the 
“devil is in the detail”. States must now focus on working together and 
finding new allies if they are to respond effectively to the threat at hand.
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THE MEDIA, METHODS AND 
MESSAGES OF THE ISLAMIC STATE’S 
COMMUNICATION STRATEGY
Harith Hasan al-Qarawee 
This article examines the communication strategy of the Islamic State. As 
an outlawed terrorist group, IS has focused great attention on controlling 
information and using available media to recruit fighters or deliver mes-
sages. It has been under no obligation to abide by legal, moral and pro-
fessional standards. As a consequence, it is willing and able to use all 
types of messages that magnify its strengths and conceal its weaknesses, 
no matter how abusive and elusive they might be. It has branded itself 
as a spectacularly violent group whose cruelty and preparedness to com-
mit atrocities have no limits. This article addresses the subject in three 
sections. The first deals with the group’s communication strategies, the 
second with its tools and tactics and the third with its messages. It draws 
on materials published by the group through its media outlets, in addition 
to what has been written on the topic in Arab and Western media and 
research centres.1
The Islamic State’s communication strategies
The Islamic State’s methods of communication and messages are used 
as strategic tools of war and power consolidation. As a terrorist organisa-
tion adopting a militant and messianic ideology, the group has multiple 
interests in elaborating an effective communication strategy. It wants to 
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communicate with the world on its own terms, mainly by controlling in-
formation and disseminating messages that serve its propaganda with-
out harming its secrecy.
On rare occasions, IS has allowed foreign journalists to visit its “ter-
ritories” and embed with its members, as was the case with the German 
journalist, Jürgen Todenhöfer.2 In general, however, the group does not 
trust the coverage of Western journalism and prefers to confide in its 
own propaganda machine and media partners in constructing the nar-
rative about its activities and operations.3 Additionally, IS uses a varie-
ty of media outlets to propagate its promise of an unremitting “holy” 
war and salvation for “true Muslims” that follow this promise. As an 
outlawed group that is denied access to most mainstream outlets, it de-
pends significantly on new media and social networks, especially given 
the fact that these media tolerate anonymity and allow the publication 
of non-verified content. 
In December 2015, “The Guardian” published a document written 
by a leading member of IS4 proposing an administrative plan for the Is-
lamic State. In this document, media and propaganda are identified as 
significant elements in IS’s management of its so-called state. The docu-
ment discusses the need for a major “promoter” serving the objectives 
and interests of the Islamic State, which requires full-time media institu-
tions functioning under the supervision of one administration. 
This attempt to control the group’s propaganda and centralise key 
outreach decisions has not prevented IS from building a decentralised 
structure to guarantee the flow of messages from different sources. Each 
wilayah (region) controlled by the group has its own media office cover-
ing the group’s activities in the region. The main concern is to make sure 
that these messages serve the group’s main objectives. For that reason, 
it assigns key media positions to people whose loyalty to the group is not 
in question. The position of the spokesperson, for example, which is the 
highest media position in the group, was given to one of its core leaders 
and ideologues, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani. 
The group publishes, releases and distributes its materials through 
media centres such as al-Hayat, al-Furqan, Ajnad, al-I’tisam, al-Battar 
and al-A’maq. Most of these centres exist only virtually and are part of 
a sophisticated decentralised network functioning from different places 
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around the world. In addition, there are thousands of fervent individuals 
who support the group by disseminating relevant materials. In this sense, 
even if the group’s physical existence suffered a severe attack, its virtual 
network could continue to function and deliver a narrative inconsistent 
with the realities on the ground. Hence, these media outlets have en-
hanced IS’s ability to construct its own reality. 
The Islamic State is engaged in a war of narratives with various en-
emies and on different levels.5 Therefore, it has diversified its media and 
tactics, as well as the content of its speech and language. In this sense, it 
uses a degree of market segmentation. Its messages targeting local pop-
ulations residing in territories under its control are distinct from those 
aiming to recruit fighters and supporters and also from those targeting 
other Muslim countries or the Western audience.6 
Media, tools and tactics
Unlike other jihadist groups, IS has widely used audiovisual production 
to deliver its messages. It has produced several films or short videos 
characterised by technical sophistication and exaggerated exhibitionism. 
The group has attracted people with experience in audiovisual produc-
tion and taken advantage of the technological development in this field, 
especially new software.7 IS has also published magazines and used tra-
ditional media outlets in order to deliver ideological content and more 
detailed messages. Among its well-known publications is “Dabiq”, the 
on-line magazine first published in July 2014 in a number of different 
languages. The group also founded al-Bayan Radio, which broadcasts in 
Mosul. In addition, billboards and murals have been installed in Mosul 
and Raqqa to standardise the spatial symbolism and assert the group’s 
ascendancy. Important vehicles for IS’s propaganda are virtual libraries 
and websites, designed to post the group’s publications, videos and au-
dios, and to promote its narrative in political and ideological debates. 
They contain vast collections of e-books and pamphlets on jihad and its 
ideological and operational aspects, as well as information about fighting 
tactics and instructions on ways to design and create explosive devices. 
It is well known that social networks are the most important me-
dium for the Islamic State. They can be divided into two types: closed 
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jihadist networks and popular open networks. The former are specialised 
social media that appear for a period of time to circulate publications and 
materials and to host debates on issues of concern. The latter include 
networks and platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. They 
have become a crucial tool to spread propaganda and recruit new mem-
bers and have been used widely because they are inexpensive, easy to 
use and capable of providing a high degree of anonymity. A recent study 
published by the Brookings Institution explains that Twitter, in particular, 
has been one of the most favourite tools used by the group and its sym-
pathisers.8 The study identifies more than 46,000 Twitter accounts affil-
iated with or sympathetic to IS. Although many of these accounts have 
been closed by Twitter and do not, after all, represent a large percentage 
of the network’s 288 million users, the study notes an attempt to organ-
ise harmonious and effective campaigning for IS. 
Another study released by George Washington University breaks 
down Twitter accounts into three categories: nodes, amplifiers and 
shout-outs. The nodes are the top voices in the IS Twittersphere, which 
set its agenda and create content. The amplifiers re-tweet and share this 
content, while the shout-outs introduce new accounts to the community 
and promote the new accounts of previously suspended users.9
Key messages
Messages produced by ISIS vary according to their targeted audience and 
objective. Through its discourse and communication content, the group 
seeks to achieve several strategic objectives that, for the purpose of this 
study, can be divided into three main categories: legitimisation, mobili-
sation and terrorising.
Legitimisation
Seeking to consolidate its power and recruit people, IS markets itself 
through two main legitimising narratives: one emphasising that it is a 
state and the other asserting that it is truly Islamic. In mediatic terms, IS 
has worked to demonstrate this by spreading standard images and sym-
bols such as the black flag and the black uniform-like costume of its mem-
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bers. As an important legitimising tool to assert its status as a “state”, IS 
has strived to appear as an authority exercising governance and securing 
loyalty within areas under its control. Here, its messages to local popu-
lation are usually delivered through traditional media, such as billboards 
and murals, and direct personal contact. The group publishes images of 
its social services, such as providing cheap medical care, distributing aid 
or petrol to local residents, offering classes to teach Qur‘an, reaching out 
to children and patrolling the cities in police cars.10 Recent photographs 
circulated by IS-affiliated websites show that the group completed a pro-
ject to pave a key commercial road in Aleppo. The group also released 
pictures in November 2015 showing its members actively working in (and 
also supervising) a lettuce farm in Fallujah, a dairy factory in Aleppo and a 
centre for the rehabilitation of war-wounded and disabled patients.
IS presents itself as the ultimate objective of any true Muslim. It has 
frequently urged Muslims to migrate to its lands, join forces under its 
umbrella and support the Islamic State in every possible way. Khilafah 
is portrayed as an integral part of Islam that Muslims had lost for a long 
time but now has finally been restored, thanks to its mujahideen. 
In his first speech as khalifa, al-Baghdadi pleaded for Muslims every-
where to join the khilafah state: “Come to your state. Syria is not for 
Syrians, and Iraq is not for Iraqis. The land is for Allah, who decides to 
whom it is entrusted”. He specifically called on religious scholars, preach-
ers, judges, military officers, administrators and public servants, doctors 
and engineers to remember that it was their obligation to help the “true” 
nation of Muslims.11
As a Salafist organisation, IS believes that justice has no other mean-
ing but submission to Shari‘a. Accordingly, a just state is, in keeping with 
the group’s definition, an Islamic Salafist state. Therefore, people have to 
follow its mandates as the group “purifies” society from non-Islamic laws 
and practices. The group installed a large billboard in Mosul showing one 
of its militants placing a foot on what seemed to be books of law while 
holding a machine gun in his hand; beside the image Arabic words read: 
“Under my foot man-made laws”. Another billboard included the follow-
ing statement in Arabic: “We want to have nothing but God’s law to judge 
us”. A similar message was seen on a mural with the slogan: “The Islamic 
State: a book guides and a sword brings victory”.12
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While seeking to appeal to all Muslims, IS cannot ignore the com-
petition with other jihadist organisations, especially al-Qaeda and its 
branch in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, in addition to smaller Sunni groups both 
in Syria and Iraq. The terrorist organisation has engaged in this compe-
tition politically, ideologically and militarily. Its propaganda emphasises 
that it represents an expanding Islamic state to which all other jihadist 
groups should pledge loyalty. It insists that no other flag but its own can 
be raised in the lands of khilafah and celebrates the declarations of bai-
yah (allegiance) made by other jihadist groups in the region. It uses these 
proclamations, even the most symbolic ones, to give the impression of 
an incessantly growing project despite the hostilities it has been facing.13 
Jihadist forums have seen intense debates on IS’s actions and deci-
sions. Its advocates have sought to justify in religious terms the declara-
tion of khilafah as one based on true Salafist jurisprudence. The group 
has declared an ideological and military war against those challenging its 
authority, issuing several statements to justify actions against them. This 
legitimising narrative is associated with a mythology viewing today’s con-
flict in apocalyptic terms. The group named its magazine, “Dabiq”, after a 
small town in Syria’s Aleppo (Halab) region near the border with Turkey. 
An Islamic prophecy predicted that Muslims would defeat “Rome” (reim-
agined by jihadists as a reference to Western powers for some time) in 
the area of Dabiq before moving to conquer Constantinople (present-day 
Istanbul). The prophecy was quoted at length in the opening pages of the 
magazine.14 This prophecy has been recognised by small circles of jihad-
ists and does not represent an influential element in mainstream Islam. 
However, it has been used to generate the sense of inevitability that IS 
seeks to spread about its ambition of “lasting and expanding”.
Mobilisation
The idea of jihad and that Muslims should be ready to fight for their “Is-
lamic State” is present in most IS statements. Murals and billboards in 
Mosul and Raqqa have been rife with slogans praising jihad. One famous 
quote from Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian jihadist intellectual, has been seen 
written on walls and has also appeared repeatedly in IS texts: “Whoever 
does not pay the price of jihad, shall pay the price of abstention”.15 
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IS’s media outlets regularly produce and distribute anthems glori-
fying the group and its achievements. Among these anthems are “The 
Clanging of the Swords”, “The Islamic State Emerged”, and “Why Kneeling 
Down”. IS’s anthems have been spread on-line by jihadists and support-
ers, using a language of determination and love of martyrdom. Although 
jihadist anthems do not use music, they are usually sung by munshideen 
(performers) with powerful voices. By the end of 2013, IS released the 
song “My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared”, which has become very popular 
on jihadist platforms and among IS supporters. These anthems provide 
the soundtrack to all the Islamic State’s videos and have been played 
from cars in towns under IS’s control and even on the battlefield.
One main objective of the Islamic State’s communication strategy 
is to recruit more fighters and operatives. It is well known that social 
media are one of its main recruitment tools. Publications and audiovisual 
productions have also aimed to present its image as a triumphant and 
undefeatable entity. For example, in June 2014 the group issued a video 
entitled “The Breaking of the Borders”, showing tractors removing bor-
der lines between Iraq and Syria, which was followed by another video 
with the title “The End of Sykes-Picot” in which one of its militant, Abu 
Sayyaf, states that IS will eventually break all of the Middle East’s borders 
to pave the way to Jerusalem.16 
In September 2014, the group released a film called “Flames of War”, 
which covers battles fought by its militants and is followed by a defiant 
message addressing the international coalition. Al-Furqan Media Foun-
dation released four parts of a film entitled “Clanging of the Swords”,17 
which follows the group’s battles since before its taking of Mosul. The 
group also released a series of 50 videos titled “Messages from the Land 
of Epics”, documenting its military achievements. Interestingly, while 
these videos have aimed to communicate an enthusiastic recruiting mes-
sage, the group has usually been careful not to jeopardise the anonymity 
of its militants or reveal sensitive military information regarding the sites 
of their operation or deployment.18 
The group’s messages employ narratives of victimisation in order to 
recruit Sunni Muslim militants. Hence, they have stressed the sectarian 
dimension of the conflict and the idea that Sunni Muslims in Iraq and 
Syria had been humiliated for a long time before the emergence of the 
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Islamic State, and that only by joining IS and subscribing to its radical 
approach, Sunni Muslims will restore their dignity and the ascendancy 
they had once achieved in the past. The victimhood narrative was also 
used after the international coalition began its military campaign against 
IS. One example is a video released following the escalation of the French 
airstrikes in Raqqa as an act of retaliation following the November 2015 
terrorist attacks in Paris. The video shows smashed buildings while an IS 
fighter, speaking in French, states that the airstrikes targeted a medical 
centre and a bakery. Then another masked militant speaking in French 
says: “Oh West. Did you not understand yet? Muslims are no longer what 
they were. Your aggressions will not go without punishment. Muslims to-
day are respected, something you are not used to. […] We will retaliate”.
Terrorising
An important element in the group’s war and communication strat-
egies is what jihadists call “the victory by terror” (Nasr bil-r’ub). The 
use of videos and images showing IS’s extreme violence and cruelty 
is intended to psychologically defeat the enemy even before engaging 
with him militarily. The group justifies this strategy by citing an ac-
count (hadith) attributed to the Prophet Mohammed in which he said 
that he was divinely favoured over other prophets by six characteris-
tics, one of which was “the victory by terror”. As in many other exam-
ples, the group has decontextualised this hadith and re-interpreted it 
to legitimise its brutal behaviour. 
These images depict IS as a ruthless, cruel group and a murdering 
machine that does not compromise with its foes. They seem to have 
been effective in some contexts, especially in the group’s early march 
to control Iraqi cities after its sudden occupation of Mosul. Influenced 
by the cruelty of those images, thousands of Iraqi soldiers are said to 
have fled their positions. The video showing IS militants murdering 1,700 
Iraqi soldiers who were deployed in Camp Speicher military base near 
Tikrit19 was one of the early manifestations of the group’s dependence 
on “terrorising methods”. Afterwards, the group released a series of 
terrorising videos of beheadings, beginning with one named “Message 
to America”, which showed the beheading of James Foley, an American 
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journalist. Shortly thereafter, in September 2014, another video was re-
leased showing the beheading of Steven Sotloff, an American hostage. In 
February 2015, the group released one of its most shocking videos show-
ing its members burning alive a Jordanian pilot who had been captured 
in Raqqa. This video appeared to have upgraded the terrorising methods 
to a new level of cruelty. 
Conclusion
As an outlawed group seeking to mobilise new recruits and communi-
cate rebellious messages, IS has developed communication strategies 
dependent on a mixture of primitive and new media tools. It has used 
billboards, murals and mosque sermons to communicate with local 
populations, while building a relatively sophisticated presence on the 
internet to communicate with its targeted audience abroad. The Islamic 
State seeks to achieve three key objectives through its communication 
strategy: legitimisation, mobilisation and terrorising. To achieve these 
goals it relies on market segmentation and diversification of media. 
Clearly, its on-line activities have been crucial to achieving its last three 
goals. Efforts to shut down its websites and social networks have recent-
ly escalated but are still far from considerably weakening its “virtual” 
presence. The degree of interdependence between the group’s physical 
existence in Iraq, Syria, and Libya and its virtual presence is still unclear, 
but they are undeniably feeding each other. IS has benefited from the 
vacuums created by failed states and civil wars in those countries by 
establishing its physical existence as a self-proclaimed state. Similarly, 
it has benefited from the networked, decentralised and globalised on-
line media that are tolerant of anonymity and non-verified content by 
building its virtual network. This confirms the multi-dimensional nature 
of the conflict against the terrorist group. However, putting an end to 
its physical existence, if indeed possible, might not be sufficient to stop 
its virtual appeal.
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THE LIMITS OF CYBERTERRORISM 
Manuel R. Torres Soriano
Despite the generalised perception of the danger arising from cyberter-
rorism and threatening jihadist propaganda, terrorist groups do not ap-
pear to possess the resources – human, economic, and technological – to 
conduct a cyberwar. Furthermore, it does not seem that such a situation 
can evolve in time to the point of increasing the likelihood of a cybernetic 
attack by the mujahideen. This does not detract from the notion that ac-
tions carried out on the web, especially if repeated and aimed at symbolic 
targets, can have an enormous emotional impact, thus increasing the ac-
tual weight and substance of the danger. 
There is a generalised perception that it is relatively easy to use the inter-
net to cause catastrophic damage by striking a random target connected 
to the web. Among the many players deemed to have a clear interest 
in creating such apocalyptic scenarios, terrorist organisations are recog-
nised due to their penchant for carrying out sensational acts and find-
ing ways to create panic among the targeted populations. Nonetheless, 
a good portion of these predictions stems from a distorted view of the 
nature of cyberspace and the prerequisites necessary to operate within 
it. One of the principal problems in understanding the actual magnitude 
of this phenomenon is the ongoing confusion concerning the scope of 
the concept of cyberterrorism. Actions typically perceived as cyberter-
The limits of cyberterrorism 109
rorism range from “hacktivism” (political activism through sabotage or 
the disclosure of classified digital content) to the use of the internet as 
a means of advancing common terrorist activities, such as propaganda, 
financing, research, or private communication among the members of 
the very terrorist groups.
However, in the strict sense cyberterrorism implies quite exclusively 
the use of cyberspace as an instrument to cause physical harm to individ-
uals and objects, which amounts to something infinitely more complex 
compared to the rest of the activities that are less rigorously associated 
with it.
Is there really any foundation to the alarm concerning the threat 
that could originate from cyberterrorism? In this essay I sustain the thesis 
that not only are terrorist groups, especially jihadist, very deficient in the 
competencies necessary to utilise cyperspace as an instrument to bring 
to fruition attacks (this despite their irrefutable interest in doing so) but 
also that it is rather unlikely that they will be able to reverse this situation 
in the future.
Interest versus competency 
Groups like al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State have demonstrat-
ed their skills quite clearly when presented with the need to utilise new 
information technologies as an instrument useful for the enhancement 
of their traditional terrorist activities. The propagandistic production of 
jihadism has aimed to spur its followers to carry out their own initiatives 
also in the realm of cybernetics. However, these appeals, which are far 
from constituting an actual terrorist blueprint, have seemed for the most 
part like deliberations uttered aloud in hopes of inspiring some other 
sympathetic follower who possesses the necessary skills. An analysis of 
information available from open sources underscores the apparent scar-
city and limited scope of events of this nature. Most of the information 
seems to indicate that some militants might be trying to get trained or 
experimenting with the possibility of carrying out attacks on the internet. 
Appearing in the public eye in recent years have been presumed groups 
of jihadist hackers whose stated goal is that of tapping into their com-
puter skills in order to carry out “electronic jihad”. Nonetheless, beyond 
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their triumphal harangues regarding the mujahideens’ ability to degrade 
the economy of the West, the reality is that the operational knowledge 
of these “groups of experts” has been limited to the sewing together 
of manuals and tutorials, which are not only easily traced on-line or in 
other ways but also lacking in practical value. The “open jihad university” 
that radical groups have claimed to establish on the internet is essential-
ly a propagandistic and motivational tool for its followers rather than a 
training institute for future cyberterrorists. Indiscriminate distribution of 
technical information, in effect, runs counter to the hermetical closing 
and the surprise factor that ought to distinguish a successful cyberter-
roristic attack. 
A greater level of sophistication has been expected from these 
groups, whose “operations” have been limited to uncomplicated attacks 
against insufficiently protected web pages. In some cases their acts 
of sabotage against virtual content deemed offensive from an Islamic 
perspective have been carried out using methods that demonstrate an 
absolute lack of special technical skills. These include, for example, ob-
taining passwords of targeted pages by using “social engineering” tac-
tics, or sending threatening messages to businesses or enterprises with 
servers with the goal of forcing them to eliminate given content from 
cyberspace. 
Cyberconflict’s barriers
The most alarmist projections concerning the feasibility of cyberterror-
ism are based on results of exercises that some American government 
institutions carried out in the late 1990s with the goal of assessing the 
security of their information technology systems. These results, how-
ever, are not directly applicable to what a terrorist organisation could 
obtain if it proposed to arrive at the same goal. Forced to operate in a 
clandestine manner and dedicated to the protection of its members, a 
non-government entity would find it difficult to mobilise a similar crit-
ical mass and to provide a secure environment for collaborative work. 
On the other hand, the bellicose use of cyberspace is not an activity free 
from economic costs. “Digital Pearl Harbor”, a simulation completed in 
2002 by the US Naval War College, came to the conclusion that the re-
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alisation of a complex act of cyberterrorism would require a budget of 
200 million dollars and would also take some five years to implement.
Over the years these entrance barriers have only increased. For ex-
ample, when the Stuxnet worm is used as a paradigm for the destruc-
tive capacity of a “simple” computer program, the actual scope of the 
cyberattack is overestimated. Stuxnet is the work of a multidisciplinary 
team that included experts in many different fields, from nuclear phys-
ics to the engineering of a specific component of industrial products 
marketed by Siemens, but it is also the product of organising operation-
al intelligence, goal identification, and the ability to physically insert the 
program in a network of computers that for security measures were not 
connected to the internet at the time.
The availability of such specialised skills and know-how is as limit-
ed in terrorist groups as it is in the rest of society. Despite the procla-
mations of jihadist propaganda, which claim that there are thousands 
of members who study computer science in order to use their knowl-
edge in combat, the reality is that only a marginal number of activists 
can count on advanced training in computer science or other poten-
tially useful fields of study. Conversely, the American National Security 
Agency (to mention just one of the Western organisations charged with 
fighting a cyberwar) has on its payroll more than one thousand math-
ematicians, nine hundred PhDs researching in different scientific and 
technical fields, and four thousand computer scientists, which repre-
sents the largest global concentration of this type of expertise in a single 
organisation. 
For a terrorist group wishing to complete the development process 
of a cyberweapon, the most important obstacle involves securing the 
means of experimenting developed software repeatedly and of eval-
uating its effectiveness on real targets. Before being put into action, 
Stuxnet had been tested on experimental nuclear installations located 
in the United States, and these installations were equipped with fea-
tures identical to those present on Iranian soil and configured exactly 
as a target would be under attack. Cyberweapons are products created 
specifically to operate against a concrete objective and under unique 
conditions that are unlikely to appear in other victims. The “spread” of 
cyberweapons and the knowledge of their coding by other individuals 
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do not necessarily presuppose a danger of proliferation. Although it is 
certainly possible to obtain useful information concerning the architec-
ture and functioning logic of these programs through an action of in-
verse engineering, we are dealing with know-how that may serve solely 
to inspire future innovations, which is also limited to those possessing 
the necessary human and material resources to use it. There is no evi-
dence in support of the thesis that the mere passing of time plays in the 
favour of the cybernetic aspirations of terrorism. Take the case of the 
hypothetical threat involving the use of chemical, biological, and nucle-
ar weapons, a threat that never materialised due the terrorists’ inability 
to access crucial resources and to master the complexity of instruments 
of this nature. 
One often speculates on the possibility that necessary expertise 
could be subcontracted to “cyberdelinquent” groups demonstrating 
greater technical sophistication, but quite certainly even these groups 
face the same difficulty regarding logistics and preparation. In reality, it 
seems improbable that organisations such as these would be inclined 
to open this “line of exchange”. Even if their motivations are principally 
economic, these groups secure earnings far greater than those that ter-
rorism could potentially offer by carrying out actions on an international 
scale, such as bank fraud directed at individuals, extortion, theft, and 
the sale of data via the internet. Agents of organised crime are aware 
that the pressure they face from diverse policing agencies is infinitely 
lesser than what they would face if they decided to collaborate with 
terrorist organisations.
There are, for that matter, few incentives that would lead a govern-
ment to opt to lose direct control of one of the most valuable assets of 
its arsenal and to assume the risk of transferring it to a group that could 
use it later against its benefactor. In theory the principal advantage 
could be its use against an enemy, which would allow the state to avoid 
retaliation by preserving its ability to deny responsibility. Even though 
the realms of cybernetics and of non-conventional weaponry share a 
degree of complexity that leaves no doubt concerning those who are 
actually able to use such resources, identifying the perpetrator of such 
attacks is not impossible, which makes the idea of working collabora-
tively on an enterprise of this nature even less attractive. 
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Beware what you think
Despite these negative elements, the obsession about the presumed risk 
of cyberterrorism can be transformed into a partially self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Repeated discussion of the ease of producing catastrophic results 
through cyberspace does nothing more than increase the groups’ inter-
est and determination in continuing such attempts. Additional practise 
can help them reach a certain skill level in other kinds of actions that 
have a greater impact in the media, such as data destruction, personal 
data theft, and on-line identity theft. Actions such as these are within 
their reach, and given the low level of technical difficulty involved in car-
rying them out, if they were to be used repeatedly against highly sym-
bolic targets, they could promote among the general public the idea that 
terrorists dominate cyberspace, indeed making their most deranged 
threats seem real.1
Daesh and the terrorist threat: from the Middle East to Europe114
NOTES
1 Published here is an abridged version of M. R. Torres Soriano, 
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RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM IN 
FRANCE: A STRUCTURAL THREAT?
Jean-François Daguzan
While terrorism is not a new phenomenon in France, jihadist terrorism 
has taken on a new dimension after 9/11 and, more recently, with the 
Syrian civil war and its call to arms, which has persuaded tens of thou-
sands of foreign volunteers to travel to the Middle Eastern country, fight 
to defend the “oppressed” Islam from persecution and an alleged plot 
hatched by the Jews, the Western countries and the heretic ones, and to 
expand the true Islamic State. France “supplies” a large portion of these 
foreign fighters and has also become a prime target of the jihad, which 
has unquestionably acquired a European dimension. The motives and so-
cial background of this new generation of fighters are being investigated. 
What has emerged is the lack of a typical jihadist profile. 
The January 2015 attacks on the weekly “Charlie Hebdo” and the Hyper-
casher supermarket (which targeted cartoonists and Jews) and those of 
November 13, 2015 at Bataclan and throughout Paris, which targeted 
young people, marked the beginning of a new phase in the Jihadist fight 
against the rest of the world and France in particular.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in France – in the past, it has 
come in all forms (anarchism, revolutionary communism, regionalism, 
and decolonisation). Terrorism linked to the Arab world and the Middle 
East emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, but it was exclusively political. It 
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was from the mid-1980s that Afghanistan became the crucible of armed 
radical Islamism, that its structural doctrine was outlined in Egypt, and 
that favourable conditions existed for the emergence of al-Qaeda.1 A few 
French youths joined this movement. However, from the 1990s onwards, 
the Algerian civil war brought the conflict to France, with the support of 
dual nationals and young people from immigrant backgrounds. This is the 
moment when radical Islamic terrorism emerged in France.
External terrorism that, little by little, became a national issue
This wave coincides with the Algerian crisis and appearance of the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA), which brought the conflict onto French soil with the 
Saint-Michel and Port Royal bombings (1995 and 1996). During this pe-
riod, European terrorists began to travel to the fields of jihad, in other 
words, the areas which represented focal points for Muslim issues, nota-
bly Bosnia, Egypt, Algeria, Chechnya and Afghanistan. Less than one hun-
dred French citizens travelled to fight in Bosnia, but the most radicalised 
of these returned to France ready for action.
Of course, jihadist terrorism took on a new dimension after 9/11, 
which brought al-Qaeda’s cause to the world’s attention. From this time 
on, Bin Laden and the Algerian Islamists have posed a threat to France. 
Meanwhile, various heads of the French intelligence services have stated 
that two or three major incidents have been prevented in France each 
year.2 The American invasion of Iraq began to attract volunteers, but their 
numbers were low. France’s involvement in Libya then Mali provoked 
renewed condemnation from Islamists of various origins. Some French 
citizens (including one convert) were arrested in Mali. But the real wide-
spread call to arms was to come with the Syrian civil war, which led tens 
of thousands of foreign volunteers (30,000) to travel to the region to 
fight. French citizens make up a large proportion, occupying first place in 
Europe and third worldwide after Tunisians and Chechens.
Like Bosnia twenty years ago, but with the addition of internet tech-
nology, Syria has offered a space for jihadists which is in relatively close 
proximity. All it takes is a bus ticket, and some volunteers travel with their 
wives and children. In 2014, former Minister of the Interior and current 
Prime Minister Manuel Valls estimated the number of jihadists who had 
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passed through Syria to be 700, with around 250/280 there present at 
that time and roughly twenty dead. 150 potential recruits were believed 
to be preparing for departure.3 One year later, 1,775 have passed through 
Syria and 543 are there currently (139 have died). Not all of these de-
partures represent the same level of danger. However, it cannot be de-
nied that this increase makes them harder to manage, especially given 
that the total number has risen by 51% since January 1, 2015. 73% have 
joined Daesh and 22% al-Nusra. This exodus includes 73 women. 23% of 
these jihadists are converts, 30% of them women.4 This phenomenon is 
so worrying that the French Prime Minister stated that 10,000 individuals 
are subject to “fiche S” files, issued by the security forces for individuals, 
flagging them as jihadist sympathisers.5
The modus operandi of the terrorists has become simpler. Rather 
than aiming to carry out bomb attacks, which call for a minimum lev-
el of equipment and technical expertise, and therefore often require a 
network, they favour attacks using automatic weapons. The “militarised” 
staging and filming of massacres of defenceless people give their perpe-
trator a feeling of power, instant media attention and create the sense of 
a brotherhood of arms among the guerrillas. Moreover, they enable the 
terrorists, as it did Merah or those involved in the January and November 
2015 shootings, to continue their “fight” against society – which is, of 
course, not possible with suicide attacks using explosive belts.
Radical Islamic terrorism has replaced the old guard of international 
terrorism (anarchism, revolutionary communism, etc.) and the old total-
itarian regimes, but it relies on tools which were not available to these 
ideologues of the past: instant global communication via social networks 
(with self-radicalisation becoming a fact of society), the accessibility of 
technology, the availability of small calibre guns and explosives, and, for 
radical proselytisers, a ready supply of frustrations and identity issues on 
which to found a long and deadly “adventure”.
Motives
Terrorists explain that Islam faces persecution in a number of countries 
and that “true” Muslims have good reason to defend themselves or to 
attack (this offensive dimension is stronger in Daesh than al-Qaeda). As a 
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result of its actions at home (the headscarf policy, secularism, caricatures 
of Mohammed) and abroad (Mali, Libya, Syria), France is considered to 
be a prime target. This “oppressed” Islam acts as a banner for those who 
feel humiliated and oppressed themselves. They therefore have a “duty” 
to fight their oppressors. The “plot” against Islam, instigated by the Jews, 
the Crusaders (Westerners), the unbelievers (bad Muslims) and the here-
tics (Shiites) therefore becomes an obsession, and something which they 
must fight against using all possible means. They must flee to the place 
where Islam is at its purest (in other words the liberated lands of the Is-
lamic State) and aid in its expansion, or if this is not possible, fight where 
they are. With the shift from GIA to GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat), which later became AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magh-
reb), France was named the second greatest enemy after the United 
States.6 Daesh has made it number one!
No “typical” jihadist
Essentially, we are faced with French people killing French people! It is 
true that these include dual nationals, but, despite the global nature of 
this issue, the large number of converts makes it a French phenomenon. 
However, there is also an undeniable European dimension, as jihadists 
from Belgium were at the heart of the 13 November attack.
While radicalisation can affect all sorts of people, there is no typical 
jihadist profile. Research carried out on radicalisation in France reveals ex-
tremely varied cases.7 Among the jihadists, we find a certain number of 
dropouts, individuals trapped in the banlieues, the deprived suburbs out-
side major cities, unemployed and with unemployed parents.8 However, it 
would be a serious mistake to associate terrorism solely with the economic 
crisis and poverty. Converts are found in all settings. They include those 
from well-integrated and educated backgrounds, those left behind by soci-
ety, converts and thugs radicalised in prison. The common threads are the 
age group (25-35 years old), level of education (secondary on average), and 
a social background of small shopkeepers and family businesses.
Of course, the radicalisation of petty criminals is nothing new. Khaled 
Kelkal, the main perpetrator of the Saint-Michel bombing, acting for the 
GIA, was the first visible example of radicalisation in prison. The Rou-
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baix Gang, dismantled in 1997, was a mixture of radicals (including the 
convert Lionel Dumont) and hardened criminals. Since then, there have 
been numerous recorded cases (both in France and the United States) 
– Mehdi Nemmouche, perpetrator of the massacre at Brussels Jewish 
Museum (2014), and Mohamed Merah, responsible for the murders of 
soldiers and Jews in the Toulouse region in 2012 are good examples of 
this. However, research demonstrates that prison is just one element in 
radicalisation among many others.9 Similarly, attending radical mosques 
is no longer ubiquitous. The internet and social networks play a major 
role, as do small, local recruiters.10
Thus, all studies carried out in France by researchers or public au-
thorities show us that there are only individual cases. These young peo-
ple are aged between 15 and 29. Women represent around 30%. All so-
cial backgrounds are present. There are also numerous converts. The loss 
of family authority and that of society (school, official bodies) appears to 
be a major factor. The feeling of exclusion, humiliation and ghettoization 
also plays a role. The impression that there is an on-going plot (against 
Islam) controlled by the Jews is also widespread. For the better-off, it 
is a question of a teenage identity crisis and a quest for adventure. As 
a result, radicalised young people can no longer believe anyone except 
their brothers in Allah (“the Truthful ones”), the only ones to possess the 
truth. Group bonds play an important role.11 The girls are attracted to 
the humanitarian aspect of jihad – helping people who are facing per-
secution and bombings. “The new believer restructures himself around 
a counter-system of supposedly traditional values, which set him apart 
from the world around him: he creates an opposition between frugality 
and the opulence of the world; modesty and the aggressive commercial-
ised sexuality of western countries; spirituality and materialism; solidar-
ity and individualism”.12
In this context, death is easy as it leads to Heaven. The jihadist 
therefore establishes an opposition between his fascination with and val-
orisation of death and the “cowardice” of the unbelievers. He acquires, 
as Farhad Khosrokhavar notes, a “Superman status”.13 As such, suicide 
bombings are both a tactical weapon and an end in themselves.
The current situation in France is therefore characterised by a 
change in scale. The number of terrorists has reached a level that has not 
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been seen since the end of the Second World War! The second factor, as 
we have mentioned, is the massive impact of social networks. Globalisa-
tion, internet use and mobile phones have created what is known as a 
“cyberjihad”, an underground recruitment system in which lost individu-
als can find empirical answers to a quest, for adventure, for identity. The 
jihadists are aware of this. For the past year, an original French version 
of a jihadist website (“Dar al-Islam” magazine) has been realised. This 
is a significant development as in the past it had been translated into 
French from English. The third factor is surterrorisation, or “over-terror-
isation”: Bombay, the attacks in Kenya, the massacre of a hundred and 
thirty-two children in Peshawar, throats slit in Syria, Boko Haram setting 
fire to villages and their inhabitants and the killings carried out by Daesh 
are illustrations of this. Surterrorisation and its impact are sold as a re-
cruitment method and the preferred form of action. This use of terror 
as a propaganda tool has been theorised by several Daesh authors and 
publications, such as “Idaratou Atawahouche” (The management of bar-
barity) by Abu Bakr Naji, and “Fiqh al-Dima” (The jurisprudence of blood) 
by Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir. 
Should we speak of a “radical generation”, as socialist Member of 
Parliament Malek Boutih did in his government mission report?14 While 
it may be an exaggeration to speak of a generational phenomenon, the 
number of aspiring jihadists poses a major long-term threat to France.
In conclusion, Islamist terrorists do not appear to be winning what 
they believe to be a war against the West and other Muslims. However, 
we can be certain that a considerable pool of volunteers will step in to 
replace the pseudo-martyrs and continue this terrorist fight which calls 
more for willingness than for means. The fragmented, worldwide and 
unseizable nature of the network, the charisma of its leaders, the fantasy 
of the caliphate, the shifting of the jihad on a global level and the ruth-
less violence of the followers of takfir,15 make it possible to imagine a 
continuation of terrorist activity and on-going attempts to carry out ever 
more spectacular acts, whether by conventional means or otherwise. 
The definitive annihilation of Daesh on Syrian soil is just one aspect of 
this multi-faceted phenomenon.
While the elimination of these groups and the fight against terror is 
essential for the security of our societies, it cannot be the only response 
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to this movement. The constant state of emergency, which appears to 
be taking hold in France as a result of government measures, is not sus-
tainable. It is true that the most radicalised fringe is totally indifferent to 
anything but suppression. But for the sake of the “lost” young people 
searching for an ideal, we must also attack the underlying causes behind 
the emergence of this new threat. They are political, economic and social 
and stem from a societal model that offers no ideal to its most defence-
less young people.
Daesh and the terrorist threat: from the Middle East to Europe124
NOTES
  1 See J.-F. Daguzan, Terrorisme(s), abrégé d’une violence qui dure, 
CNRS Editions, Paris 2006.
  2 See J.-F. Daguzan, El terrorismo islámico en Francia, Real Instituto 
Elcano, December 22, 2008, available on-line at www.realinstitu-
toelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOB-
AL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari166-2008.
  3 S. Mantoux, Cachez ces djihadistes que je ne saurais voir… les volon-
taires français en Syrie, Historicoblog, July 26, 2014, available on-line 
at historicoblog3.blogspot.it/2014/07/cachez-ces-djihadistes-que-je-
ne.html.
  4 Figures authorised and confirmed on October 22, 2015.
  5 Valls: ‘20.000 personnes font l’objet d’une fiche S en France’, Lefiga-
ro.fr, November 24, 2015, available on-line at www.lefigaro.fr/flash-
actu/2015/11/24/97001-20151124FILWWW00383-valls-20000-
fiches-s.php.
  6 J.-F. Daguzan, El terrorismo islámico en Francia.
  7 France did not begin to carry out in-depth sociological studies of ji-
hadism until very recently. 
  8 S. Belaala, Les facteurs de création des processus de radicalisation 
violente, chez les jeunes en particulier, CEIS, Paris 2008, p. 64, avail-
able on-line at ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/pdf/
ec_radicalisation_study_on_trigger_factors_fr.pdf.
  9 Institut national des hautes études de sécurité et de la justice, Rad-
icalisation islamiste et filières djihadistes. Prévenir, détecter, traiter, 
INHESJ, July 2015, p. 12, available on-line at www.inhesj.fr/sites/de-
fault/files/files/publications/rapport_gds_3.pdf.
10 Assemblée National, Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’en-
quête sur la surveillance des filières et des individus djihadistes, June 
2, 2015, p. 42, available on-line at www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/
pdf/rap-enq/r2828.pdf.
11 Ibid., p. 40.
12 Ibid., p. 35.
13 D. Bénichou, F. Khosrokhavar, Le jihadisme. Le comprendre pour 
Radical Islamic terrorism in France: a structural threat? 125
mieux le combattre, Plon, Paris 2015, p. 308; see in particular the 
chapter “Approche sociologique: anatomie de la radicalisation”.
14 M. Boutih, Génération radicale, June 2015, mission report for the 
French Prime Minister, available on-line at www.boutih.fr/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/07/G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ration-radicale.pdf.
15 The Takfir wa hijra (excommunication and exile) movement, born in 
Egypt in the 1980s, authorises the killing of the enemies of Islam, in 
particular “bad Muslims”, and to flee to places where Islam is pure – 
like the Islamic State in Syria today.
Daesh and the terrorist threat: from the Middle East to Europe126
THE HISTORY, MOTIVATIONS,
FRAMING AND PROCESSES OF BELGIAN 
JIHADISM: THE MOLENBEEK CASE
Johan Leman 
The municipality of Molenbeek, which gained notoriety after the Novem-
ber 2015 attacks in Paris, due to its large Muslim population, offers a use-
ful sample to analyse and better understand the process of radicalisation 
of young Muslims, the context in which this process takes place and the 
motivations that drive them towards jihadism. The following analysis1 is 
based on interviews with family members of twenty young people, mostly 
from Molenbeek, who left Belgium between 2012 and 2015 for “small 
jihad”. Analysis is based also on YouTube videos that the subjects had 
watched2 and on insights shared between other researchers, fieldwork-
ers, police officers and some Salafist acquaintances.3 
History 
Khaled Kelkal is one of Europe’s first jihadists.4 Kelkal radicalised during 
a prison sentence between 1990 and 1992, became a member of the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), carried out his jihadist attacks in the summer 
of 1995 and was killed by French police on September 29, 1995.
Kelkal provides an interesting link when discussing jihadism in Bel-
gium, and particularly in Molenbeek, since it is Djamel Beghal, also a 
member of the GIA in France, who stayed some months in Molenbeek 
during his visits to the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. 
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Beghal left for Afghanistan at the end of 2000 and returned to France one 
year later. During his stay in Molenbeek, Beghal came into contact with 
Malika El Aroud and Ayachi Bassam, the French-Syrian sheikh. 
Bassam was obliged to leave France in 1992 and came to Molen-
beek, where he started his pro-jihad activities in 1997 with the creation 
of the Centre Islamique Belge (CIB) and the website Assabile.com. He 
had contact with Farid Melouk, an Algerian member of the GIA, who had 
travelled between France and Belgium before his arrest in 1998 following 
a shootout with police in Brussels. 
In the same marginal neighbourhood in the lower part of Molenbeek, 
sheikh Bassam, Malika El Aroud, from time to time also Beghal, and Abd 
al-Sattar Dahmane, who had married El Aroud and killed Afghan command-
er Massoud a few days before 9/11, could start their recruitment activities, 
first for Afghanistan, and later for Somalia. Also belonging to the network 
was Nizar Trabelsi, the former soccer player arrested in 2001 and con-
demned in 2003 to ten years in prison. After a 2006 court case in Brussels 
against his son and also against his comrade, Raphaël Gendron, sheikh Bas-
sam left Molenbeek for Italy, where, in Bari, a new case was brought against 
him in 2008. Once free, in 2012, Bassam left first for Molenbeek and later 
for Syria. In Molenbeek, Bassam developed once again new connections, 
among them, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a young man who would make contact 
with Mehdi Nemmouche, the killer at the Brussels Jewish Museum in 2014. 
Abaaoud would become one of the brains of the Paris attacks in November 
2015. Obviously, the France-Belgium (in particular, Molenbeek) connection 
has a twenty-year history. Abaaoud and Nemmouche, however, were al-
ready part of a new generation: the so-called third-generation jihadists.
It is interesting, as Kepel observes,5 that in France beginning in 2012 
a third jihad-generation (after the Afghan and al-Qaeda ones) took over, 
including jihadists such as Mohamed Merah, who was responsible for kill-
ings in Toulouse and Montauban, Nemmouche, and others. They are the ji-
hadists that Abu Musab al-Suri hoped for in “The Global Islamic Resistance 
Call”,6 which called for an inter-religious civil war in Europe against all kuffar 
(infidels), an approach that was reinforced when al-Baghdadi proclaimed a 
global jihad in 2014. Nizam, la tanzim: a system, not an organisation.
There is, however, more. A London hate preacher of Pakistani de-
scent, Anjem Choudary, the founder of Sharia4UK, came to Belgium 
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in 2006 to found Sharia4Belgium. He met Fouad Belkacem, who had 
already begun promoting Shari‘a legislation for Belgium in Boom and 
Antwerp in 2004. Starting in Antwerp, the small group around Belkacem 
became active in Vilvoorde, a small city near Molenbeek. Many Moroc-
can families in Molenbeek have family members living in Vilvoorde. Their 
children meet during the year and not only during holidays in the Rif in 
northern Morocco.
In Molenbeek, still in the second-generation spirit, Rachid Benomari 
became a jihadist recruiter for Somalia between 2010 and 2011. He was 
arrested in Kenya in 2013. He recruited, among others, Mustapha Bouy-
ahbaren, who appeared in court in Brussels with Benomari. The fact that 
Mustapha Bouyahbaren helped Trabelsi find a new spouse at the end of 
Trabelsi’s stay in jail in 2012 proves that the original France-Belgium con-
nection is still active. The Bouyahbarens are part of the sample of twenty 
jihadists that we studied. 
However, there is yet another connection that warrants our atten-
tion. When studying Moroccan migrations to European countries, one 
may see that migrants from Nador and Oujda (where many jihadists 
come from) are very present in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. 
In our Molenbeek sample we discovered that at least one jihadist pro-
ject was elaborated in Nador by people coming from Vilvoorde as well as 
from Molenbeek. Nador and Oujda are quite close to Senhadja de Srair, 
in the central Rif (Ketama), which is an area under control of organised 
crime as a result of its large hashish production. From the central Rif 
an important hashish smuggling activity begins, passing through Spain, 
France and Belgium to the Netherlands.7 Is it pure coincidence that a 
certain number of jihadists are drug dealers before their “conversion”?
We must not, however, reduce all possible jihadist recruitment in 
Belgium to the three aforementioned connections. There clearly also ex-
ists a connection between jihadists in the Netherlands and Flanders, and 
there is also the internet with its virtual connections: cyberjihadism.
Numbers
In Belgium, in December 2015, the police followed 1,050 people sus-
pected of having sympathies with terrorism and radicalism. Some 500 
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are from the Brussels region, and 118 live in the police zone where Mo-
lenbeek is located.8 Of these 118 people, 15 are presumed dead. The 
remaining 103 files concern 25 people living in Syria, 13 who have prob-
ably returned, 8 who unsuccessfully tried to leave for Syria, 31 who are 
thought to be leaving, 17 jihad recruiters and/or supporters, 6 children 
that were brought to Syria by their parents, and 3 people whose inten-
tions are not precisely known. This analysis indicates that the follow up 
of the jihadist phenomenon is not that simple and that figures have only 
a relative value everywhere.
Motivations
Fraihi sees the following motivations for “small jihadists”: Salafist ideology, 
the image of Syria created in the social media, opportunism and peer pres-
sure. Furthermore, many of these people are already known by the Belgian 
services for their extremism and their affiliation to extremist groups.9
According to Van San, there is, for the most part, not one motivating 
force that leads an individual to become a jihadist. It may be faith, but a 
lack of authority in a family, financial problems, or other issues may come 
into play.10 Once at the absolute limit, they may further radicalise, and 
contact with their family may decrease over time.11
In my own sample, I distinguish between four subgenerations of 
what Kepel calls the third generation of jihadists, which also involves a 
variety of motivations. There is a 2012 Sharia4Belgium subgeneration, in 
which young criminals are not an exception. In Molenbeek they are not 
settled criminals but rather young ones involved mostly in drugs. They 
convert to an aggressive “small jihad” ideology. The 2013 subgeneration 
feels attracted by adventure; they have no doctrine. In the 2014 subgen-
eration we see more girls and young women in search of a better life and 
a lucky marriage in a caliphate. They often come from broken families. In 
the 2015 subgeneration we still see the attractiveness of the caliphate on 
young women, who are allured by young, radicalised Islamic men, and on 
young people, in general, who feel socially downcast.12 A possible heroic 
death becomes an alternative for a social death.13 
We can take into consideration many elements that have created a 
social fabric fostering radicalisation and jihadisation. Let us look closely at 
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the social fabric of lower Molenbeek. There was a significant demographic 
explosion in Molenbeek as a whole from 1995, when there were 68,000 
inhabitants, to 2015, which saw 96,000 documented residents and 4,000 
undocumented ones. The four districts in lower Molenbeek are charac-
terised by enormous density, fluctuating between 18,267 and 23,414 per 
square kilometre. 49% of the families live in apartments smaller than 55 
square metres. The population is very young, with 7% under the age of 
three. One third of the families with children are single-mother house-
holds. Only 25% of the young people between the ages of 18 and 24 years 
have a job, which offers evidence of a significant youth unemployment 
problem. The job market in Molenbeek provides work for only 3,055 in-
habitants, while 21,755 workers come from outside the area. 58% are 
working on their own, as shopkeepers or hairdressers despite having a 
Diploma of Higher Education. There is a high mortality rate due to pollu-
tion. Low incomes explain why half of the population does not pay taxes. 
The municipality is very poor. There is a street culture that includes drug 
dealing, tenant exploitation and illegal weapons trade. In such a context, 
one might feel socially downcast, marginalised and stigmatised.
Framing
Where there is marginalisation there is space for countercultures, which 
may become micro-settings for radicalisation.14 Conspiracy theories may 
become common food. Youth culture, mises en scène of violent practic-
es (a result of gaming culture) and elements of Salafism become inter-
mingled. Narratives, not ideologies, drive this Salafism.15 In other cases 
it concerns, rather, a late-adolescent identity crisis. One may radicalise, 
which is not necessarily a problem, but it may become problematic when 
a process of disaffiliation starts up, marking the beginning of a secluding 
jihadisation that leads the youngsters into a “new, isolated and alienating 
world”, the world of the caliphate.16
The Ikhwan, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafiyya 
Jihadiyya are the preachers of a caliphate under divine Shari‘a legis-
lation. Alienating myths may become the new framing macro-horizon 
in the jihadisation process. On June 19, 2014, Ad-Dawla as-Islamiya 
fi’l-Iraq wa’sh-Sham (Daesh), represented by sheikh Abu Muhammad 
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al-Adnani al-Shami, published a message in “al-Furqan”, referring to 
Qur‘an 3:110: “Khilafah is back!”. Khilafah is said to be a just society of 
total equality, represented by a descendent of the Prophet, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, whose full name denotes his personal profile: Ibrahim ibn 
’Awwad, ibn Ibrahim, ibn ’Ali, ibn Muhammad al-Badri al Husayni al 
Qurashi (his lineage), al-Samarra-i (his birth place), al-Baghdadi (where 
he studied Islam). Three months later, al-Baghdadi pronounced a fat-
wa, turning the territorial jihad into a global one. The ideologies of 
al-Baghdadi and of al-Suri began reinforcing intra-European civil war 
aspirations among young jihadists.
The apocalyptic dimension of the caliphate is also something very 
attractive to youngsters in search of heroism. Some Hadith narratives 
support the idea that the Mahdi is coming, appearing with the Dajjal 
(the false Messiah) and Issa (Jesus). There are signs of fitna, chaos and 
disorder, in Sham, Syria and Iraq. Even martyrdom is part of the myth 
of jihadism, according to sheikh Kishk.17 One could wonder how post-
modernism leads to an ideological climate in which individuals may find 
their own authoritative sources.18 It is a fundamental problem in Islam. 
According to a postmodern interpretation, one’s niyyah (intention) be-
comes common good: a Muslim’s good intention is enough to justify an 
action that might even be criminal. The internet and its virtual space of 
narratives, images, colours and sounds create a new “second order semi-
otic system”19 in the Y-generation.
The triggers in the process
How does a person enter from the micro-horizon into the macro-hori-
zon? What are the triggers? Conversion literature offers an interesting 
model. After an encounter with a significant other, one may disaffiliate 
from former networks to re-affiliate slowly or quickly in a new, smaller 
one.20 In my sample there is a case involving two cousins who embraced 
Salafism. In Salafism, an ideology where there is always a delegitimation 
of democratic structures since Salafists strongly believe that Shari‘a, and 
not a secular legislation, is the one that should rule the world, a distinc-
tion is made between the takfirist and non-takfirist interpretations of the 
al-wala wa-l-bara doctrine. Al-wala is what God loves, al-bara is what 
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God rejects. The takfirists give themselves the right, and even the duty, 
to fight against the kuffar since God asks them, in their view, to support 
Him in preparing a clean world that will hasten the Mahdi’s arrival on 
earth. In opposition to them, the apolitical, so-called orthodox al firqatou 
l-annajia Salafists, who strongly believe in a select, small group of true 
believers, do not adhere to the takfir doctrine and reject violence. Of 
the two cousins, after a stay in Morocco where he took Qur‘an lessons, 
the first one opted for the Salafiyya Jihadiyya and left for Syria, while the 
other cousin did not leave. In the words of the latter, his sheikh in Bel-
gium convinced him that the non-takfirist interpretation of the al-wala 
wa-l-bara doctrine is the only right one. 
A second trigger moment is when the jihadist sympathiser becomes 
convinced that it is even an act of love and of respect for her/his family 
(and for her/his mother) when s/he becomes disposed to cut the physical 
relations with them for a higher objective: caliphate and Shari‘a. Videos 
on the internet, conversations with peers in prayer houses and meetings 
with recruiters convince jihadist candidates that leaving their families 
may even become a benefit for them in later life, in Paradise. 
Very often, jihadists leave with humanitarian objectives in mind. Ob-
viously, the process of joining a sect does not end when they cross the 
Belgian border, and surely not once they arrive in Syria.
The history, motivations, framing and processes of Belgian jihadism: the Molenbeek case 133
NOTES
  1 See J. Leman, www.johanleman.be, manuscripts, 2015.
  2 Videos of Anwar al-Awlaki, Abu Muammad al-Maqdisi, Rachid Abou 
Houdeyfa, Abu Qatada al-Filistini and information may be found 
on-line at sites such as DeWareReligie.nl. See also: muslimmatters.
org/2012/02/17/yasir-qadhi-khutbah-o-bilaad-al-shaam-you-are-
in-our-hearts, the Islamic State’s magazine “Dabiq” and At Tibyan 
Publications. 
  3 Researchers include Elke Soors, Montasser ElDe’emeh, Pieter van 
Ostaeyen, and Younous Lamghari. Fieldworkers include Peter Calluy 
in Boom, Alexander van Leuven in Mechelen, and the Foyer team in 
Molenbeek.
  4 K. F. Allam, Il Jihadista della porta accanto. Isis, Occidente, Piemme, 
Milan 2014.
  5 G. Kepel, A. Jardin, Terreur dans l’Hexagone. Genèse du djihad 
français, Gallimard, Paris 2016.
  6 1,600 pages that can be found on the internet (January 2005).
  7 P. De Mas, Radicalization and Terrorism: The Need for an Integral and 
Transnational Approach, Lecture at the Faculty of Social Sciences, 
KU Leuven (PPT presentation), December 17, 2015.
  8 Brussels has six police zones. 
  9 T. Fraihi, Syriëstrijders uit België. Enkele feiten en cijfers, in P. Loo-
buyck (ed.), De lokroep van IS. Syriëstrijders en (de)radicalisering, 
Pelckmans, Kalmthout 2015, pp. 25-40. 
10 M. Van San, Tragiek van de heilige overtuiging. IS-strijders en hun 
familie, in P. Loobuyck (ed.), Works Cited, pp. 61-73. 
11 Ibid., p. 70.
12 O. Roy, La peur d’une communauté qui n’existe pas, in “Le Monde”, 
January 9, 2015.
13 F. Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements 
Worldwide, Paradigm, London and Boulder 2008.
14 A.-S. Hemmingsen, The Attractions of Jihadism. An Identity Ap-
proach to Three Danish Terrorism Cases and the Gallery of Charac-
Daesh and the terrorist threat: from the Middle East to Europe134
ters around Them, PhD thesis, University of Copenhagen, Depart-
ment of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, 2010.
15 O. Roy, Al-Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a 
Narrative, in M. Emerson (ed.), Ethno-Religious Conflict in Europe. 
Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities, Cen-
tre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 2009, p. 14.
16 S. Sayyid, Recalling the Caliphate: Decolonization and World Order, 
Hurst, London 2014.
17 K. F. Allam, Nuovi paradigmi dell’Islam militante. L’epopea accultura-
ta dei predicatori islamisti, in “Religioni e società”, 14/1992.
18 O. Roy, Bricoleurs de la culture en monde musulman, CERI, Paris 1987. 
19 R. Barthes, Mythologies, Seuil, Paris 1957.
20 H. Gooren, Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation: Tracing Patterns 
of Change in Faith Practices, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2010.
Keyboard jihadism or violent militancy: the phenomenon in Italy 135
KEYBOARD JIHADISM OR VIOLENT 
MILITANCY: THE PHENOMENON IN ITALY 
Lorenzo Vidino
The Italian jihad scene follows the dynamics of radicalisation and mobili-
sation already present in other countries, though on a much lesser scale. 
Even in Italy a new generation of Islamic extremists is taking shape. It 
consists of individuals not belonging to structured organisation, tends to 
operate outside mosques, and, in the majority of cases, carries out its 
activity on the internet, aiming above all to publish and distribute mate-
rial ranging from purely theological to operational in nature. Only rarely 
have authorities identified cases of aspiring jihadists who left the country 
to participate in a jihad or were planning a terrorist attack. The phenom-
enon, nonetheless, seems to be dangerously on the increase.
In 2015 Italian anti-terrorism authorities carried out two high-profile 
operations that reveal the actual presence and the varied nature of ji-
hadist cells on Italian territory. In one operation, organised by the pub-
lic prosecutor’s office in Cagliari, a network of Pakistani militants with 
close ties to al-Qaeda was dismantled. The militants had actively par-
ticipated in acts of terrorism in Pakistan and, according to investigators, 
had also planned a possible attack against the Vatican. The cell follows 
the typical model of jihadism in Italy: first-generation immigrants arrive 
in Italy already radicalised and belonging to a sophisticated structure 
that offers logistical support to a formation operating outside national 
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territory. Dynamics of this nature, above all regarding North African net-
works, have been noticeable in Italy since the beginning of the 1990s. 
In Brescia, in March 2015, the DIGOS (General Investigations and Spe-
cial Operations Division) carried out an equally important operation, 
which resulted in the arrest of two alleged recruiters of Albanian origin 
residing in the Torino area and two young North Africans. Known as the 
“Balkan Connection”, the case reveals the new face of jihadism in Italy. 
The two North Africans are, in fact, prototypes of the “home-grown 
radical”. Unlike “classic” jihadists, they are young individuals who were 
born or, at very least, raised in Italy and are often well integrated. At a 
certain point they adopt the jihadist beliefs. Both men were active on 
the web, and one of them, the naturalised Italian citizen Halili El Mah-
di, had become the first Italian translator of the Islamic State’s texts, 
among them “The Islamic State, a Reality that Would Like to Speak with 
You” (“Lo Stato islamico, una realtà che ti vorrebbe comunicare”) which 
he had made available on-line. The two Albanian citizens involved in 
the operation represent, rather, the new face of recruitment in Italy, 
which is not tied to mosques but based on the internet, where the two 
North Africans were “caught”.
This evolution of Italian jihadism follows dynamics already present 
for some years in the rest of Europe. Today Italy, too, no longer sees the 
jihadist threat as external, that is, caused by individuals who establish 
inactive cells on Italian soil. While this threat is not reduced, as demon-
strated by the Cagliari investigation, it is now evident that the problem of 
internal radicalisation exists. As the Italian secret service authorities had 
predicted in 2009, Italy has also witnessed the rise of “a new generation 
of Islamic extremists, not belonging to a structured organisation and for 
the most part not identified previously, who have undertaken a path to-
ward the jihadist beliefs, to the point of embracing militant activism”. The 
Report on Information Security Policy (“Relazione sulla politica dell’in-
formazione per la sicurezza”) continued by stating “In some cases, the 
assimilation of radical ideology has been fostered through the encounter 
with influential Islamists within Italy during a period of imprisonment for 
common felonies. More frequently, however, the formation of young mil-
itants is facilitated by the ideals of indoctrination and training obtained 
from the ‘web’. Within this perspective, what is especially significant is 
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the propagandistic work of Italian-speaking activists and, in some cases, 
of Italians converted to radical Islam who spread in the Italian language 
public statements made by the al-Qaeda leadership”.1
The Italian jihadist scene
The news media in recent months have reported stories of the few 
(“few” compared to the “many” seen in other European countries) Ital-
ians (be they citizens or youngsters raised in Italy and, as such, “socio-
logically” Italian even if not holding a passport) who have travelled to 
Syria to join the Islamic State and other groups within the jihadist galaxy. 
These individuals include Ibrahim Giuliano Delnevo, the Genoese con-
vert killed in Syria while fighting with an Islamist militia; Anas El Abbou-
bi, an ex-rapper from the province of Brescia who had tried to create the 
group Sharia4Italy before travelling to Syria; the Balkan labourers Ismar 
Mesinovic and Munifer Karamalesky who left from the valleys of Belluno 
and died in Syria; and Maria Giulia Sergio, the convert of Neapolitan and 
Lombard extraction. Add to this list several instances involving individ-
uals who were planning attacks in Italy (such as Mohamed Jarmoune, a 
twenty-year-old Moroccan national raised near Brescia and suspected of 
planning an attack against the Jewish community in Milan) and dozens 
of foreigners thrown out of Italian territory in recent months. Before 
travelling to Syria or engaging in significant criminal conduct, these in-
dividuals simply belonged to the informal world defined as the “local 
Italian jihadist scene”. This actual subculture is a small world that has 
formed spontaneously in recent years, one that individuals can join in 
a purely informal way. However, coming from this world are the few 
individuals who, at a certain point in their paths to radicalisation, decide 
to move from “keyboard jihadism” to violent militancy, doing so for rea-
sons that are varied yet often mysterious and unpredictable. It is impos-
sible to determine the definite number of individuals belonging to this 
scene. One can presume that they amount to several hundred. Similarly 
one can also estimate that a greater number of individuals sympathises 
with jihadist ideology, though with varying levels of intensity. For the 
most part, this group is small, comprised of extremely heterogeneous 
individuals (age, sex, ethnic origin, level of education, social status) who 
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share jihadist beliefs. Most of these subjects interact on the internet 
with others in Italy and abroad who share their beliefs (one might say 
that most of these people meet through social networks on the inter-
net). They live above all in Northern Italy, in big cities like Milan, Genoa 
and Bologna, as well as in small towns in the country, but some may be 
found in Central and Southern Italy.
It must be made clear that the majority of these individuals is not 
involved in any violent action, limiting its militant action to an often 
spasmodic activity on-line that has the goal of publishing and dissemi-
nating material ranging in nature from purely theological to operational. 
Although in specific cases activities such as these might constitute a vi-
olation of article 270 quinquies of the Italian Penal Code (“Training for 
activities for the purpose of terrorism, even if international in scope”), 
aspiring home-grown, Italian jihadists are prevalently just that: nothing 
other than “aspiring” individuals who do not carry out violent actions. 
Nonetheless, as the cases involving Jarmoune, El Abboubi and Delnevo 
demonstrate, at times this transition takes place, often in a manner and 
with a timeframe that Italian authorities have a hard time predicting. 
The new Italian jihadist scene has some important characteristics. 
First of all, its members tend to operate beyond the sphere of mosques, 
where their ideas do not find fertile ground. Rather, the community is 
active on the internet, though not exclusively so. It is important to state 
that the term “community” must not be interpreted as meaning a co-
hesive and well-structured group. On the contrary, more correct is the 
assertion that there are individuals residing in Italy who adopt varied 
forms of jihadist ideology and operate and interact with one another 
on-line to different degrees.
Despite these differences, all the subjects belonging to this scene 
are interested in the most conservative and militant fringes of Salafism. 
Some are more and others less interested in jihadism, and they are con-
nected on Facebook. Even if it is difficult for this author to reconstruct 
these trends, it seems that many of these individuals also know one an-
other in the real world. In some cases the connection in the real world 
begins after an encounter on-line while just the opposite happens in oth-
er cases involving individuals who form relationships after meeting at an 
event, in a mosque, or through mutual friends.  
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The cornerstone of this scene consists of about fifty individuals who 
are extremely active on-line (and, in some case, even in the real world) 
and in constant contact with numerous other internet users. Their soci-
ological profiles are heterogeneous, but many are Italian converts be-
tween the ages of 20 and 30, with a fair number of forty-year-olds among 
them. Others have foreign origins even though they were born and spent 
most of their lives in Italy. It should be noted that this group does not 
include a large number of individuals of North African origin, who are de-
mographically the largest Muslim group in Italy and traditionally the driv-
ing force behind Italian jihadism. Overrepresented are individuals with 
origins from Albania, Kosovo and, though to a lesser extent, Bosnia. For 
these subjects it seems as though their principal interest in life is militant 
Salafism, be it openly jihadist or less extremely so. They constantly up-
date their Facebook pages and also often manage one or two blogs and 
Twitter accounts. Unlike the majority of first-generation militants, who 
were only passive consumers of internet propaganda, the new genera-
tion of home-grown activists is also often active in the production of its 
own jihadist material. As witnessed in the cases of Jarmoune, El Abboubi, 
Delnevo and many others, these activists translate and post their own 
texts and make their own videos, which are very well produced in some 
cases. Around this strong core of activists there exists a larger group of in-
dividuals whose dedication – at least judging from the material included 
on their Facebook pages – seems less intense. In this larger category it is 
not unusual to chance upon subjects who occasionally hit “like” beneath 
a jihadist video or add a favourable comment to a post dealing with ji-
hadist subject matter, but their dedication to the cause seems to end 
there. Some among them seem to have a less “wholesome” profile when 
compared to the core members: they are Muslim (even though this is 
not always clear), but some, if not most, of their interests (discotheques, 
hip-hop, interaction with the opposite sex) are not among those typically 
associated with militant Islamism. 
This virtual Italian, pro-jihad scene is rather fluid and informal and 
operates much like other on-line communities. Its “members” become 
“friends”, “tag” one another in photographs, and post on their friends’ 
walls. They publicise various events and interesting news stories taking 
place in their area and organise real-world meetings and on-line discus-
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sion groups. They also interact with one another in ways that vary from 
offering mutual expressions of support and sharing personal life events 
to displaying strong disapproval and entering into outright scathing argu-
ments. One of the most common forms of interaction is the exchange of 
comments including links or videos on current events, whether they deal 
with Italian politics or the various global conflicts pertaining to Muslims. 
These expressions of approval for jihadist groups may be interpreted in 
different ways. From one standpoint, it seems wise to avoid alarmist re-
actions. Several studies have demonstrated that it is normal for people 
to say and do things on the internet that are much more extreme in na-
ture than their typical real-life behaviour. There are thousands of forums 
replete with threats of violence that involve extremist militants, be they 
right wing, leftist, anarchist, environmentalist, or of other ideologies. The 
same is true for global websites visited by ultras or even websites visit-
ed by fans of singers and actors. Nonetheless, the majority of subjects 
invoking such violence on-line will never commit any violent act in the 
real world. The vast majority of jihadist “cyber warriors” is exactly like 
other cyber-warriors: they are virtual extremists whose emphatic expres-
sions of opinion will never move from the keyboard to the street. Many 
individuals belonging to the Italian community of jihad sympathisers will 
likely leave it altogether at some point, considering it nothing more than 
a phase of their young life. Others will probably stand by their opinions 
without ever acting violently. 
At times some members of the home-grown, Italian jihadist com-
munity move to action, which might consist of planning attacks in Italy 
(such as Jarmoune) or travelling abroad to join a jihad. The drive to 
begin a path leading to violence is a personal trajectory determined by 
the complex interaction of psychological, ideological and circumstan-
tial factors that are specific to each single case. A similar combination 
also influences the choices made by an individual once the decision 
has been made to use violence. Will that person travel abroad to join a 
group of jihadists? If so, where? Or will that person stay in the country 
to execute attacks there? And in this case, what are the targets? Will 
the person work alone or with other individuals?
A set of diverse factors determines these dynamics. Some are psy-
chological, conditioned by personal preferences. However, a determin-
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ing factor often consists of the encounter with individuals who have the 
“right” connections and manage to put the aspiring jihadist in contact 
with organised groups.  
Often called “recruiters” but more aptly identified as “facilitators”, 
these individuals offer the right hook-up, connecting supply and demand 
in the jihadism market. The two Albanian citizens involved in operation 
“Balkan Connection” in Brescia fall into this category. Acting as “facilita-
tors”, they assist two young radicalised men who are interested in mobi-
lising and departing for Syria but lacking the means of interacting with IS 
or any other jihadist group toward the achievement of their goal.
Future dynamics
As stated previously, the Italian jihadist scene follows radicalisation and 
mobilisation dynamics present in other countries, though on a much 
lesser scale. The magnitude of mobilisation for the conflict in Syria 
clearly demonstrates this analysis. French authorities speak of more 
than one thousand citizens and residents having departed to join ji-
hadist groups in Syria. English and German authorities each recognise 
around 700, and officials from the small country of Belgium count 400. 
Italian authorities, however, estimate Italian foreign fighters in Syria to 
be only slightly more than 50. 
The phenomenon, nonetheless, appears to be growing and has 
alarming consequences, some of which are operational in nature. 
Home-grown nuclei or, even more so, lone actors are often difficult to 
identify considering that they do not work within a structure whose 
communication and activity may be more easily traced by authorities. 
The aforementioned article 270 quinquies of the Italian Penal Code of-
fers an excellent tool. It has been used on several occasions in order 
to apprehend home-grown Italian jihadists active on the internet well 
before they had put into action real plans aimed at bringing to fruition 
terrorist attacks. However, application of the article in courts of law 
has been problematic. The phenomenon places limits also on the fre-
quent use of expulsion, one of the methods preferred by the Italian 
anti-terrorism authorities. Some home-grown jihadists, despite being 
born in Italy, may not have Italian citizenship, therefore making them 
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liable to expulsion as a result of the strict Italian legislation on the sub-
ject. But others, beginning with converts, are fully entitled Italian citi-
zens and, therefore, not subject to such a penalty.
The second consequence of the arrival of the phenomenon in It-
aly is sociopolitical in nature and probably even more worrisome. In a 
replay of a situation already witnessed on several occasions in some 
other European countries, the mere possibility that a Muslim raised 
in Italy could carry out an attack in Italy is likely to have enormous re-
percussions within the nation-wide debate concerning issues such as 
immigration and the presence of Muslims in Italy, which is already ex-
tremely tense and highly politicised.
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NOTES
1 Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Relazione sulla politica dell’in-
formazione per la sicurezza, 2009, p. 19, available on-line at www.
sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/
relazione-2009.pdf.
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ISLAMIC RADICALISATION AND 
TERRORIST CELLS IN THE BALKANS: 
FACT OR MYTH? 
Marina Ragush 
In the wake of civil wars in the Balkan countries during the last decade of 
the twentieth century, Wahhabism and jihad have gained traction with-
in the Muslim populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, 
Montenegro and some parts of Serbia. Even though the majority of offi-
cial Western sources initially claimed that terrorist cells and Islamic radi-
calisation were a myth or propaganda between ethnically and religiously 
divided countries, the twenty-first century has proved them wrong. For-
eign “holy warriors” came predominantly from Arab countries to fight, 
offering “moral support” to Muslims in Bosnia and eventually creating a 
foothold for terrorist cells affiliated to Daesh, which pose a real and con-
stant danger for Europe. This essay offers insights into the organisation, 
origin and network of global jihad in the traditionally turbulent region 
of the Balkan Peninsula. Analysis is based on mainstream media news, 
official reports, and judgments and hearings of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
During the civil wars in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) between 1992 and 1995, the “holy warriors” of jihad appeared as 
“brothers in arms” on the Bosnian Muslim side. Bosnia is a country in 
which Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks govern themselves according to the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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also known as the Dayton Accord. The war saw horrible atrocities com-
mitted by all sides. Concerning the subject at hand, the most relevant 
feature of the war was the presence of the mujahideen, or members of 
the El-Mujahid Detachment that was under the jurisdiction of the Army 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). Arriving predominantly from Arab 
countries and well organised through Muslim charities and NGOs, they 
waged jihad against Christians, mobilised local Muslim populations and 
created a network for future “projects”. The Dayton Accord required that 
all foreign fighters leave Bosnia. Some of them returned to their homes 
while others failed to do so and eventually received BiH citizenship, 
sometimes under different names, which allowed them to continue their 
work or, as we will learn later, their mission.
These facts are known and agreed upon by a majority of analysts, 
scholars, practitioners and officials. However, disputes arise among them 
concerning the question of terrorist cells in the Balkans and whether or 
not they have gained a foothold in the area as a result of civil wars in the 
1990s. Before we address this issue, it is important to note that the mu-
jahideen became geopolitical instruments during the Afghan war, when 
the US decided to provoke Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A 1998 
interview published by “Le Nouvel Observateur” provides evidence in 
support of this assertion. When asked to comment on the United States’ 
involvement in Afghanistan, President Carter’s National Security Adviser, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, stated that, “According to the official version of his-
tory, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after 
the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, [in] December 1979. But the real-
ity, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise. Indeed, it was 
July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid 
to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, 
I wrote a note to the President in which I explained to him that in my 
opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention”. Asked 
by journalists if he had any regrets, Brzezinski responded, “Regret what? 
That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing 
the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day 
that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: 
‘We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War’. 
Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupporta-
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ble by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralisation 
and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire”. Even though the operation 
offered support to Islamic fundamentalists and advice to future terror-
ists, Mr. Brzezinski felt it was justified and concluded by asking, “What is 
most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of 
the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central 
Europe and the end of the Cold War?”.1
This secret alliance, as a legacy of the Cold War era, is well docu-
mented in several books, the most popular and best selling being Rob-
ert Dreyfuss’s “Devil’s Game” and Steve Coll’s “Ghost Wars”. Not long 
after the operation, terror phenomena, such as al-Qaeda, appeared. 
Now the strongest terrorist organisation is the self-proclaimed Islamic 
State. In this network of terrorist cells, the Balkans are now playing a 
significant role. 
Wahhabism, mujahideen, al-Qaeda and Daesh in the Balkans:
fact or myth?
Most analysts, scholars and practitioners of Wahhabism see the move-
ment as a relatively new sect, but it dates to the eighteenth century, fol-
lowing the teachings of Muhamad ibn Abdul Wahhab. The term Wahhabi 
that is used today comes from the Turkish language, but it derives origi-
nally from the Arabic term Wahhaiyyah and describes followers of early 
Muslims, or Salafism. After the Balkan civil wars, Bosnia became fertile 
ground for Islamic fundamentalism, which spilled over to other coun-
tries of the region: Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Ser-
bia, though mostly in the Raska and Sandzak regions. According to some 
sources, there are more than 3,000 Wahhabis practising in Bosnia, and 
they live in a typically Arab way and show a strong unwillingness “to inte-
grate into the infidel society”. In Raska, the Wahhabi movement started 
in 1993 with propaganda by Alia Mahmutovic that included verbal and 
physical harassment of believers and imams, both within and outside the 
mosques. Some sources indicate that the movement started with around 
200 men and their families, a number that has increased significantly. In 
Kosovo, where slightly more than fifteen men were practising, Wahha-
bism has not gained a strong foothold. In Macedonia, however, there is 
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rapid diffusion. The Wahhabi movement is mainly concentrated in the 
Skopje region and in rural parts of the nation. In 2001 and 2002 there 
were about 550 fundamentalists in the Republic of Macedonia.2
The links between members of the El-Mujahid Detachment, al-Qa-
eda and Osama Bin Laden in the years following the end of the civil wars 
have been confirmed despite a majority of analysis that once refuted 
this fact. In 2001, the International Crisis Group (ICG) completed a re-
port on “Bin Laden and the Balkans”, which concluded that local politi-
cians and media coverage had “joined anti Muslim harangue”3 follow-
ing the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. The introduction of the report 
coloured the atmosphere: “Although the world may have changed on 11 
September 2001, Balkan politicians and propagandists are still trying to 
make the new world fit the old. If, suddenly, the only stories the foreign 
media wish to hear concern threats from former, potential or imaginary 
Islamist terrorists, the Balkan markets of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia have been quick to oblige – for rea-
sons of their own”.4 The “wave of anti-Islamist propaganda”, as ICG put 
it, had the simple aim to impose pressure on the Muslim population 
in Kosovo, other parts of Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro. 
“Ironically,” as the ICG reported, “the two groups that most benefited 
from US and Western European engagement in the region during the 
1990s – Bosniaks and ethnic Albanians – have now been portrayed with-
in the region, and even beyond it, as potential supporters of bin Laden 
and al-Qaida. Poorly researched or sensationally written stories in West-
ern newspapers about terrorist hotbeds in the Balkans probably have 
no ulterior motive. […] There, the intention is to justify a tougher stance 
towards ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, 
and to increase international suspicion of – and pressure on – Bosniak 
and other Muslim leaders”.5
However, the sequence of events showed peculiar but real links 
that gave different perspectives on terrorist activities and their Balkan 
foothold dating to the years of the civil wars. Numerous analyses, ap-
pearing in sources ranging from the Centre for Peace in the Balkans and 
regional media to “The New York Times” and “The Washington Post”, 
showed that former El-Mujahid members, later holders of Bosnian pass-
ports, planned and organised several terrorist attacks in Europe and the 
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US. In December 1999, Algerian national Ahmet Ressemi was arrested 
at the US-Canadian border in a car filled with bomb-making materials. 
He was allegedly preparing to target the US infrastructure at the start of 
millennium and, according to the Centre for Peace in the Balkans, had 
fought as a member of the mujahideen in Bosnia. The following year, 
“The New York Times” reported that Jordanian sources had warned the 
CIA of at least three plots to attack US targets in Europe, each led by 
Bosnia-based Islamist terrorist cells.6
In 2005, “The Washington Post” reported that “Terrorist Cells Find 
[a] Foothold in [the] Balkans”; an October 19 raid in Sarajevo, the capi-
tal of Bosnia, confirmed the suspicion among several intelligence agents 
that Bosnia and other parts of the Balkans were becoming a launch pad 
for terrorist attacks in Europe. In particular, Islamic radicals were look-
ing to create cells of so-called white, non-Arab al-Qaeda members who 
could avoid racial profiling techniques used by police forces to watch for 
potential terrorists. “‘They want to look European to carry out operations 
in Europe’, said a Western intelligence agent in Belgrade, the capital of 
Serbia and Montenegro, adjacent to Bosnia. ‘It’s yet another evolution 
in the tools used by terrorists’”. During the raid a group that had links 
with cells in Denmark and Great Britain was stopped. In the same year 
Croatian and Italian police arrested five people who had allegedly plotted 
a bomb attack during the funeral of Pope John Paul II in Vatican City in 
April. The group originated from Gornja Maoca in north-eastern Bosnia 
and planned to smuggle rocket launchers, explosives and a detonator to 
Italy.7 The plot was stymied along with many others that, in the majority 
of cases, demonstrate a Balkan connection to Islamic radicalism. These 
cases signal that the Balkans may be seen as a platform for terrorists 
aiming to conduct attacks throughout Europe. Moreover, if we look at 
the chronology of jihadism in Western Europe from 1994 to 2007, we no-
tice the pattern of a long and well-prepared process. From 1994 to 1996, 
Europe was an arena for local jihad, as the Algerian Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) operated in France. From 1998 to 2004, Europe became an arena 
for global jihad under the auspices of al-Qaeda networks, cells and sup-
port. From 2003 to 2007, it was a target of a global jihad when al-Qaeda 
inspired Islamists from the European jihadist underworld who were mo-
tivated by some EU member states’ participation in the invasion of Iraq.8
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The following years proved that each intervention in the Middle 
East by a US-led coalition triggered a new form of jihadist organisa-
tion, networking, mobilisation, finance and infrastructure. The situa-
tion came to a boiling point when civil and sectarian war began in Syria 
in 2011, and now the self-proclaimed Islamic State has proven to be 
the most powerful terrorist organisation in world history with financial 
backing that could give it long life and also numerous followers and 
supporters. The seizing of oil fields in Iraq and Syria, the sale of oil on 
the black market and earnings worth around 50 million US dollars per 
month have made the so-called Islamic State even more dangerous 
than one could ever estimate.9 
According to one calculation, Bosnia has provided more volunteers 
per capita for the Syrian jihad than any other country in Europe, and vari-
ous reports suggest that there are probably more than 500 jihadists from 
south-eastern Europe now in Syria.10 Over time, thanks to corruption and 
ties between some government officials, intelligence agencies and organ-
ised crime networks, militant Islamists have created a very progressive in-
frastructure in parts of south-eastern Europe, such as in villages in isolat-
ed mountain areas and in mosques run by local clergy. Furthermore, the 
media offer a powerful vehicle for radical teaching, mobilisation and the 
indoctrination of youngsters in those poor Balkan countries with Muslim 
populations. Internet outlets, social media and well-equipped methods 
of electronic communication facilitate the transfer of operational plans, 
information and orders from fundamentalist fronts, such as Daesh and 
al-Qaeda, whose jihadist leaders were initially financed by NGOs, char-
ities and very generous Middle Eastern donors. This system has offered 
a real platform that could easily run any activity on European soil. The 
Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the 
Gulf’s largest donors to the Balkans, was funded by hundreds of millions 
in donations from members of the Saudi royal family. A Bosnian investi-
gative journalist disclosed that from 1992 to 2001 the Saudis alone spent 
500 million US dollars to reconstruct and also build mosques in Bosnia 
alone. A Kosovar investigative journalist discovered in 2012 that some 
of the country’s Islamic institutions received payments from Al-Waqf 
Al-Islami (AWAI), otherwise known as the Islamic Foundation. In 2011, as 
the Saudi government announced the end of the two-decades-long relief 
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programme in Bosnia, the Islamic Development Bank, Al Baraka Banking 
Group and other Saudi investors formed a joint investment company for 
the Balkan country worth about 50 million US dollars and focusing on 
infrastructure.11 In 2013, Macedonia and Qatar established a Joint Com-
mittee for Economic Cooperation. The same year marks the agreement 
of 200 million US dollars between Jugoimport SDPR, the Serbian arms 
manufacturer, and the United Arab Emirates. Etihad Airways and JAT, the 
Serbian national airline, signed a strategic investment partnership. In 
2014, the Speaker of Albanian Parliament met with Abdullah bin Zayed Al 
Nahyab, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in order 
to discuss economic cooperation, and the Albanian Parliament formed 
an Albania-UAE friendship group.12
The CIA has estimated that one third of Bosnian NGOs operating 
worldwide have terrorist connections or employ people with terrorist 
links. In the aftermath of 9/11, a raid on such a “charity” in Sarajevo, 
the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia, according to the Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network, netted “maps of Washington, materi-
al for making false State Department identity cards, and anti-American 
manuals designed for children”.13 The arrival of a new generation of Isla-
mist preachers from academically rigorous places such as Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan and Egypt, with millions of dollars for building madrassas and 
Islamic schools in the Balkans, marks the beginning of a new phase of 
Islamist fundamentalism. It will take time for the secularist and peace-
ful integration of followers of moderate Islam to take place because, 
first of all, after so many recent threats and terrorist attacks, the trust 
in multicultural and religious societies has eroded and become rife with 
tension. Rebuilding this trust will be a difficult mission in the midst of a 
rising tide of ultra-conservative factions in multicultural societies, which 
advocate strict anti-immigration policies. Secondly, a moderate form of 
Islam does not help fulfil the strategic goals of radical Islam and its fol-
lowers, which aim to steer all forms of Islam towards fundamentalism. 
In short, rebuilding societies that are culturally, ethnically and religious-
ly diverse represents the challenge of our time. Educational and social 
assistance programmes and initiatives must aim for inclusion, especially 
among younger and economically disadvantaged members of society, 
who are viewed as easily mobilised and manipulated by jihadist groups 
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operating through radical Islamist schools and charitable organisations 
established and supported by wealthy Gulf countries. With significant 
financing deriving also from the oil fields and criminal activity of the 
self-proclaimed Islamic State, the challenge posed to the European ideal 
of multiculturalism appears even greater. 
Having just tackled the phenomenon of “Sunni revolution”, it may 
now be easier to answer the question concerning the real or imagined 
presence of al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in the Bal-
kans. How is it, then, that discussion of the topic of the terrorist threat in 
the Balkans has not made progress? From one perspective, we have seen 
how some international organisations charged with monitoring the phe-
nomenon and predicting its development and risks, such as the ICG, con-
cluded that local politicians and the media had “joined anti-Muslim ha-
rangue”, which implies the use of propaganda. However, has there been 
a local or regional attempt to spin the truth concerning the presence of 
terrorist cells in the Balkans? Indeed there has. On the other hand, how-
ever, are we dealing with political propaganda used by the spread by the 
elite in the Balkan region? Certainly not. As stated previously, some of 
the mainstream media, think tanks and independent researchers were 
unbiased in their treatment of the civil wars in the Balkans, and their 
work has allowed us to gain a better understanding of not only the ori-
gins, development and aftermath of terrorist activity in the Balkans but 
also the threat of future acts of terrorism deriving from the area. Finally, 
after so many years, we have access to legal hearings and sentences that 
offer hard evidence, beyond any reasonable doubt, of the connection 
between al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State and the Balkans.
The ICTY has proven the link between al-Qaeda and the Balkans
In September 2007, a former mujahideen fighter appeared before the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the trial 
against General Rasim Delić, once Commander of the Main Staff of the 
ABiH, and offered testimony concerning the nature of the relationship 
between Arab fighters and the ABiH. Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, the Hague Tri-
bunal’s prosecution witness, stated that mujahideen units in Bosnia could 
not conduct their military operations in the country unless they were in 
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agreement with the ABiH. The witness claimed that although mujahideen 
units had their own commanders, a significant amount of coordination 
with the ABiH took place as well. “Us, foreign Mujahedeen, received or-
ders from our chiefs only, but this does not mean that we were not under 
the control of the ABiH”, said Ali Hamad, also known as Abu Ubejda. “We 
agreed on all actions. All our attacks were done in collaboration with the 
ABiH”, he added. He told the trial chamber how he had arrived in Bosnia 
as a member of al-Qaeda after having trained in Afghanistan. The muja-
hideen only took orders from their “al-Qaeda bosses”, the witness said. 
“We responded to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Army’s calls to take part 
in the actions, but we prepared for actions alone and we alone decided 
when the attack would start and end”, he went on to say. He claimed that 
the mujahideen stuck to this rule throughout the war.14
We have also learned from this testimony that the al-Qaeda lead-
ership and Middle Eastern sponsoring countries had a close connection 
with Bosnia’s political and military leadership. Al-Qaeda terrorists were 
first trained in camps and in a military academy founded by Osama Bin 
Laden and then deployed to battlefields in order to gain experience and 
create al-Qaeda cells.15 Rasim Delić was sentenced in 2008 to three years 
imprisonment for the crimes committed by the El-Mujahid Detachment 
of ABiH.16 The sentence was determined based on the cruel treatment of 
Serbian soldiers by mujahideen, which had included the first decapitation 
witnessed in the Balkan region. This evidence refutes all the aforemen-
tioned cases of “propaganda” concerning the notion that in the Balkan 
region there is no real foothold or threat of terrorist cells serving as a 
platform for terrorist attacks in Europe. 
This discussion also leads us to the current refugee and migrant cri-
sis. The Western Balkan route has traditionally been used for human traf-
ficking, and drugs and arms smuggling. Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda was also fi-
nanced by proceeds from, among other sources, heroine smuggling from 
Afghanistan to the Western drug market. In this context, the infrastruc-
ture of organised crime offers terrorists much needed channels, such as 
crime routes and access to weapons, thus enabling them to challenge 
public security as well as armed forces. Terrorism and organised crime 
are different types of criminal activities, and their actions are driven by 
different incentives. Nonetheless, they cannot be examined as isolated 
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and unrelated entities. Organised crime and terrorist networks operate 
on a global level and do not recognise nationalities and borders. These 
groups are only motivated by the rule of supply and demand, which in-
volves the strategies and tactics of effective marketing.17
Since October 2015 more than 200,000 refugees have used the 
Western Balkan route,18 and some among them, as has been speculat-
ed, belong to hidden terrorist cells. Speculation has given way to fact 
following the investigation of the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. A Syrian 
passport bearing the name of twenty-five-year-old Ahmed Almuhamed 
was found near the body of one of the suicide bombers. It was used by 
an asylum seeker who had registered on the Greek island of Leros on Oc-
tober 3, 2015. According to reports, he reached Leros after his makeshift 
boat from Turkey, carrying around 70 migrants, had foundered off the 
coast and the Greek Coast Guard had rescued him. He then reportedly 
applied for asylum in Serbia before travelling to Croatia, Austria and then, 
it is believed, France.19 No one could tell how many future terrorist cells 
have used the Western Balkan route to reach their desired destinations, 
but all threats might turn into horrific events.
Conclusion
Terrorists as geopolitical agents and terrorism as a geopolitical means 
have provided some secret alliances that compromise Western civilisa-
tion in the areas of finance, economy, security and stability. Today, our 
civilisation is facing the most powerful terrorist organisation in world his-
tory, known as Daesh or the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Terrorism with 
religious motivations has evolved over the last two decades with a pre-
cise plan to gain a worldwide state, the Islamic caliphate. This product of 
social, ethnic, religious and cultural engineering has almost proved to be 
a success also because the international community has been late in re-
sponding to prevent the group’s horrific agenda. This phenomenon could 
easily be described as the last Sunni revolution, brought to the surface 
by means of terror. Finally, some poor decisions have been made as a re-
sult of a belated response to the migrant and refugee crisis. Attempts to 
suspend the Schengen Agreement in order to protect borders from refu-
gees, asylum seekers, migrants and, among them, potentially hidden ter-
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rorists cells strike a heavy blow to the very foundation of the EU project. 
Some of Europe’s guiding principles are at risk, and the European project 
is experiencing a period of hardship. Therefore, the greatest and most 
difficult question today is the following: is the European Union strong 
enough to overcome these challenges and to quickly and efficiently de-
velop an adequate policy regarding the rising tide of Islamic radicalism 
and the brutality of its expression?
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EUROPE’S DELAYED RESPONSE
TO TERRORISM 
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde
The events that took place throughout 2015 in Paris, Copenhagen, 
Sousse and Bamako reflected a certain amount of difficulty on the 
part of EU institutions in grasping crises and responding rapidly. Al-
though the threat was known and identified, it still took several se-
ries of attacks to bring about awareness and lead to practical action. 
Structural and economic factors were the reasons behind this delay. 
Only after the November Paris attacks has there been a more ade-
quate European response.
A threat that was known, if not clearly defined
Repeated warnings
For several months, if not years, there had been no shortage of warn-
ings of the risk posed by foreign and European fighters, issued by the 
intelligence services, and regularly relayed by the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove. A number of ministers (especially in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and France) had also sounded the alarm. The 
list of measures to be taken was relatively well known and defined. But 
awareness was very slow in coming at the European level. Political at-
tention was focused elsewhere: the Eurozone crisis, European elections, 
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then the migrant, refugee and border crisis, and the political crisis. It took 
more than one attack to provoke a reaction. 
A warning, a wake-up call, a shock wave
The first warning came in 2014, with the attack on the Jewish Museum in 
Brussels. It did not cause any major reaction. This apathy can be explained 
by Europe’s inward-looking attitude at the time, the European elections, 
the setting up of new management within the various institutions, and 
critical management of the Eurozone, coupled with the death toll of four, 
which seemed relatively small. The attacks on Paris and Copenhagen at the 
beginning of 2015, therefore, came as a real shock and a wake-up call. Af-
ter the first somewhat disjointed reactions, several decisions were made, 
but they were really only a matter of intention. Once again, Europeans’ at-
tention had gone astray... The migrant and refugee crisis, mass drownings 
in the Mediterranean and forced border crossings urged Europe to direct 
its attention elsewhere. The Paris attack on the Bataclan and surrounding 
areas, in November 2015, seemed like another brutal wake-up call, a sense 
of obligation to act. Then the pace of measures escalated more rapidly.
Structural causes for the lack of rapid response
First element: the issue of terrorism is first and foremost
the prerogative of the state
This is an obvious element. Terrorism is not within the competence of the 
Union. At least that is the argument often used to justify a certain degree 
of European paralysis. In fact, this assumption is not entirely accurate. 
The EU Treaty, revisited in Lisbon, even makes provisions for a number of 
competences and instruments (see Box 1).
Box 1 – European competences regarding terrorism
The Lisbon Treaty provides for two main competences. Ar-
ticle 75 provides a competence for the freezing of funds, 
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financial assets, or economic gains held by terrorist groups 
or persons. And Article 83 allows the European Parliament 
and the Council, by means of directives, to establish “mini-
mum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a 
cross-border dimension”. Terrorism is cited first on the list 
of areas of threat. 
And the EU has two instruments clearly intended for the 
fight against terrorism. Firstly, the Europol agency, whose 
mission is “to support and strengthen action by the Member 
States’ police authorities and other law enforcement servic-
es […]” (Article 88). Secondly, peacekeeping field missions 
(CSDP), whose field of action has been extended to the fight 
against terrorism, “including by supporting third countries in 
combating terrorism in their territories” (Article 43.1). 
Not forgetting the solidarity clause (Article 222), which 
requires “The Union and its Member States” to act “jointly 
in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a 
terrorist attack […]”. The Union must then “mobilise all the 
instruments at its disposal, including the military resources 
made available by the Member States, to [notably] prevent 
the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States, 
protect democratic institutions and the civilian population 
from any terrorist attack […]”.
Second, more tangible element: the European economic crisis
The economic crisis inevitably led to introspection and a reduction in 
national resources. And, contrary to the predictions of some observ-
ers, reduced budgets do not lead to better cooperation. The logic of “I 
share my resources if I have less” translates rather into the opposite, 
“the less I have, the less I can or want to share my resources”. This has 
the effect of reducing resources (financial and human) allocated to the 
intelligence services.
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Third element, slightly taboo: the slowing down
of the EU community mechanism
To that was added a more institutional component. The policy of José 
Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, and to a less-
er extent that of Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, from 2009 to 2014, opted to slow down the 
community harmonisation mechanism. The key was given back to the 
member states. The European Commission’s power of initiative and 
its readiness to anticipate legislation slowed down. Now was the time 
for doing “less law-making”, and for conducting impact studies. Tak-
ing over as head of the Commission at the end of 2014, Jean-Claude 
Juncker saw things differently. But ten years of decline had caused the 
machine to get stiff.
Fourth element, often given less emphasis: lack of political unity
Enlargement of the EU also led inevitably to a certain dilution of the 
threat. For the dozen or so countries that joined the Union, terrorism is 
not really a threat. None of the new member states has really known the 
various European-style waves of terrorism, be they national (IRA, ETA, 
Corsican), or ideological (Baader-Meinhof Group, Action Directe, Cellules 
Communistes Combattantes, etc.), or “imported” (Palestinian, Armenian, 
Algerian, Iranian, etc.). Under Soviet control, the leaders of these states 
had even supported them, more or less. The idea of risk and of crisis 
management had gradually disappeared.
A Europe disarmed and not really united
In January 2015, when the first attacks on “Charlie Hebdo” in Paris oc-
curred, Europe was not only unarmed, it was not really united in its reac-
tion to the incident, as it had been during the wave of attacks in 2001-04. 
The reaction of the Latvian Prime Minister, who held the presidency of 
the European Union, was a prime example. In an exchange with journal-
ists, Laimdota Straujuma even mixed up the fight against terrorism and 
a new strategy on immigration (legal or illegal), and spoke of a “clash of 
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religions”, “which, luckily, we do not have in Latvia”. Implying that what 
had happened in France could be blamed on immigration… and France. 
Latvia was not affected. 
The economic causes of this delay
There are three major elements, both linked to the economic climate, 
that have delayed awareness. 
First element: lack of significant political impetus
There was no special meeting of heads of state and government after 
the shockwave of the Paris attacks.1 That was a first in the short his-
tory of the response to European terrorism. After the 2001 attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon, an exceptional 
summit of the heads of state was convened by the Belgian presidency 
of the EU, for September 21, ten days later. After the Madrid attacks, in 
March 2004, there was no need for an extraordinary meeting. A summit 
had already been scheduled for March 25, 2004, just two weeks later. 
Under the Irish presidency, the European Union adopted a comprehen-
sive declaration (18 pages) containing a plan of action. Various meas-
ures were taken.2 At the time of the London attacks on July 7, 2005, an 
extraordinary meeting of the Ministers of the Interior was sufficient. It 
was convened for July 13, 2005 in Brussels by the British presidency. 
That was barely a week later. All this would be put on hold a few years 
later. “Terrorism is no longer on the European Union’s radar”, acknowl-
edged a European expert on the subject.
In 2015, the response was much slower and less focused. The High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, decided 
to disrupt the agenda for the meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers, sched-
uled to take place ten days after the attacks, on January 19, but that was 
to be the only emergency response. Latvia, which held the presidency 
of the EU, chose to procrastinate. The subject was put on the agenda of 
the informal meeting of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs in Riga 
on January 29 and 30. On the other hand, Donald Tusk, former Polish 
Prime Minister and permanent President of the European Council, chose 
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to use the meeting already scheduled for February 12 to “discuss how 
to respond to the challenges”. That was one month later. The meeting 
resulted in a declaration that paved the way for a series of measures to 
be devised and approved. But it already seemed a little too late.
Second element: the migrant and border crisis
The migrant crisis began. It reached its peak in April 2015 and in summer 
it turned into a political crisis. The centre of gravity moved from the cen-
tral Mediterranean (Italy-Libya) towards the east (Greece-Turkey), from 
sea to land. Front line countries (Italy, Greece, and Malta) were no longer 
the only ones affected. In turn, the states of central (Hungary, Austria, 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Germany) and northern Europe (Denmark, Swe-
den, Finland) were affected and sought to protect their borders. They 
tried desperately to find solutions, by appealing to neighbouring coun-
tries (Turkey, Africa, etc.) to ensure the protection of their borders. The 
Schengen area was under threat.
Third element, being the consequence of the first two:
few practical measures to discuss
There was a lack of political impetus as the arrival of the migrant crisis 
had a long-term impact on the pace of implementing decisions. When 
the European Commission introduced a new Agenda on Security in April 
2015, largely devoted to terrorism, attention had already turned else-
where. Admittedly, it reiterated some of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coor-
dinator’s recommendations, with nine key measures: defining terrorism, 
strengthening Europol, setting up a European Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) file, defining risk indicators, countering radicalisation, penal coop-
eration, exchanging information, and combatting the trafficking of weap-
ons. However, all this would take many months to put into practice. 
In June, Europeans were divided, particularly on how to respond to 
migration and resettlement plans. The meeting of Home Affairs Ministers 
merely “took note” of the new Agenda on Security and planned to dis-
cuss the subject again… in October. When autumn came, ministers still 
had no proposals to discuss in concrete terms. Conclusions were adopted 
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on strengthening the fight against firearms trafficking. And a meeting was 
scheduled for December.
Late 2015, the European response is set in motion
In effect, it was the November 13 attacks that finally pushed Europe to 
take stock of the events and regard the fight against terrorism as a matter 
of the utmost urgency. Within a matter of weeks, nearly all the measures 
that had been proposed and prepared for many months were introduced. 
A demand for national solidarity
France decided to invoke the solidarity clause of Article 42.7 of the 
European Union Treaty, the European counterpart of Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. It was a small revolution on the political level. All 
the Defence Ministers, gathered together for their ordinary meeting on 
November 17, assured their French counterpart, Jean-Yves Le Drian, 
of their full support. However, no real European dialogue or European 
coordination has been set in motion. Paris does not want it. The Euro-
peans have not pressed the matter. The call for solidarity did not, how-
ever, produce the expected results with regard to European defence. 
France wanted minimal involvement from European institutions and 
preferred to manage the issue bilaterally. But it had the effect of cata-
lysing other domestic decisions. 
A political impetus
A special meeting of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs was also con-
vened only a week after the attacks, on November 20, by Luxembourg, 
which had taken over the presidency of the EU. It stressed the need to 
“speed up the implementation of the decisions” announced on Febru-
ary 12, 2015. According to the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de 
Kerchove, there was no question of creating a European CIA, as some 
European ministers and leaders had suggested. “The intelligence services 
are already cooperating intensely. It’s more a question of resources”, and 
legislative framework.
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The pace of proposals is accelerating
The European Commission has shifted up a gear. Some legislative texts 
are already ready. On November 18, it proposed a more stringent frame-
work for the possession of firearms, which seeks to strengthen control 
over “deactivated” firearms. On December 2, it proposed a European 
definition for foreign fighters and put forward an “action plan” to deal 
with illegal trafficking of weapons and explosives. Two days later, a po-
litical agreement was finally reached by the European legislator on the 
European register of air passenger data. The European PNR scheme ap-
peared. Ministers also confirmed the agreement reached with the Euro-
pean Parliament on strengthening the Europol agency. On December 15, 
the European Commission put forward a proposal to revise the Schengen 
Borders Code to introduce systematic checks at the borders. In 2016, the 
legislative pace will hopefully be resumed.
Conclusion: one more step to take at the policy coordination level
Though speed is never a good guide on civil liberty issues, it has one 
merit when it comes to European affairs: it helps take advantage of po-
litical opportunity to push forward decisions that would not have stood 
a chance of succeeding outside the crisis period. Paradoxically, it is at 
critical times that Europe is at its best and can move forward. In losing 
sight of this axiom, some European leaders wasted precious months in 
the fight against terrorism. Lessons must be learned, and maybe the Eu-
ropean structure should be provided not with a new institution, but with 
a “restricted security council” or European “Cobra” type mechanism, en-
abling the various officials concerned (President of the Commission, High 
Representative, President of the European Council, Commissioners for 
Justice and for Home Affairs, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, head of EU 
Intelligence Analysis Centre INTCEN) to be brought together in the event 
of an emergency.
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NOTES
1 A meeting of the European Council has two highly political objec-
tives. One of them is symbolic. It is a demonstration of European 
unity, a symbol of solidarity for European citizens and the rest of the 
world. The other is more practical: it drives and accelerates the pace 
of decision-making of other bodies at both national and European 
level (Commission, Council of Ministers, Parliament).
2 Legislation was put in place: a common definition of a terrorist act, 
initial measures to combat terrorist funding, implementation of 
de-radicalisation actions. A “situation centre” (SITCEN) was set up 
within the Council, to allow for the informal exchange and analysis 
of information.
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CONCLUSION
Massimo D’Alema
The phenomenon of Islamic terrorism is not new. Ample evidence to that 
effect has been provided by several of the prominent authors contribut-
ing to this book. From the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which launched 
deadly assaults in France in the 1990s, to the much more notorious 
al-Qaeda, whose 2001 attacks on US territory have led terrorism at large 
and the Islamic strand in particular to a never-before-seen level of vio-
lence, the phenomenon has constantly accelerated its pace. In our time it 
is supported by the increasing speed of communication, the widespread 
diffusion of the internet and new technologies, the unstoppable move-
ment of people across continents, the growing accessibility to weapons 
and, more in general, as keenly noted by Elena Giunchi in her essay, the 
process of globalisation.
However, to a certain extent, we can also sustain that what we are 
witnessing today is something completely new because Islamic terrorist 
movements nowadays strive for an unprecedented political and military 
goal: the constitution and unremitting expansion of a “truly” Islamic 
state. As a state, Daesh is exerting the monopoly of control over a de-
fined territory and using coercion on its inhabitants, while also providing 
services to its citizens. It also shows an unrelenting willingness to vio-
lently oppose Western oppression and the alleged Zionist plot against 
Islam; to overthrow impious Muslim governments that try to imitate 
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Western political systems; to lure and offer shelter and raison d’être 
to Muslim individuals and converts from all over the world, people in 
search of a religious and political cause, of an identity and, surprisingly, 
in some cases, of simple and pure adventure – as underlined by both 
Jean-François Daguzan and Johan Leman, who, together with Lorenzo 
Vidino, have investigated the spread and grip of terrorist cells in France, 
Belgium and Italy respectively. 
In the Islamic State envisaged by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his fol-
lowers (whose birth, growth and main features are delineated in Andrea 
Plebani’s contribution), the old borders defined by the Western powers 
in the twentieth century are to be cancelled. There is no room for coexist-
ence with the infidel, or for any form of participatory democracy (which 
is inconsistent with the concept that laws are exclusively God-given); only 
a rigorous interpretation of Shari‘a shall regulate every aspect of both 
public and private life, indissolubly merging the political dimension and 
the religious one. 
Such a prospect – that is, the existence of a state in which the ca-
liphate, idealised and craved for by Muslims for centuries, is eventually 
realised – is proving more and more attractive to a growing number of 
people, particularly young men and women, often enticed by the Islamic 
State’s exceptional propaganda skills. 
The threat posed by Daesh today, which clearly emerges from the 
essays published in this volume, is, therefore, threefold. It is military, as it 
unfolds in a ferocious war fought in Syria and Iraq. It is terrorist, as it re-
veals itself in the deadly attacks against Western targets or “sacrilegious” 
objectives not only in Europe but also in an ever-expanding territory that 
stretches along the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and from Afri-
ca to Indonesia. And it is societal and political, as it has an impact on our 
societies and our democratic systems. In other words, it affects European 
states’ capability, on the one hand, of integrating and offering responses 
to the rightful quest for identity of second-, third- and even fourth-gen-
eration immigrants, who risk otherwise falling under the spell of Daesh, 
as the growing phenomenon of foreign fighters (efficaciously illustrated 
in this book by the essays of Sandro Menichelli and Claudio Neri) proves; 
and, on the other hand, of responding to the terrorist threat without 
losing sight of the fundamental and undisputable values and principles 
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on which the European project has been built. The latter is not an odd as-
sumption, considering how, in the course of 2015, some EU governments 
have been reacting to the enormous flow of immigrants – most fleeing 
the Syrian civil war – that is continuously crossing the European frontiers, 
and have been calling into question one of the most significant successes 
of the European project, the Schengen system. 
The social and cultural background of those European citizens or im-
migrants that decide to abandon their families and lives, join the Islamic 
State’s forces and either fight in one of the Middle Eastern battlefronts or 
import terror in Europe; the motives that drive such extreme decisions; 
and the details of this process of radicalisation are all topics featured in 
most of the essays that compose this book. What emerges is, on the one 
hand, that social inequalities by themselves are not enough to explain 
the diffusion of the phenomenon, and, on the other hand, that it is not 
possible to draw a unique profile of the European foreign fighter. Another 
compelling element is that, unlike the mujahideen who went to fight in 
Afghanistan or Chechnya in the last decades of the twentieth century, to-
day’s foreign fighters lack a deep knowledge and understanding of their 
own religion. As philosopher Tariq Ramadan observed, today’s young 
radicalised Muslims tend to lean towards an archaic and decontextual-
ised reading of the Qur‘an, where they look for answers to the inexorable 
process of globalisation and to the “Westernisation” of Arab societies, 
two developments they are not equipped to deal with. The origin of this 
phenomenon of radicalisation is therefore to be found, above all, in a 
cultural and social identity crisis. 
Thus, in order to contain its diffusion, it will be necessary to re-think 
the different patterns of integration that have so far been adopted in 
European Union member states and to actively involve the many Muslim 
communities that live in our countries. The goal should be, in my view, 
the promotion of the growth of a European Islam. The antidote to an 
archaic understanding of Islam should be the development of a modern 
form of Islam, encouraged by a new generation of European Muslim in-
tellectuals and theologians. 
The peculiar nature of the Daesh’s menace, in its international and 
European dimensions, has now been recognised, even if, I am afraid, lat-
er than it should have been. But in our search for a response, we shall 
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also be aware of the role played by the Western countries in the rise 
of the Islamic State. As Andrea Manciulli – and other authors, such as 
Marina Ragush – highlights in his introduction, the United States and 
European countries are far from being free of guilt to the extent that 
the birth and evolution of Islamic terrorist organisations are concerned. 
Without going too far back in time (as in 1970s and 1980s Afghanistan, 
whose experience is clearly illustrated in Giunchi’s contribution on the 
birth and evolution of al-Qaeda), the case of post-Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
offers a valuable example of the incompetence, negligence and lack of 
foresight with which the United States and its allies managed the state- 
and institution-building processes and the dismantling of armed forces 
in the Middle Eastern country, feeding the long-standing mutual mistrust 
between Sunnis and Shiites and the process of marginalisation of the for-
mer within Iraqi institutional and political settings. This marginalisation, 
on the one hand, explains the significant role that Iraqi Sunnis play with-
in Daesh militias today, and, on the other, reflects the broader on-going 
conflict between Shiites and Sunnis in the Muslim world.
Likewise, in the early stages of the Arab Spring, Western countries 
betrayed a deep lack of understanding of the events that were unfolding 
in the Arab world and of the weight that fundamentalist organisations 
held within revolutionary movements, with the result that the West has 
too often ensured support to forces that it should have rather restrained. 
However, whatever the faults of the West may have unquestionably 
been, today we are facing a threat that is destined to last for a very long 
time, that is going to challenge not only our security but also our very 
way of life, principles and beliefs, and that requires on our part a broad 
and widely shared strategy. 
I am firmly convinced that it would be a renewed mistake to build 
a coalition of Western forces to fight against the Islamic State. Such a 
move would deepen the already wide gap between Western and Arab 
civilisations and would not take into due account a fundamental feature 
of the current menace. Arabs and Muslims are the principal victims of the 
Islamic State and of the wave of terrorism that is shaking the world with 
increasing frequency and intensity. From the young women harassed, 
kidnapped and killed by Boko Haram in Nigeria to the unknown number 
of casualties of the Syrian civil war (which ranges, according to sources, 
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from 150,000 to 350,000), Daesh is targeting above all other Muslims, be 
they Shiites or supposed apostates. I do not intend to underestimate the 
scope of the threat to European cities and citizens, but I am afraid that 
numbers cannot be mistaken. 
In order to neutralise Daesh’s threat, it is first of all necessary to 
drive it out from the very territories in which it is taking root, whether it 
be Syria, Iraq or, more recently, Libya, which, in the wake of a change of 
strategy on the part of the Islamic State, is increasingly becoming a new 
jihadist battlefront. But this can hardly be done by a Western army. The 
Syrians, the Iraqis, the Libyans are to be given the instruments and the 
support to fight against this common enemy. 
In Libya, the constitution of a joint government, after years of ne-
gotiations between the Tripoli and the Tobruk ones, is the precondition 
for the search for stability and the eradication of the Islamic State’s 
forces. Yet, as Kader Abderrahim’s enlightening contribution points out, 
deep-rooted ethnic, tribal, economic and political interests and rivalries 
among the several components of Libya’s society are difficult to over-
come and indeed offer fertile ground for Daesh’s actions.
In Syria, the rough and difficult path undertaken by the participants 
of the Vienna talks aims at reaching a cease-fire between Bashar al-As-
sad’s forces and the non-fundamentalist elements within the Syrian op-
position, at consequently isolating the Islamic State and establishing a 
transitional government, which should not, in my opinion, include Pres-
ident Assad. Without a doubt, it is an extremely complex strategy. Yet, it 
is a necessary first step towards the removal of the deep-seated reasons 
for distrust and hostility between Shiites and Sunnis, which, it has to be 
emphasised, the West has fed for decades.
Against this backdrop, the Islamic Republic of Iran can, in my opinion, 
play a significant role. To this aim, the establishment of a dialogue be-
tween two long-standing enemies, Teheran and Riyadh, would be complex 
yet extremely worthwhile. It would help mitigate differences between Shi-
ites and Sunnis and isolate the most dangerous forms of fundamentalism. 
In his introduction, Andrea Manciulli discerns a blueprint for the 
subverting of the present international order and the creation of a new 
one drawn from Osama Bin Laden’s strategy, as outlined in the al-Qa-
eda leader’s fatwas and other documents. This plan seems to be in-
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exorably unfolding in events in the Middle Eastern countries, and the 
Islamic State seems to be implementing it. Whether it is part of a larger 
strategy or not, Daesh’s challenge and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism 
pose today a major threat to both the Western world and the Muslim 
one. This threat must be faced and fought on multiple levels and will 
require on our part, on the one hand, a deeper comprehension of the 
phenomenon and, on the other hand, the support and promotion of 
moderate Islam, both in Europe and in the Middle East, as the only 
instrument capable of isolating extremism. We shall not succumb to 
xenophobia and Islamophobia because they stem from the same roots 
of fundamentalism and share the idea that Islam, no matter what kind 
of Islam, carries the seed of jihad. This is, in my opinion, an assumption 
that we must strongly reject.
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Islamic terrorist attacks showed a dramatic escala-
tion in 2015. Targeting increasingly European coun-
tries and objectives, they represent a phenome-
non that we must confront and better understand. 
This collection of essays aims to provide insight 
into the origins, evolution, principal characteristics, 
and unique means of recruitment and financing of 
Islamic terrorist organisations. Moreover, it exam-
ines the diffusion of Islamic radicalisation among 
young Europeans and of the foreign fighters, who, 
in growing numbers, leave their home countries to 
join Daesh. Cooperation among EU member states 
in the fight against this threat has strengthened 
following the Paris attacks. Nonetheless, the EU’s 
response has been late and feeble thus far. Much 
remains to be done in order to put in place meas-
ures capable of facing the direct menace and re-
ducing the risk of radicalisation.
